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“All who claim to foretell or forecast the future are inevitably liars, 
for the future is not written anywhere – it is still to be constructed. 
This is fortunate, for without this uncertainty, human activity would 
loose its degree of freedom and its meaning – the hope of a desired 
future. If the future were totally foreseeable and certain, the present 
would become unliveable. Certainty is death.” 
 
(Godet, 1990, p.731) 
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Summary 
 
Summary 
 
In the following, a short summary of the thesis is given with a basis in the following 
chronological points: 
 
• Background and main goal of the thesis. 
• Theoretical foundations – Innovation. 
• Theoretical foundations – Scenarios. 
• Practical implications. 
• Conclusion, results and further work. 
 
 
Background and main goal of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 gives a short introduction to the thesis and address the background and main 
goal of the thesis. 
 
My experience from working in shipping over the last five years indicates that shipping 
companies are mainly concerned with day to day operations and that little effort is put 
into pursuing innovation in a systematic manner. It is my conviction that using 
scenarios may improve innovation and thereby strengthen the competitive force in 
shipping. 
 
The importance of using scenarios in shipping is further underlined by the increasingly 
changing conditions in the business environment. General globalisation, emergence of 
new integrative information technology systems, stricter environmental regulations, 
alliances and mergers, individualisation of end customer and new types of service 
providers (e.g. 4PLs) are only some of the driving forces that companies are faced with 
when planning for the future. 
 
With a basis in the background of the thesis outlined above, the main goal of the thesis 
is to show how innovation in shipping may be guided by using scenarios. In order to 
realise the goal, I develop and test guidelines for using scenarios to improve innovation. 
By following the guidelines, a company may explore, evaluate and implement 
innovations. 
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Theoretical foundations – Innovation 
 
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical basis for understanding innovation.  
 
Innovation is defined as the development or adoption of new services resulting in 
competitive advantages. New services are considered to be for instance real time 
tracking of cargo and processing of raw materials during transport from shipper to 
receiver. Usually, what has been mentioned as new services has to be based on the 
development/adoption of new products and/or by co-operating with other actors in the 
transport chains.  
 
Products are broadly defined as physical objects (e.g. main engine) or technologies (e.g. 
technologies for combustion processes, or technologies for communication processes) 
or methods (e.g. new methods for ship maintenance and training of crew). Co-operative 
forms are classified according to whether the co-operation is horizontal (e.g. carrier-
carrier) or vertical (e.g. carrier-trucker). Further, three forms of co-operation are 
identified as market, alliance and integration with corresponding governance 
mechanisms termed as price, trust and authority. The price mechanism is commonly 
used in commodity shipping. Authority may be associated with a tight co-operation 
(possibly through ownership) between a shipper and a carrier. Trust may be used to 
govern a co-operation between companies during an innovation process. 
 
By discussing several models of innovation, it is concluded that the innovation process 
is presently viewed as a complex and dynamic interplay between different actors in a 
business network. Stable relations between actors are viewed as a precondition for 
initiating and accomplishing an innovation process.  
 
In the adoption of new products, five aspects of an innovation are important for a 
decision to adopt: 
 
1. Relative advantages (e.g. increased efficiency and flexibility). 
2. Compatibility (e.g. technological and cultural compatibility with existing systems 
and organisation). 
3. Complexity (e.g. number of interconnections in a system). 
4. Trialability (e.g. possibility of small scale tests). 
5. Observability (e.g. number of users at a given time). 
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Theoretical foundations – Scenarios 
 
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis in order to understand scenarios and presents the 
scenario-based guidelines for innovation. 
 
The history of scenarios is reviewed showing how scenarios have been used in the past 
and how scenarios are used today. Scenarios have evolved from being used as military 
tools, to develop government policies, and finally to support business strategies. Today, 
there is a trend towards qualitative descriptions of the future (i.e. scenarios), possibly as 
a result of the fact that qualitative descriptions of the future are quicker to develop and 
are usually perceived as more realistic images of the future. 
 
Benefits of scenarios are discussed in order to show how scenarios may guide 
innovation. Scenarios treat uncertainty regarding how the future might develop by 
analysing how key drivers of change may lead to a future structurally different from the 
situation today. Scenarios may contribute in exploring directions for innovation by 
expanding our experience-based mental models. Further, scenarios may contribute in 
evaluating identified directions for innovation by testing them against a range of 
plausible futures (referred to as a “map of the future”). Finally, scenarios point to key 
indicators to be monitored. By monitoring these indicators, a company may track the 
migration of business towards a specific scenario or combination of scenarios. In this 
way, the scenarios may guide the implementation of innovations. 
 
A representative technique for developing scenarios is presented and complemented by 
discussing additional contributions from the scenario field of research. The technique is 
based on a six step process as illustrated in Figure 3-2.  
 
The scenario-based guidelines for innovation indicate five major steps as illustrated in 
Figure 3-4. The guidelines are not described in detail at a prescriptive level. The reason 
for this is that the individual companies should be able to tailor the guidelines according 
to their needs. 
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Practical implications 
 
Chapter 4 reports from how the scenario-based guidelines have been applied in practice 
by three different companies: MARINTEK, Statoil Driftstjenester and Wallenius 
Wilhelmsen Lines.  
 
The methodology used and underlying the empirical work is described and discussed in 
section 4.1. Basically, each of the three case descriptions given in section 4.2 – 4.4 are 
read, commented upon and approved by a leading company representative in order to 
assure correctness of the findings reported in the thesis. Further, minutes of meeting 
(read and commented upon by all scenario team members), final company approved 
reports/presentations, interviews with participants and notes taken during the execution 
of the process contribute to assure the validity of the findings. 
 
The three cases are described according to the following structure: 
 
1. Introduction: 
• Company profile. 
• Conditions leading to interest in scenarios. 
• Goals of scenario process and time horizon for scenarios. 
• Time for accomplishing the scenario process. 
• Organisational slack available for the scenario process. 
• Scenario team. 
2. Development of scenarios (step 1 in the scenario-based guidelines for innovation, 
refer Figure 3-4): 
• The practical execution and results of each step are described. 
3. Exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations (step 2-5 in the scenario-
based guidelines for innovation, refer Figure 3-4): 
• The practical execution and results of each step are described. 
4. Evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation: 
• Advantages and disadvantages based on feedback during the execution of the 
process and interviews with participants shortly after the termination of the 
process. 
 
General problems related to implementation of innovations triggered by scenario 
discussions are identified as: the possibility of a game-like atmosphere, the timing of the 
implementation and the need for concretising certain types of services (e.g. how many 
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vessels should be chartered?). These problems are discussed in section 4.5 with a basis 
in the three case studies. 
 
Conclusion, results and further work 
 
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by assessing how the goals of the thesis are met and by 
assessing the applicability of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation.  
 
Both the theoretical and practical results of the thesis confirm that scenarios may be 
used to guide innovation in shipping. More specifically, the three cases confirm that 
scenarios may be used to guide exploration, evaluation and implementation of 
innovations in shipping. 
 
However, more time is needed in order to asses how monitoring of key indicators may 
guide the implementation of innovations. The effects of monitoring has not been 
documented well enough for any of the three cases as these effects only will be 
measurable over a longer term. 
 
Finally, further work is needed to identify ways of combining scenario techniques with 
quantitative techniques in order to reveal quantifiable consequences of scenarios when 
needed. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1 the reader is introduced to the background and importance of the thesis. 
Goals of the thesis, major definitions and limitations are given in order to serve as a 
framework for the rest of the chapters. Further, I put forward a set of conditions and 
requirements which have to be met in order to develop and use scenarios for innovation. 
These conditions and requirements will be addressed throughout the thesis. Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is explained and illustrated in order to prepare the reader for the 
following chapters. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The thesis has its origin in the strategic activities of the Short Sea Shipping Program, 
launched by The Research Council of Norway. The Short Sea Shipping Program 
outlines three strategic activities: 
 
1. Analytical methodologies for design and operation of integrated logistical systems. 
2. Technology development, external conditions and strategic choices: 
• Market behaviour and competition. 
• Innovation in short sea shipping. 
• Future scenarios for the markets of transportation in Europe. 
3. Development in transportation and changes in the economic geography of Europe. 
 
My work is triggered by the second point of the second activity: Innovation in short sea 
shipping. Although, the thesis will address shipping in general, I feel it is appropriate to 
underline the importance of innovation in short sea shipping. 
 
1.1.1 Innovation in short sea shipping 
 
Short sea shipping has always played a vital role in Norway due to the long coastline 
and the demographic distribution. 
 
Norway is a long country, cut through by numerous fjords and gulfs. The coastline is 
2.650 kilometres, but including fjords and gulfs the coastline reaches incredible 21.465 
kilometres (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1998a). The major Norwegian cities, such as Oslo, 
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Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, Tromsø and Kristiansand are all located along the 
coastline. 
 
In addition to the favourable geographic and demographic conditions for short sea 
shipping, Norway is experiencing an increasing amount of goods being transported.  
 
In the time period 1970 – 1990, the Norwegian domestic transport increased 27% from 
14.895 million ton-kilometres to 18.941 million ton-kilometres, and in the period 1990-
1997 the domestic transport increased another 12%, from 18.941 million ton-kilometres 
to 21.300 million ton-kilometres (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1998b). 
 
For the last three decades, however, short sea shipping has lost market shares and 
experienced increased competition from other transport modes, and in particular from 
the road transport, as illustrated in Figure 1-1. 
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Figure 1-1 Norwegian domestic goods transport by mode of transport - Relative 
share (Statistisk Sentralbyrå 1998b) 
During the last thirty years, short sea shipping has lost considerable market shares to road 
transport in the transport of Norwegian domestic goods. 
 
 
In European short sea shipping, the tendency is the same. Between 1990 and 1997, short 
sea shipping grew by 23% in ton-kilometres, while the road transport experienced a 
26% growth in ton-kilometres (European Commission 1999). 
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What are the reasons behind this development in the transport patterns? Why does road 
transport continue to gain market shares at the cost of sea transport? Obviously, the road 
network has improved over the last thirty years. However, this is only a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition for the success experienced by road transport. More important 
are the requirements and needs of the customers (e.g. shippers), related to transport 
time, frequency, flexibility and cost. 
 
It is difficult for short sea shipping to avoid a longer transport time in comparison to 
road transport, partly because of the additional loading and unloading in ports, but also 
because of a generally low frequency of sailing adding to the total transport time. 
Further, the flexibility offered by road transport is very hard to match. The reason for 
this is that a trailer has a considerably lower cargo capacity than a ship, and may 
therefore transport smaller shipments, at shorter notice, and door to door without 
additional loading/unloading. A ship requires considerable cargo in order to obtain a 
sufficient utilisation of her capacity. In addition, the sender and receiver of the cargo are 
usually not located in the loading and unloading ports, meaning that a door to door 
transport, without additional loading/unloading, is not possible.  
 
Due to weak performance in transport time, low frequency of service and poor 
flexibility, short sea shipping has to offer relatively low freight rates in order to attract 
cargo. However, as companies’ attention is shifting to speed and time-based 
competition in the 1990s (Carter et al. 1995), logistical systems are subject to massive 
interest and cost is no longer the only important criterion for selecting transporting 
solutions. 
 
Through innovation, a short sea carrier may gain competitive advantages related to cost 
reductions and value added services (Figure 1-2). 
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Figure 1-2 Innovation leads to competitive advantages 
Through innovations a short sea carrier may gain competitive advantages related to cost reductions 
and value added service. The figure is inspired by the “three C’s” (Company, Customer, 
Competitor) (Ohmae 1983) and Porter’s (1980) generic strategies (cost leadership and 
differentiation) for creating a defendable position in an industry over the long run. 
 
 
The Research Council of Norway (NFR) underlines the importance of innovation in 
shipping and particularly for short sea shipping competing with road and rail (Norges 
Forskningsråd – Industri og energi, 1996). Both technological and organisational 
challenges are pointed out by NFR. The European Commission (1999) argues that short 
sea shipping needs to attract volumes through better logistics organisation, service level 
frequency, regularity, networking and one-stop shops (i.e. single point of contact) for 
the management and pricing of the whole transport chain from door-to-door as in road 
transport. 
 
Although innovation may lead to competitive advantages (Figure 1-2), these advantages 
will not last forever. At regular intervals, companies will have to undertake innovation 
in order to maintain competitiveness. Today, some authors actually claim that the ability 
to innovate is the only competitive advantage a company may possess in the long run. 
 
Furthermore, the development, adoption and implementation of innovations have to be 
triggered by considerations related to the future. The reason for this is that it will 
usually take considerable time from the decision to develop or adopt an innovation, 
until the innovation is implemented and in operation. 
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However, the future is characterised by uncertainty. Uncertainties may be related to 
customer needs, competitor actions, political regulations and development of new 
technologies. The treatment of uncertainties related to the future in an innovation 
process poses a challenge with respect to the goals of this thesis. No innovation 
literature surveyed during my work addresses such uncertainties in a structured way, 
and to an acceptable level. In chapter 3, however, I show how scenarios may be used to 
take uncertainties into account in an innovation process. 
 
1.2 Goals 
 
My experience from working in shipping over the last five years indicates that shipping 
companies are mainly concerned with day to day operations and that little effort is put 
into pursuing innovation in a systematic manner. It is my conviction that using 
scenarios may improve innovation and thereby strengthen the competitive force in 
shipping. 
 
The importance of using scenarios in shipping is further underlined by the increasingly 
changing conditions in the business environment. General globalisation, emergence of 
new integrative information technology systems, stricter environmental regulations, 
alliances and mergers, individualisation of end customer and new types of service 
providers (e.g. 4PLs) are only some of the driving forces that companies are faced with 
when planning for the future. 
 
Realising the above, it is easy to understand the need for a structured way of treating 
uncertainty. Further, the treatment of uncertainty should guide innovation, in order for a 
company to adapt to changing conditions and prosper in new competitive arenas. 
 
With a basis in the above and the discussion in section 1.1, my main goal is to: 
 
Show how innovation in shipping may be guided by using scenarios. 
 
I will develop and test guidelines for using scenarios to undertake innovation. By 
following these guidelines, a company may explore, evaluate and implement 
innovations. 
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In this way, the innovation I write about is a kind of forced innovation, where forced 
innovation is defined as a set of structured activities undertaken in order to develop or 
adopt innovations in order to gain competitive advantages. 
 
1.3 Definitions and limitations 
 
In this section, major definitions and limitations are given. 
 
1.3.1 Definitions 
 
Throughout the thesis, important words and expressions are defined the first time they 
are used. In this section, however, my major definitions are given in order to serve as a 
framework for the thesis. 
 
Innovation: 
 
Innovation is defined as the development, or adoption of new services resulting in 
competitive advantages. 
 
Although the goal of this thesis is not to identify and discuss specific new services, but 
rather to develop and test guidelines for using scenarios to undertake innovation, it may 
be appropriate to mention what is considered to be “services”. New services are 
considered to be, e.g.: 
 
• Real time tracking of cargo. 
• Processing of raw materials during transport from shipper to receiver. 
• Extension of core sea transport to also include inland distribution to end customer. 
• Higher frequency on established routes. 
 
Usually, what has been mentioned as new services has to be based on the 
development/adoption of new products and/or by co-operating with other actors in the 
transport chains. Products are broadly defined as physical objects (e.g. main engine) or 
technologies (e.g. technologies for combustion processes, or technologies for 
communication processes) or methods (e.g. new methods for ship maintenance and 
training of crew). In a transport chain perspective, there are two basic forms of co-
operation: horizontal co-operation (e.g. carrier-carrier) and vertical co-operation (e.g. 
carrier-trucker). 
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Consider the example where a carrier wishes to extend his/her core sea transport service 
to also include inland distribution to the end customer. In order to develop and 
eventually offer this new service, the carrier may need to co-operate closer with 
terminals, truckers and the receiver. At the same time, these actors may need to invest in 
common information and communication technologies in order to integrate and 
optimise the cargo flow in the transport chain. 
 
Short sea shipping: 
 
Short sea shipping is defined as intra-continental freight of unit loads by sea. 
 
Although the thesis will address shipping in general, I feel it is appropriate to give a 
definition of short sea shipping as the term is used several times throughout the thesis. 
 
Traditionally, short sea shipping has been associated with freight of cargo from one port 
to another. In 1964, however, Skipsteknisk Forskningsinstitutt (the forerunner for 
MARINTEK) held a conference regarding rationalisation of loading and unloading 
processes. In this conference several of the speakers (Erichsen 1964, Heirung 1964) 
underlined the importance of viewing shipping as a link in an integrated transport chain. 
 
In the last decade, the term has been subject to a massive interest from both industry and 
academia in Europe due to a declared policy from the European Union to shift freight of 
cargo from road to sea (European Commission 1999). Congested roads and the resulting 
negative economic and environmental effects, largely trigger this policy (Østvik et al. 
1998). OECD estimates the cost of congestion at 2% of GNP in industrialised nations, 
or more than 120 billion ECU for the EU (Donnelly and Mazières 1999). In the past few 
years, three “European Research Roundtable Conferences on Short sea Shipping” have 
been held (Wijnolst et al. 1993b 1995, Peeters and Wergeland 1997), all underlining the 
importance of integrating short sea shipping into intermodal transport chains and 
networks. 
 
Based on the above discussion, I will view shipping in an intermodal perspective, trying 
to gain increased knowledge and understanding of the different actors’ roles and 
relations in the transport chain. 
 
In the definition of short sea shipping given above, the concept of unit loads is applied. 
Unit loads are defined as containers, trailers, swap-bodies and pallets. It is primarily in 
the unit load segment that the competitive position of short sea shipping is weak 
compared to road transport. In the bulk segment, the low value of the cargo does not 
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normally justify any other transport mode than by sea. The unit load segment of short 
sea shipping is also the fastest growing segment. The statistics provided by 15 European 
ports show that the transport of containerised cargo rose by 44%, from 1993 to 1997 
(European Commission 1999). The markets for short sea shipping and road transport are 
partly separate, as there is a considerable difference between the average distances of a 
ton carried by short sea shipping (1385 kilometres) and by road (100 kilometres). 
However, short sea shipping can still be competitive within a considerable market 
segment, a segment that could increase if transport users could be attracted to using 
short sea shipping for shorter distances (European Commission 1999).  
 
Scenarios:
 
Scenarios are defined as structurally different stories about how the future might 
develop. 
 
Fahey and Randall (1997b) argue that scenarios provide vividly contrasting narrative 
descriptions of how several uncertain aspects of the future might evolve. Their 
understanding of scenarios is fairly representative for the bulk of scenario thinkers.  
 
In Table 1-1, I highlight the basic ideas behind scenarios based on my own 
understanding of and experience with scenarios. 
 
Scenarios are: Scenarios are not: 
Structurally different stories about how 
the future might develop 
Prediction of the future with a certain 
probability 
Acknowledgement of an uncertain future Extrapolation of existing trends 
Acknowledgement of intuition Exclusively analytical considerations 
An active attitude towards the future A passive attitude towards the future 
Strategic tools Operational tools 
Table 1-1 Defining scenarios 
 
 
1.3.2 Limitations 
 
In the limited time period available for writing the thesis, it is impossible to cover all 
relevant aspects of the given subject. The thesis has to be limited. 
 
 8
1 Introduction 
 
The major definitions given in the previous section contribute in limiting the thesis. In 
addition, I would like to inform about limitations concerning the theoretical and 
practical basis of the thesis. 
 
Theoretical basis: 
 
The innovation process is a complex and dynamic interplay between different actors and 
institutions involving many different activities and resources. In order to understand 
innovation processes, an overview of relevant innovation theory is needed. 
 
Further, in order to understand how certain properties of scenarios may guide 
innovation, an overview of relevant scenario theory is given. 
 
Practical basis: 
 
Three different companies have tested the guidelines in practice: 
 
• MARINTEK. 
• Statoil Driftstjenester. 
• Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines. 
 
Time limitations and other practical circumstances made it very difficult to seek co-
operation with additional parties. 
 
1.4 Conditions and requirements for developing and using scenarios 
 
In the following, I put forward a set of necessary and sufficient conditions and 
requirements, which have to be met in order to develop and use scenarios for the 
guidance of innovation. Erichsen and Selvig (1991) inspired the classification and 
development of these conditions and requirements. 
 
Necessary conditions must be present, but do not warrant the development of scenarios. 
If sufficient conditions are present, the applicability of scenarios is secured, provided 
that the necessary conditions are met. 
 
 
 
 9
1 Introduction 
 
The following necessary conditions are identified: 
 
• The future is uncertain. 
• Organisational slack is present. 
 
The first of the necessary conditions states that the future has to be uncertain in order to 
develop scenarios. Otherwise, one should develop new services optimised to fit the 
requirements of a known future. Some may argue that this is a given condition, that 
uncertainty is the only certainty about the future. This understanding of the future is also 
reflected in the quotation given by Godet (1990) on page i. However, I choose to 
include this condition in order to emphasise that different aspects of the future may be 
associated with different degrees of uncertainty. One could argue that a carrier with all 
his/her tonnage tied up in a 20 year charter party faces less uncertainty than a carrier 
operating in a spot commodity market with eroding profitability due to less cargo 
availability and new entrants. Thus, when I claim that the future has to be uncertain in 
order to develop scenarios, I am referring to a certain degree of uncertainty influencing 
strategic choices with respect to innovation. 
 
The second of the necessary conditions states that in order to develop scenarios, 
organisational slack is needed. Organisational slack is defined as available time, 
financial and competency resources. 
 
The following sufficient conditions are identified: 
 
• Forced innovation is wanted. 
• Strategic decisions have to be taken, but not within a limited time period. 
 
These two conditions are closely related to each other. 
 
The first of the sufficient conditions states that a company has to request forced 
innovation in order to develop scenarios. The scenarios are supposed to guide 
exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations. 
 
Further, forced innovation usually implies that some kind of strategic decisions have to 
be taken. Examples of such decisions are: 
 
• Should we purchase a new vessel or not? 
• Should we develop a strategic alliance with company X or not? 
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Scenarios should not be used for operational decisions, which need to be taken on a day 
to day basis. It is not necessary to develop scenarios in order to decide whether to 
purchase round-headed or flat-headed screws! 
 
In addition, the second condition states that scenarios may not be used for time-critical 
decisions. Normally, it takes several months to develop a good set of scenarios1. 
 
If both necessary and sufficient conditions are present, scenarios should be developed in 
order to guide innovation. In order to be of use, however, scenarios should satisfy a set 
of requirements: 
 
• The minimum number of scenarios to be developed is two, and the maximum 
number is five. 
• The time horizon of the scenarios should correspond to the time horizon of the 
consequences of the strategic decision to be taken. 
• The scenarios should embrace the extreme points of plausible futures relevant for 
the strategic decisions. 
 
The first requirement states that there is no need to develop just one scenario, as this 
would imply that the future is certain. The minimum number of scenarios to be 
developed is therefore two. I will argue that a maximum number of scenarios should be 
set to five. Normally, two to five scenarios are developed and learning and problem-
solving experiments show that the amount of information that can be held in the short-
time memory appears to be seven, plus or minus two (Miller 1956). 
 
The second of the requirements states that the scenarios ought to cover the full time-
span relevant to the strategic decisions. If the scenarios are to guide the strategic 
decisions they will, obviously, have to address the time-span relevant to the strategic 
decisions. 
 
The third requirement states that the scenarios need to embrace the extreme points of 
plausible futures relevant for the strategic decisions. This is important in order for the 
scenarios to capture the major uncertainties related to how the business environment 
may change and how these changes may affect the outcome of the strategic decisions. 
 
                                                 
1 Some consultants actually develop scenarios during a day or two, but these “stunt” scenarios are not 
used for major strategic decisions. 
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Conditions and requirements are to be further discussed and tested throughout the 
thesis. 
 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis consists of five main chapters and two appendixes. Chapter 1 gives an 
introduction to the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical basis in order to understand 
innovation. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis in order to understand scenarios and 
develops guidelines for using scenarios to guide innovation. Chapter 4 reports from how 
the guidelines have been applied in practice. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by assessing 
how the goals of the thesis are met and by concluding the applicability of the scenario-
based guidelines for innovation. Appendix A contains a paper presented at the RINA 
Design and Operation of Containerships Conference, London, 1999. Appendix B 
contains a paper presented at the 7th International Marine Design Conference, Korea, 
2000. The two papers are part of the thesis and examples of how my work has been 
communicated to the public. 
 
The structure and main content of the thesis are shown in Figure 1-3. 
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1 Introduction 
Gives a short introduction to the thesis regarding: 
• Background 
• Goals 
• Definitions and limitations 
• Conditions and requirements for developing and using scenarios  
• Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Theoretical foundations – Innovation 
Deals with a theoretical basis for understanding innovation, like: 
• Definitions, characteristics and classifications of innovations 
• Models of the innovation process 
• New products 
• New forms of co-operation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Theoretical foundations – Scenarios 
Deals with a theoretical basis for understanding innovation, and includes: 
• History of scenarios 
• Scenario benefits 
• Scenario techniques 
• Scenario-based guidelines for innovation4 Practical implications 
Reports from how the guidelines have been applied in practice, by: 
• MARINTEK 
• Statoil Driftstjenester 
• Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines 
 
5 Conclusion 
Revisits the goal and concludes the applicability of the guidelines..  
 
Appendix A/B 
Give examples of how my work has been opened up for the publicFigure 1-3 The Structure and main content of the thesis 
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1.6 Conclusions of chapter 1 
 
The thesis has its origin in the strategic activities of the Short Sea Shipping Program, 
launched by The Research Council of Norway. Short sea shipping has lost considerable 
market shares to road transport in the transport of Norwegian domestic goods. In 
European short sea shipping the tendency is the same. Innovation may lead to 
competitive advantages and may contribute in strengthening the competitive position of 
short sea shipping. 
 
The main goal of the thesis is to show how innovation in shipping may be guided by 
using scenarios. I will develop and test scenario-based guidelines for innovation in 
shipping. 
 
Major definitions and limitations are given. Innovation is defined as the development, 
or adoption of new services (e.g. real time tracking of cargo) resulting in competitive 
advantages. Short sea shipping is defined as intra-continental freight of unit loads by 
sea. Scenarios are defined as structurally different stories about how the future might 
develop. Several theoretical treatments of the subject are looked into, due to the 
complexity of innovation. Time limitations and other practical circumstances make it 
impossible to have more than three companies testing the guidelines in practice. 
 
A set of necessary and sufficient conditions must be present in order to develop 
scenarios for innovation. In addition, the scenarios should satisfy a set of requirements 
in order to be of use. 
 
The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1-3. 
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2 Theoretical foundations – Innovation 
 
Chapter 2 discusses several theoretical contributions in order to understand innovation. 
 
First, several definitions, classifications and characteristics of innovation are reviewed 
in order to focus and constrain the rest of the chapter. Thereafter, models describing the 
development and adoption of new products are discussed. A classification of different 
forms of co-operation is given, together with a model describing the process of 
developing and entering into a new co-operation. 
 
2.1 Definitions, classifications and characteristics of innovation 
 
The goal of this section is to review some definitions, classifications and characteristics 
of innovation in order to focus and constrain the rest of the chapter. First, innovations 
are defined in terms of new products, new processes and new forms of co-operation. 
Thereafter, development, adoption, imitation and implementation of innovations are 
discussed. Evolutionary innovations are contrasted to revolutionary innovations and 
some of the uncertainties associated with innovations are discussed. 
 
2.1.1 Products, processes and co-operative forms 
 
Most people associate the concept of innovation with something new. This new is often 
referred to as new products, new processes or new co-operative forms (Solberg and 
Danielsen 1992, Nås et al. 1994, Nærings- og energidepartementet 1996). 
 
In shipping, examples of product innovations are the steam engine and the diesel engine 
allowing the transition from sail to steam to diesel. Another product innovation was the 
container causing the shift from break bulk stowage of cargo to containerisation. Other 
product innovations may be related to new technologies, such as advances in 
information technology enabling a better integration of actors and activities in a 
transport chain, or new loading/unloading technology speeding up port operations. In a 
broader context, product innovations may be related to new methods and routines for 
ship operation, maintenance and training of crew. 
 
New processes are most commonly associated with improvements in the production 
process of a product. Examples of process innovations are welding robots allowing 
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more efficient welding than traditional manual welding techniques. Process innovations 
are typical for a production company (e.g. a shipyard), and not for actors in a transport 
chain which are discussed in this thesis. Therefore, process innovations will not be 
further discussed. 
 
New forms of co-operation are related to co-operations between actors in a transport 
chain. Examples of new co-operative forms may be pooling of cargo in order to obtain 
scale economies, or a joint venture aiming to serve a specific market. 
 
2.1.2 Development, adoption, imitation and implementation of innovations 
 
Rogers (1983) defines innovation in this way: 
 
“An innovation is an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption” 
(Rogers 1983, p.11) 
 
Rogers’ definition stresses the individual’s perception of newness, as opposed to some 
sort of objective newness (Ferguson 1995). An innovation may therefore be new to an 
individual, a company, an industry, a nation or the whole world. This implies that 
innovations need not only to be related to the development of new products or new co-
operative forms from “scratch”. For a company, adoption of new products or new co-
operative forms from other companies, or industries, can be considered an innovation. 
Ferguson (1995) supports this view by arguing that the adoption of new technologies is 
an innovative process that involves elements of creativity. The difference between 
adopting a new technology and developing a new technology is a question of degree. In 
both cases, external information is learned by the company and further developed for 
company-specific use. 
 
In addition to viewing the development and adoption processes as involving innovative 
activities, Dosi (1988a) also relates imitation to innovation, as he defines innovation in 
this way:  
 
“… the search for, and discovery experimentation, development, imitation, and 
adoption of new products” 
(Dosi 1988a, p. 222) 
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Further, Dosi (1988b) argues that: 
 
“In general, it must be noticed that the partly tacit nature of innovative knowledge 
and its characteristics of partial private appropriability makes imitation, as well 
as innovation, a creative process, which involves search, which is not wholly 
distinct from the search for “new” development, and which is economically 
expensive – sometimes even more expensive than the original innovation…”  
(Dosi 1988b, p. 1140) 
 
The discussion above suggests that innovations may be related to development, 
imitation and adoption processes all involving elements of creativity and discovery. In 
the rest of the thesis, however, I do not look specifically into the imitation process, as 
this process is not wholly distinct from the development and adoption processes (Dosi 
1988a, 1988b).  
 
Finally, some contributors view the innovation process as a commercialisation, or 
implementation process. Nås et al. (1994) argue that an innovation is fulfilled when a 
new or changed product is being introduced in the market. A similar view on innovation 
is taken by Teece (1986) and McKelvey (1993), defining innovators to be those 
companies that are first to commercialise a new product or process in the market. In this 
way, the use of the innovation is considered, relating the innovation to its market 
introduction. I consider implementation of innovations as taking place after the 
development/adoption/imitation process.  
 
An example of a successfully implemented innovation in shipping is the container. The 
container was implemented in American coastal trades in 1956-57. In 1966, Sea-Land 
established the first transatlantic container route and by the early 1970s, all major 
transatlantic routes were covered by container services. Short sea transport in Europe 
became influenced by the transatlantic container traffic, and approximately 13 million 
TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) were loaded and discharged by short sea vessels in 
1994 (Zachcial 1996, Trondsen 1998). 
 
An example of a failed implementation of an innovation in merchant shipping is nuclear 
propulsion. In January 1955, Skipsteknisk Forskningsinstitutt (SFI – the forerunner for 
MARINTEK) hired the naval architect Jens Wilhelmsen jr. in order to undertake a 
technological/economic analysis of the introduction of nuclear reactors in different ship 
classes and trades. The final report, published in 1956, concluded that a nuclear 
powered oil tanker would have a high building cost, but that under certain 
circumstances it might be able to compete with a conventional ship regarding earning 
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capability. However, In the 1960s, as the oil price went down, diesel engines became 
more efficient and gas turbines were introduced, the nuclear powered ships were not 
able to compete. Nuclear powered merchant ships never became profitable. Nuclear 
powered military ships, however, numbered up to a total of nearly 1000 in 1994 (Listog 
1997). 
 
2.1.3 Evolutionary and revolutionary innovations 
 
The effects of innovations are hard to measure. There is no single, simple 
dimensionality to innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). In a wide sense, innovation 
may be compared to economical terms as utility or welfare that are subjective, not 
comparable and not directly measurable. However, this does not mean that every aspect 
of innovation is impossible to measure. In case of new products, they are often 
measurable in the company's product range and sales (Nås et al. 1994). 
 
Due to the fact that there is no generally agreed way of measuring an innovation’s 
importance or impact, there is a tendency to identify innovation with innovations of a 
highly visible sort – electric power, automobiles, aeroplanes and television. However, 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) argue that one must not forget that many improvements are 
of a less visible and even, in many cases, an almost invisible sort – for example minor 
modifications in the design of a machine that will enable it to serve certain highly 
specific end-users better, or that make it easier and therefore cheaper to manufacture. 
The subsequent improvements in an innovation after its first introduction may be 
economically more important, than the innovation in its original form. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it seems natural to characterise innovations by their 
degree of newness and the degree of changes that innovation implies. In the innovation 
literature, the terms minor, smaller, and evolutionary are used as opposed to major, 
radical and revolutionary, when discussing innovations.  
 
Examples of major innovations in shipping are the container, the specialised car-carrier 
and the hydrofoil boat. 
 
Some companies are very effective in high-risk, radical innovation. These innovations 
may give radical improvements, or generate entirely new products, in productions- and 
sales processes, as a fundament for new activity. Other companies may be effective in 
small, cumulative and evolutionary changes that give incremental improvements in 
existing products, productions- and sales processes (Nærings- og energidepartementet 
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1996). Both types of innovation are important. The control of costs is important to 
remain competitive in the short run, and the movement to radically improved services is 
often necessary to survival in the long time (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). 
 
For new technological products, Dosi (1982) explains, in rather general terms, the role 
of continuity and discontinuity in technological change. In his model, continuos changes 
are related to progress along a technological trajectory defined by a technological 
paradigm, while discontinuities are associated with the emergence of a new paradigm. 
A technological paradigm2 is defined in accordance with the epistemological definition 
as an “outlook”, a set of procedures, a definition of the “relevant” problems and of the 
specific knowledge related to their solution. In addition each technological paradigm 
defines its own concept of “progress” based on its specific technological and economic 
trade-offs. A technological trajectory is then interpreted as the direction of advance 
within a technological paradigm. By using this terminology, minor, smaller, and 
evolutionary innovations may be related to progress along a technological trajectory, 
while major, radical and revolutionary innovations may be related to the emergence of 
a new technological paradigm. 
 
In shipping, a shift of technological paradigms may be related to the shift from sail to 
steam for propulsion of ships. The shift may be illustrated by S-curves, as shown in 
Figure 2-1. 
S-curves
Resources
R
es
ul
ts
Sail
Steam
 
Figure 2-1 S-curves in shipping 
The transition between two technological paradigms in shipping, sail and steam, is visualised by the 
use of S-curves. 
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Wijnolst (1995) argues that the improvement in efficiency of the sailing ships, as from 
around the year 1600, starts with the Dutch Fluit. The Dutch Fluit was a ship of 160 
tonnes, which could be sailed by a 7 men crew (compared to 30 for traditional ships). 
The ship also had a favourable length to breadth ratio, giving good sailing performance 
and vertical sides that facilitated the stowage of cargo. The S-curve ends with the 
clipper, a ship that created a whole new market for itself, due to a significant increase in 
speed. The ultimate effort of the ship owners, who did not believe in steam engines 
onboard ships, was the construction of the 7-mast Thomas W. Lawson. This ship was 
built in 1902, but tipped over in a storm in 1907, while at anchor in a harbour, due to 
instability. 
 
The steam engine was invented in 1712, and after experiments at the end of the 18th 
century, it was put on boats to drive paddle wheels around 1820. The boats were used 
on canals and rivers and had significant advantages over sailing ships, which could not 
operate in narrow waterways. In 1830, the invention of a surface condenser solved the 
problem of freshwater for the boilers and the steamship became an economically 
feasible solution for sea transport. Two further advances, the iron hull and the screw 
propeller, strengthened the steamship paradigm even further (Wijnolst 1995). In 1880, 
steamships carried more than half of the world sea-borne trade (Weyergang-Nielsen 
1994). 
 
S-curves illustrate how results improve as resources are invested in the development of 
new technology. For the steam paradigm, results may be related to higher speed, faster 
port operation and more reliable transport than sailing ships. Resources may be related 
to investments (time and money) in developing the new steam technologies, e.g. the 
surface condenser. In the first phase (1712-1830) improvements were small and slow. In 
the second phase of the paradigm (1830-1900) major improvements were made in 
shorter time, due to increasing market acceptability and accumulation of knowledge and 
experience related to steam technology. In this period, further improvements in sailships 
started to decline, and a limit was reached at the turn of the century with the mentioned 
clipper ships. In addition, Wijnolst et al. (1993a) argue that the opening of the Suez-
canal in 1869 accelerated the transition from sail to steam even further. 
 
Although Dosi (1982) related his paradigms to technological development, I believe it is 
possible to use his framework in a non-technological context as well. Introduction of 
                                                                                                                                               
2 Technological paradigms are developed as a parallel to, and based upon scientific paradigms as 
introduced by Thomas Kuhn (1962). 
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new co-operative forms may also be described by using the concepts of paradigms and 
trajectories. 
 
In the following, I will give an example of a paradigm shift of co-operative forms in 
shipping. In the 1960s, producers (e.g. shippers) were mainly focused on improving 
internal resources and activities in order to serve their customers in a better way. In the 
1970s and 1980s, organised co-operation with suppliers was in focus due to stricter 
quality requirements and the need for more flexibility in terms of product volumes, 
specifications and delivery times. In the 1990s, strategic alliances between shippers and 
their suppliers (including transport suppliers) are increasingly more common (Persson 
and Virum 1995). For a carrier this means that as the shippers’ transport chains are 
getting increasingly integrated, the possibilities for long-term contracts and co-operation 
will increase. One could argue that the old paradigm characterised by port to port 
operations is being replaced by a new paradigm characterised by door to door 
operations and the emergence of integrated transport chains. 
 
2.1.4 Uncertainty in innovation 
 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) argue that the central dimension that organises innovation, 
if there is one, is uncertainty. Innovation implies creating the new, and the new contains 
elements that we do not comprehend at the beginning and about what we are uncertain. 
  
I will argue that in order to increase the probability of success, companies need to have 
an opinion of the future. The reason for this is that it will usually take considerable time 
from the decision to develop or adopt an innovation, until the innovation is 
implemented and in operation. However, as the future can not be predicted, companies 
are faced with a number of challenging uncertainties, as they plan their future transport 
service.  
 
Uncertainties are related to changes in the business environment. On a micro level, 
customer needs are always changing. In the 1960s and 1970s cost leadership was a 
common strategy (Porter 1980, Carter et al. 1995). The cost of transport activities was 
in focus. Carter et al. (1995) argue that during the 1980s, many companies realised the 
importance of quality as a source of a competitive advantage. However, in the 1990s, 
attention is shifting to speed and time-based competition. In addition to changes in 
customer needs, companies may experience uncertainty related to competitors, 
suppliers, substitutes and entrants as proposed by Porter (1980). On a broader macro 
level, uncertainties may be related to the rapid emergence of information technology 
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and the Internet, changes in the oil price sparked by OPEC, or conflicts in the Middle 
East, the Asian financial crisis, and international regulations concerning environmental 
requirements. A structured approach for discussing uncertainties at micro and macro 
levels is given in chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Developing new products 
 
There have been a number of attempts in recent years to impose some sort of conceptual 
order on the innovation process, with the purpose of understanding it better (Kline and 
Rosenberg 1986). In this section, I look into three models of innovation addressing the 
development of new products. 
 
First, the linear model of innovation and the chain-linked model of innovation are 
discussed. Thereafter, a rather new model of the innovation process, the network model 
of innovation, is discussed. Finally, the three models are compared and discussed in 
order to uncover similarities and possible shortcomings. Aiming for a complete picture 
of the innovation process, identified shortcomings are further addressed and discussed. 
 
2.2.1 The linear model of innovation 
 
The generally accepted model of innovation since World War II has been what a few 
authors have called the linear model. In this model, one does research; research then 
leads to development, development to production, and production to marketing (Kline 
and Rosenberg 1986). A sketch of this model is given in Figure 2-2. 
 
Development Production Research Marketing 
Figure 2-2 The linear model of innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986) 
The innovation process is triggered by research and does not have any feedback paths from the 
market or within the process. 
 
 
In the following, I give some critical comments regarding the model. 
 
Firstly, I would like to question the linearity of the model. The linearity of the model is 
obvious, as no feedback paths within the process are assumed. However, feedback is 
important as the development of new products is an iterative process. Decisions taken 
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early in the process are normally based on rather limited information on requirements 
and restrictions, but as the process proceeds towards a product solution, more 
information will be available and support for making decisions will improve. It may 
therefore be necessary to go back in the process in order to redo some decisions. I will 
argue that feedback paths from the market and within the different activities in the 
process, are essential in order to ensure a market success for a product. 
 
Secondly, the model does not acknowledge a company’s organisational slack needed in 
order to undertake innovation. Organisational slack will influence the process of 
innovation. A carrier with limited financial resources and little technological 
knowledge, may, for example, not develop a new loading and unloading technology 
from “scratch”. If the carrier does not co-operate with other carriers and/or actors in the 
transport chain in order to increase organisational slack, an adoption process of existing 
technology would seem more likely. 
 
Thirdly, the process is triggered by research. Not many companies have their own 
research departments, meaning that external research institutions are needed in order to 
innovate. Research is, however, not necessarily a triggering condition in every 
innovation process. Need and not research triggered the development of the specialised 
car carrier in the early 1960s. Bulk carriers could not efficiently handle the increasing 
export of small Japanese cars, and a conversion of bulk carriers to car carriers emerged, 
gradually leading the way to the first pure car carriers (Nilsen 1999). In addition, minor 
innovations, such as smaller improvements in existing technology, may be based on 
experience, knowledge and skills already present within the company. 
 
Finally, the model does not seem to treat uncertainties related to future changes in the 
business environment. Before making a decision to develop or adopt and implement an 
innovation, a carrier should address the robustness of his/her decision. For example, 
how will a decision to invest in development of one large container feeder vessel play 
out, as opposed to an investment in two smaller vessels, if the shippers are increasingly 
demanding smaller shipments at a higher frequency? 
 
I would argue that the linear model of innovation is better suited for describing large 
and long-lasting, national, or international, research efforts with extensive financial and 
organisational resources, rather than innovation undertaken by companies in order to 
gain new competitive advantages, normally within a restricted time period given by 
requirements for the pay-back period of the investments. 
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The national research and development efforts on nuclear powered merchant ships in 
Norway may be described by using the linear model of innovation, although the designs 
never went into production and marketing. Substantial research and development efforts 
were undertaken and co-ordinated by an external research institution. It seems as if 
“Nuclear optimism” in the 1950s and 1960s guided the process, rather than short-term 
commercial requirements. 
 
2.2.2 The chain-linked model of the innovation process 
 
Kline and Rosenberg (1986) developed the chain-linked model as an alternative to the 
linear model, described in the previous section. In the following, I will present and 
review the model and its assumptions. 
 
The chain-linked model is shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
Invent
and/or
produce
analytic
design
Redesign
and
produce
Distribute
and
market
Detailed
design
and test
Potential
market
Knowledge
  Research
c c c
D I S
c
K KK
R RR
f fff
F f
f
 
Figure 2-3 The chain linked model of innovation (Kline and Rosenberg 1986) 
A potential marked need leads to an invention and/or production of an analytic design. Detailed 
design and testing then follows before redesigning and production, and finally distribution and 
marketing. Several feedback paths from the market and within the process are indicated. 
Knowledge and research are accessed if necessary. 
 
 
The central chain of innovation (“c”) is triggered by a potential market need. The 
marked need leads to what the authors refer to as an invention and/or a production of an 
analytic design. Invention is interpreted as a significant departure from past practice. 
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Analytic design differs from inventions as it is either a routine consisting of analysing 
various arrangements of existing components, a modification of designs already within 
the state of the art, or an improvement to accomplish old tasks more effectively. In this 
way, an analytic design is the complete opposite of an invention based on non-existing 
components. Detailed design and testing then follows based on market feedback. The 
product is, if necessary, redesigned before production and, finally, distribution and 
marketing. 
 
The model is certainly not linear, as several paths of iteration are indicated. Feedback 
paths from the market (“F”, “f”), and feedback paths within the innovation process (“f”) 
provide input for evaluations and further progress. There are links to knowledge (”K”) 
and research (“D”, “KR”) all along the central chain of innovation (“c”). Long-range 
generic research for backup of innovations, financed by the market, is also indicated 
(“S”). Finally, innovations and new products support science and research by providing 
new tools and instruments (“I”). 
 
With a basis in this model, Kline and Rosenberg (1986) claim that arguments about the 
importance of “market pull” versus “technology push” are artificial. The argument is 
that a perceived market need will be filled only if the technical problems can be solved, 
and a perceived performance gain will be put into use only if there is a realisable market 
use. 
 
In my opinion, the chain-linked model is a significant improvement from the linear 
model. The importance of feedback within the process and from the market is 
acknowledged. However, I miss a discussion on how a company’s organisational slack 
is taken into account together with the market feedback, in order to focus and constrain 
directions for innovation. In addition, possible changes in the business environment 
should be addressed in order to develop robust directions for innovation. 
 
I will also argue that the model treats the access to knowledge and research too 
simplistic. How does a company gain access to relevant external knowledge, not already 
present in the company? Does the company use its relations to customers and suppliers, 
attend conferences and subscribe to relevant journals? If research is needed, very few 
companies have their own research department, leaving the companies to rely on 
external research institutions. Knowledge seems to be easy available, lying alongside 
the central chain of innovation, ready to be used whenever needed. It seems as if Kline 
and Rosenberg (1986) treat knowledge as a generic commodity, which is one of the key 
assumptions in neo-classical theory. By using a neo-classical perspective, however, 
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knowledge needs to have a number of certain attributes, as identified by Smith (1997, p. 
20): 
 
• It is generic. An item of knowledge, or a particular advance in knowledge, can be 
applied widely among firms and perhaps among industries. 
• It is codified. Transmitability implies that knowledge is written or otherwise 
recorded in fairly complete usable forms. 
• It is costlessly accessible. Transmission costs are negligible, or firms do not face 
differential cost barriers in accessing knowledge or bringing it into production. 
• It is context independent. Firms have equal capabilities in transforming such 
knowledge into different service capabilities. 
 
Obviously, in the real world, these attributes are not common. Transaction cost 
economics, discussed in section 2.5.2, suggests that the transfer of knowledge requires 
investments beyond single economic investments, creating transaction costs. In 
addition, network theory, discussed in section 2.3.3 and 2.5.4, argues that access to 
knowledge will depend largely upon the relations a company has with other companies 
in a business network. 
 
In the following, the chain-linked model of innovation is related to shipping. Normally, 
yards and equipment vendors develop and produce new products. A carrier or a 
shipbroker may often communicate a potential market need for new products to a yard 
or an equipment vendor. In a survey carried out by Ying (1989), 18 Norwegian shipping 
companies answered a set of questions regarding product development orientation. The 
sources of business ideas were found to be (the respondents could choose more than one 
alternative): 
 
• Customers (61%) 
• The company’s own force (56%) 
• Consultants/brokers (28%) 
 
Wijnolst (1995) argues that carriers and shipbrokers operate in the transport market, 
enabling them to see opportunities for new ship concepts. Although the discussions 
regarding “market pull” and “technology push” are artificial according to Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986), I will argue, in concert with Wijnolst (1995), that innovations in 
shipping, at least major innovations, are characterised by a stronger market pull than 
technology push. The carrier operates on a day to day basis in the transport market and 
should therefore easily be aware of potential improvements in the transport chains. A 
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technology push may also be hindered due to risk-averse yards. As the yard is asked to 
deliver a bid for building a new ship, normally in competition with other yards, the yard 
does not want to spend a lot of engineering hours on a design it is not certain to build. 
The yard may therefore choose to use a well tested design. In this way the yard may act 
as an obstacle to innovative ship designs. However, this is a general observation and it 
is my experience that some yards are eager to develop new and innovative designs in 
co-operation with the carrier. 
 
2.2.3 The network model of innovation 
 
The “Industrial network approach” is the outcome of a fairly broad research program 
which originated in the mid-1970s at the University of Uppsala in Sweden. It deals 
primarily with the functioning of business markets. 
 
In this research program, empirical studies show that business organisations often 
operate in environments which include a limited number of identifiable organisational 
entities, or actors. Relationships that develop between the actors are generally continuos 
over time, rather than being composed of discrete transactions, and the web of 
relationships is referred to as a network (Mattson 1987, Håkansson and Snehota 1989, 
Fossen 1996). These empirical findings contradict the neo-classical assumptions 
regarding relationships in the business environment. In a neo-classical market view, the 
actors’ competitive rather than complementary activities are stressed and organisations 
are not assumed to be related to each other in a network, instead organisations are 
supposed to exist in an atomistic structure with instantaneous and short term relations 
(Mattson 1987, Håkansson and Snehota 1995). Mattson (1987) and Easton (1992) argue 
that the competitive activities are evident in Porter’s basic model (1980), where 
competitive pressures from companies among the sellers of substitutes, potential 
entrants, powerful buyers and powerful sellers are the basic driving forces. In the 
network approach, however, both complementary and competitive interdependencies 
are identified (Mattson 1987). Openness, mutual trust and respect are important 
characteristics of relationships in the industrial network approach (Easton 1992). In 
Figure 2-4, I have tried to illustrate the difference between the neo-classical market 
organisation and the network organisation. 
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Neo-classical market
organisation
Network
 organisation
• Atomistic structure
• Focus on competition
• Network structure
• Focus on co-operation
A
C
B
 
Figure 2-4 A network organisation as opposed to a neo-classical market 
organisation 
The industrial network organisation (“University of Uppsala”) contradicts the neo-classical market 
organisation (for example promoted by Porter (1980)) in terms of business structure and relations. 
 
 
In a network, each actor has direct or indirect relations to the other actors (Mattson 
1987, Easton 1992). The assumption of indirect relations implies that A may affect C 
through B (see Figure 2-4), simply because there are exchange relationships between all 
three parties. If a carrier (A) lowers his price to shipper (B), then a competing carrier 
(C) may be willing to do the same. 
 
In the industrial network approach, the basic variables are actors, activities and 
resources. These variables are related to each other in the overall structure of the 
networks. Actors are defined as those who perform activities and/or control resources. 
In activities, actors use certain resources (defined as technology, material and 
knowledge resources) to change other resources in various ways (Håkansson and 
Johanson 1992). 
 
So how does innovation take place according to network theory? To answer this 
question, the network theory assumes that resources are heterogeneous, having 
attributes in an unlimited number of dimensions. This means that the application of a 
specific resource (e.g. steel) can never be fully or finally specified (Easton 1992, 
Håkansson and Johanson 1992). 
 
Resource development appears to take place to a large extent between companies. This 
indicates that the relations between companies play an important role in the innovation 
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process. Fossen (1996) argues that the relations and interaction between companies will 
be central to the establishment of new resource combinations, and thus also central to 
innovations. Easton (1992) argues further that the continuous interaction between 
companies offers, on the one hand, the opportunity for innovation and, on the other, the 
existence of a known and predictable environment in which innovations can be realised. 
 
A quantitative survey of innovation in the Norwegian industry, performed by the STEP 
group3 (Nås et al. 1994), supports the empirical findings in the industrial network 
tradition. One of the findings in this survey was that companies often make use of 
accessible, external information to adjust and develop technological knowledge, as a 
substitute for, or complementary to, developing new knowledge by themselves. In the 
survey, the most important source of information was found to be customers of the 
company. The third most important source of information was suppliers to the 
company. 
 
The industrial network approach does not give a prescriptive model of innovation, as 
the two earlier discussed approaches did, to some degree. However, network theory 
points to a very important, and empirically validated, characteristic of the innovation 
process: relationships between actors. 
 
One of the lacks in the network model of innovations may be that the network approach 
seems to emphasise trust and mutual respect in relations, in place of possible 
opportunism and dominance. A large shipper may use five different carriers for his 
goods on a certain route and the shipper may be very important, in terms of income, for 
each of the five carriers. By playing the carriers up against each other, the shipper may 
gain very low freight rates due to his dominance and the carriers’ dependency upon his 
freight. Instead of a long term co-operation with one or two of the carriers in order to 
develop a more integrated transport chain, the shipper may choose to use his dominance 
in order to cut freight rates. 
 
In the network approach, it is argued that invention and innovation occur in networks 
not within but between companies. However, I will argue that some of the innovation 
may also actually take place within companies. Knowledge within a company, about 
market and technology such as cargo flows, navigation and skills in operation and 
maintenance of ships, may trigger and direct an innovation process. In a survey 
                                                 
3 The STEP group is located in Oslo, Norway, and specialises in studies of technology, innovation and 
economic policy. 
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undertaken by Ying (1989), 18 Norwegian shipping companies respond that 56% of 
business ideas emerge from the company’s own force. 
 
As opposed to the chain-linked model, discussed in the previous section, the network 
approach claims that access to external knowledge is gained through a company’s 
relations in a business network. 
 
The industrial network approach to innovation implies that a carrier should pay 
considerable attention to his or her relations with customers (shippers) and suppliers 
(yards and equipment vendors). Through these relations the carrier gains insight into 
both technical (supplier dominated) and market (customer dominated) opportunities 
which have to be addressed during an innovation process. In the earlier mentioned 
survey carried out by Ying (1989), 18 Norwegian shipping companies agree that market 
research is important. Some of the typical market research activities are identified as 
(Ying 1989): 
 
• Visit customers and discuss their problems with them. 
• Visit relevant industrial fairs 
• Customer interviews 
 
I believe that a company’s relations with other companies in a business network, is of 
vital importance in directing innovative efforts. By paying close attention to its 
customers and suppliers, a company may gain insight into events and trends shaping the 
future. 
 
2.2.4 Similarities and shortcomings in the three models of innovation 
 
In this section, the three models are compared and discussed in order to uncover 
similarities and possible shortcomings. Aiming for a complete picture of the innovation 
process, identified shortcomings are further addressed and discussed. 
 
All three models address the development of new products. Previously, I have defined 
products rather broadly to include not only physical objects, but also technologies and 
methods. It seems as the linear model and the chain-linked model of innovation mainly 
describe the development of new physical products, while the network model of 
innovation may also be applied in describing the development of new technologies and 
new methods enabling new and improved services. 
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In the following, the three models of innovation are compared and discussed according 
to a set of characteristics: 
 
• Triggers: How is the innovation process triggered, or initiated? 
• Feedback: Are feedback paths from the market and/or within the process assumed? 
• Activities: Which activities are included in the innovation process? 
• Knowledge: How does the model address access to knowledge needed in the 
innovation process? 
 
In the linear model, innovation is triggered by research, leading to development, 
production and finally marketing of the new product. No feedback paths are indicated 
and the access to knowledge needed in the innovation process is not specifically 
addressed. 
 
The chain-linked model is an improvement in comparison with the former as the 
importance of feedback from the market and iterations in the innovation process are 
taken into account. A potential market need triggers the process, leading to an invention 
and/or production of an analytic design. Detailed design and testing then follow before 
redesigning and production, and, finally, distribution and marketing. Knowledge and 
research are assumed to be accessed whenever needed, indicating a treatment of 
knowledge as a generic commodity. 
 
In the network model of innovation, a more sophisticated view on the innovation 
process is taken. Relations between actors in a business network are supposed to trigger 
the innovation process and provide feedback throughout the whole process. By 
combining heterogeneous resources, actors develop new products. Knowledge needed 
in the process is accessed through relations in the network. 
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A structured summary of the comparison of the three models is given in Table 2-1. 
 
Characteristic 
of an innovation 
process 
The linear 
 model of innovation 
(section 2.3.1) 
The chain linked model 
of innovation 
(section 2.3.2) 
The network 
 model of innovation 
(section 2.3.3) 
Trigger(s) 
 
Research Potential market need Customers and suppliers 
Feedback 
 
 
No feedback paths From the market, and 
within the process.  
Through relations with 
other actors in the business 
network 
 
Activities 
 
 
 
 
Research – development – 
production – marketing  
Invent/produce analytical 
design – design and test – 
redesign and produce – 
distribute and market 
Combine heterogeneous 
resources to innovate 
Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Access to knowledge not 
specifically addressed. The 
process is, however, 
initiated by research – 
leading to new knowledge 
Links to knowledge all 
along the central chain of 
innovation. External 
knowledge treated as a 
generic commodity to be 
used whenever needed 
Access to external 
knowledge through 
relations with other actors 
in the business network 
 
Table 2-1 A comparison of three models of innovation 
 
 
Realising that the linear model was launched before the chain linked model, which 
again came before the network model, one may argue the perception of innovation has 
changed over time. Initially, the assumption was that the innovation process was 
generated from basic research, whereas the present view is that innovation is dependent 
on a complex and dynamic interplay between different actors in a business network. 
 
However, three important characteristics of an innovation process, organisational slack, 
institutional framework, and uncertainty are not addressed specifically by any of the 
models discussed. These characteristics are discussed below, together with a further 
discussion of triggers. 
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Organisational slack 
 
None of the three models discussed above address organisational slack needed in order 
to undertake innovation. Organisational slack is defined as available time, financial and 
competency resources. 
 
Financial resources are required in order to develop new products. Market research, 
design and development of products require capital investments, for example in order to 
buy necessary equipment for developing and testing the new product. In addition to 
financial resources, competent people and time need to be dedicated to creative and 
innovative pursuits to uncover technological and market opportunities. 
 
Generally, Norwegian short sea carriers lack organisational slack required to undertake 
innovation (Bartz-Johannesen 1996, Norges Forskningsråd – Industri og energi 1996). 
However, a co-operation between carriers and/or other actors in the transport chains 
may contribute in establishing a sufficient organisational slack. Co-operation between 
actors in transport chains is discussed in section 2.4. 
 
Lack of organisational slack may hinder or constrain the innovation process for the 
single carrier, and is therefore identified as a possible obstacle to innovation. 
 
Institutional framework 
 
None of the three models discussed above address how the institutional framework may 
trigger, or constrain an innovation process. The institutional framework is often seen as 
specific to regional or national contexts (Smith 1997). Nelson (1992) argues that 
national education systems, university research, laws, fiscal monetary and trade policy 
to a large degree will remain national, despite increasing globalisation. In this context, I 
choose to define the institutional framework as consisting of: 
 
• Authorities and institutions. 
• Education systems. 
• Research institutions. 
 
The above factors are closely related to each other. A number of such relations may be 
demonstrated. For example, authorities may influence the development of both 
education systems and research institutions while research institutions may provide both 
authorities and institutions with decision support. 
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In the following, I discuss how these factors may both trigger and constrain innovations. 
 
Authorities affect funding of research and development (R&D) activities, taxes and 
subsidising. Large investments in R&D activities may trigger innovations, while 
reduced investments in R&D may hinder new innovations (refer the linear model of 
innovation presented in section 2.2.1). In the same way, changes in the tax and subsidy 
levels may affect the rate of innovations. 
 
An example of how R&D investments trigger innovations may be taken from the 
building of a ship model-testing tank (SMTT) in Norway. The building of the SMTT 
was very much dependent upon governmental support. The first Norwegian professor in 
shipbuilding, Hans Ramm Mørch, argued early for the need of a SMTT in Norway. The 
theoretical basis for calculating ship resistance and design of propellers was not good 
enough, and full-scale experiments were too costly. A plan for the establishment of a 
SMTT was launched in 1916. However, small economic contributions from the 
shipping industry in Norway (183 000 NOK as opposed to the needed 500 000) forced a 
need for governmental support. In 1919, the government granted 250 000 NOK for the 
project, but of little help as the new cost estimate for the SMTT had reached 1 million 
NOK. In the 1920s an economic depression hindered further grants. After additional 
public grants, the SMTT was finally opened in 1939. The SMTT contributed in 
developing better hull designs and propellers (Karlsen 1997). 
 
In addition to authorities, various institutions may also trigger or constrain innovations. 
A large number of national and international institutions develop rules and regulations 
for shipping. Most known are the classification societies and IMO (International 
Maritime Organisation). IMO recently developed new safety standards for ro-ro vessels, 
after the disaster of the Estonia, influencing the design of the visor-doors at the bow 
(Wijnolst 1995). Classification societies develop the design rules for all classes of ships. 
The classification societies have also played an important role in the development of 
methods of design of ship structures (Wijnolst 1995). In this way, the classification 
societies have contributed to innovations in the form of improved hull designs. 
However, Meek (1997) argues that the classification societies have an almost too 
powerful influence and that some may even say that practically speaking they are the 
designers of ship structure. Classification societies may constrain innovative efforts as 
their rules may act in a preservative way. 
 
International rules and regulations also affect the possibilities for patenting new 
products and thereby the innovator’s ability to capture profits generated by an 
innovation. However, Teece (1986) argues that patents rarely confer perfect protection, 
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and that they can be “invented around” at modest costs. An empirical survey carried out 
by Levin et al. (1987) looks at alternative means of protecting the competitive 
advantages of new or improved products. Generally, lead time, learning curves and 
sales or service efforts were regarded as substantially more effective than patents in 
protecting new products. Furthermore, diffuse patent regulations may contribute in 
constraining innovative efforts as the innovator will not be able to protect an innovation 
for a time long enough to justify the resources spent in developing the innovation. 
 
Education systems may also trigger or constrain an innovation process. With the 
completion of the SMTT, Norway could educate more and better naval architects and 
strengthen the nation’s competence in ship building (Karlsen 1997), and thereby 
increase organisational slack needed for innovation (i.e. required competency 
resources). An example of how a poor education system may constrain innovation may 
be related to the slow Norwegian transition from sail to steam. Berggren et al. (1989) 
point to the fact that the first Norwegian school for marine engineers did not receive 
government assistance before 1885, while more than half of the world seaborne 
transport was carried out by steamships in 1880 (Weyergang-Nielsen 1994). 
 
Finally, I will look into how research institutions may trigger and constrain 
innovations. In Norway, several research institutions provide maritime research. The 
most known are MARINTEK (Norwegian Marine Technology Research Institute) 
located in Trondheim and SIØS (Centre for International Shipping and Economics) 
located in Bergen. According to the linear model, research shall be of importance in an 
innovation process (although newer contributions show that relations between actors in 
a network may be of greater importance). Research institutions employ competent 
people who provide specialised knowledge that may be of importance in an innovation 
process. Companies in need of specialised knowledge may order research services 
from the institutions. However, the Government normally supports a large degree of 
the research undertaken and directions for research-based innovation may therefore be 
constrained or triggered accordingly.  
 
An example of a Norwegian financed project is TRANSDATA aiming to improve the 
information flows in the transport chain by developing a transport reference 
information model. Another Norwegian financed project is Aluminium in Ships. This 
project had a budget of 70 million NOK, including 25 million given by the Research 
Council of Norway (NFR).  
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Some of the results from TRANSDATA were (Norges Forskningsråd 1999): 
 
• Improved design of hulls – 10% reduction in resistance. 
• More effective production techniques. 
• Hours/ton consumption – 15% reduction. 
• Total cost savings in production of a 60 metres catamaran – 7 million NOK. 
 
Triggers 
 
The three models of innovation identify triggers of innovation as research, market needs 
and interactions with customers and suppliers. In the previous section, I also showed 
how an innovation process may be triggered by the institutional framework. However, 
several other triggers of innovation are identified in the innovation literature and these 
triggers are discussed below. 
 
Rosenberg (1976) points to technical imbalance of a system as a possible trigger of 
innovation. Through examples from the machine tool industry, Rosenberg (1976) shows 
how changes in one component of an interdependent system create a stimulus for 
changes elsewhere in the system. Imbalances between components have led to an 
exploration of possibilities for corrective action whose eventual result has been major 
improvements in productivity. From the history of military technology it is shown how 
improvements in weapons have emerged from the continuos rivalry between offensive 
and defensive weapons. For example, the great increase in the destructive power of 
offensive weapons led to the application of armoured plates to ships to protect them 
against shells. It was out of this interplay that the modern warship was developed 
(Rosenberg 1976). In short sea shipping, ports may be regarded as technical imbalances 
(bottlenecks) in a transport chain. In European short sea shipping, the port costs will 
often be greater than the costs for the actual sea transport (Levander 1994, 
Coasterudvalget 1991). 
 
Wijnolst et al. (1993a) identify five triggers of innovation in shipping: 
 
1. Physical laws. Physical laws may lay restrictions that trigger innovation. Resistance 
in water will restrict the speed of a ship. If the speed is to be increased beyond a 
certain limit, dynamic lift and/or a powered lift may be used. 
2. Geographical restrictions. Geographical restrictions may trigger certain changes in 
ship technology: the breadth of the ship may be restricted due to the breadth of 
channels such as the Panama and the Suez (resulting in designs such as the Panamax 
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and Suezmax carriers), the draft may be restricted by depth of ports, bridges may lay 
restrictions on the air draft of ships (leading to ship bridges that can be lowered to 
pass under the bridges). 
3. Economic parameters. The drive of owners to develop new ship types of increased 
earning capacities and/or reduced costs is a strong trigger of innovation in shipping. 
Oil-bulk-ore carriers (OBO) are examples of ships providing an opportunity to shift 
to markets with higher freight rates. 
4. National and international rules and regulations. Design and operation of ships is 
regulated by national and international regulations. An example is the Oil Pollution 
Act 1990, introduced by the USA after the Exxon Valdez accident, which led to the 
development of double hull tankers. Other examples on how rules and regulations 
trigger, or constrain innovations are given in the previous section treating the 
institutional framework. 
5. (Technological) change in related sectors. Innovations in other areas, such as 
information technology, may enable the development of new transport services in 
shipping (e.g. more integrated transport chains). 
 
Finally, I will argue that experience, knowledge and skills within a company may 
trigger and direct an innovation process. 
 
Uncertainty 
 
None of the models discussed address uncertainty related to possible changes in the 
business environment. It is important to acknowledge the dynamic nature of the 
business environment. Although an innovation may be well suited for the situation 
when is was made, it may not be sufficiently robust to tackle changes in business and 
technological environment.  
 
Consider an example where a carrier invests in a certain information technology system 
used by their most important customer in order to offer the customer a better service. 
Two months after the implementation the customer goes bankrupt and no other 
customers are using the same information technology system. The innovation did not 
tackle a radical change in the business environment. 
 
A structured approach for dealing with such uncertainties is presented in chapter 3. 
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2.3 Adopting new products 
 
In section 2.1.2 it was concluded that adoption of new products could be considered an 
innovation for the adopter. In the previous section, I discussed three models of 
innovation addressing the development of new products. In this section, I look into the 
adoption of new products. Adoption is associated with the decision to buy, implement 
and make regular use of a new product. 
 
First, Rogers’ (1983) model of adoption is discussed. Rogers’ (1983) model is one of 
the best known, and most referred to in the adoption literature. Thereafter, the decision 
to adopt is related to the diffusion process. Diffusion refers to the process where new 
products are communicated to actors through a social or business network. Three 
models of the diffusion process and their implications for shipping are discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Rogers’ (1983) model of the adoption process 
 
Rogers (1983) presents an adoption model, consisting of two phases: initiation and 
implementation. The trigger of the process is identified as a performance gap: 
 
 “… the discrepancy between an organization’s expectations and its actual 
performance” 
(Rogers 1983, p.362) 
 
In order to fill this gap, a company will seek information on new products used by other 
companies. If the new product is likely to contribute in filling the performance gap, a 
decision to adopt may be taken, and the implementation of the new product will follow. 
A simplified version of Rogers (1983) model of adoption is shown in Figure 2-5. 
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Implementation
Putting the innovation 
into use
Initiation
Information gathering, and 
planning for the adoption 
of an innovation
The decision
to adopt
 Performance 
gap
 
Figure 2-5 A simplified version of Rogers' (1983) model of adoption 
A performance gap leads to a search for new products that may contribute to fill the performance 
gap. After the decision to adopt is taken, the implementation of the innovation starts. 
 
 
A crucial element in Rogers’ (1983) model is the decision to adopt. Rogers (1983) 
identifies five aspects of an innovation as being important for the decision to adopt: 
 
1. Relative advantages: Relative advantages are often measured in economic terms 
including such aspects as increased efficiency, reduced uncertainty, lowered costs 
and increased flexibility in relation to existing products. Relative advantages are 
considered to be the basis of rational decision-making. Rogers (1983), however, 
found four additional aspects which are discussed below. 
2. Compatibility: Compatibility includes both technological compatibility and cultural 
compatibility. If an innovation has poor technological compatibility with existing 
systems, the organisation must undergo greater change if adoption is to occur. This 
will reduce the relative advantages and increase the uncertainty due to the greater 
change necessary if adoption is to occur. Cultural compatibility address how well 
the innovation fits with norms and rules within the adapting organisation. 
3. Complexity: Complexity can be seen as the number of interconnections in a system. 
The understanding or knowledge of a system is dependent on the understanding of 
its component relationships. The more of interconnections that are poorly 
understood the greater is the probability that the adoption will fail. 
4. Trialability: Trialability refers to the extent to which an innovation can be tried on 
a small scale or temporarily. Trialability allows a potential adopter to decrease 
uncertainty by increasing tacit knowledge of the innovation through first hand 
experience without making a full commitment. Tacit knowledge is primarily gained 
through experience (insight) and is difficult to transfer (Ferguson 1995, Teece 1986, 
Dosi 1988b). 
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5. Observability: Observability of an innovation increases as more firms or 
individuals adopt the innovation. Observability increases the interest in the 
innovation by allowing potential adopters to increase their knowledge before 
making a commitment. 
 
The final evaluation of whether to adopt an innovation or not may be based on a 
perceived balance of these aspects. An extreme relative advantage may outweigh a 
weakness in one of the other aspects – a large gain in efficiency, for example, may 
motivate adoption, even though the use of an innovation has a poor cultural 
compatibility with the adopting organisation. 
 
Rogers’ (1983) model seems to capture some of the key activities in an adoption 
process. However, I would like to question the assumption that the adoption process is 
triggered by a performance gap. In the previous section, several additional triggers of 
innovation were discussed (e.g. a market need). 
 
Rogers’ (1983) description of the adoption process, and his five aspects of innovations, 
provide a starting point for understanding how companies may perceive and evaluate 
potential adoptions. 
 
Consider an example where a carrier is searching for new loading and unloading 
equipment to be installed on his/her ships. The equipment should contribute to a more 
efficient cargo handling. In addition to the relative advantages, such as increased 
efficiency and reduced costs in relation to the present equipment, the carrier must also 
address technical compatibility with existing port systems and cultural compatibility – 
how well does the technology fit with the competence of the crew? In addition, it may 
be necessary to consider the complexity of the new technology – the more of 
interconnections that are poorly understood the greater is the probability that the 
adoption will fail. If the new equipment could be tried temporarily on one of the 
carrier’s ships, the carrier could obtain first hand experience and increased (tacit) 
knowledge of the innovation without making a full commitment. Similarly, if a lot of 
other carriers operating in the same trades already have adopted the innovation, the 
carrier may increase his knowledge by studying their operation before making a 
commitment. 
 
Rogers (1983) does not specifically address the search process for a new product to be 
adopted – how does a company hear about an innovation in the first place? Diffusion 
theory, discussed in the following section, aims to describe these processes. 
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2.3.2 Diffusion of new products 
 
In order for a company to adopt a new product, the company needs to be made aware of 
the new product in some way. Awareness of a new product is obtained by diffusion of 
knowledge of the new product into the relevant industry. 
 
In diffusion theory the individual is normally the adopting unit. How then, is diffusion 
theory applicable to describe diffusion of products among companies? Realising that 
relations between companies are based on relations between individuals, I believe it is 
fair to suppose that diffusion of innovations among companies may be described by 
diffusion theory. 
 
Valente (1995) defines diffusion of innovations in this way: 
 
 “The spread of ideas, opinions, and products is referred to as the diffusion of 
innovations” 
(Valente 1995, p. xi) 
 
The definition above implies implicitly that Valente (1995) relates innovations to ideas, 
opinions and products, which is a rather broad definition of the concept. In this section, 
I will relate innovations to new products only.  
 
Another definition is given by Rogers (1983) defining diffusion as the process where: 
 
“an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” 
(Rogers 1983, p.5) 
 
Valente (1995) argues that a network of communication determines how quickly 
innovations diffuse and the time of each individual’s or company’s adoption. Valente’s 
(1995) understanding of networks may be related to the “industrial network approach” 
as discussed in section 2.2.3. Relations between actors may be regarded as channels for 
communication. 
 
Traditionally, the diffusion effect is modelled by mathematical relations in which 
adopters influence non-adopters at a specified rate and by assuming that once a 
company has adopted an innovation, the company remains an adopter and does not 
discontinue his/her adoption or develop negative attitudes toward the innovation. 
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Valente (1995) gives a hypothetical diffusion case of 100 potential adopters in which 
adopters influence non-adopters to adopt at a 1% rate. With 5 initial adopters among the 
100 potential adopters, 4,75 additional adopters are recruited (4,75 = 5x95x0,01) in time 
period 2. Now, at time period 3, there are 9,75 adopters and 90,25 non-adopters who 
interact, and 1% of those interactions result in adoptions: 8,8 new adopters. Thus after 
time period 3 there are 18,55 adopters (9,75 + 8,8). This diffusion effect continues until 
everyone in the system has adopted, which yields the diffusion curve as shown in Figure 
2-6. 
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Figure 2-6 Hypothetical diffusion curve (Valente 1995) 
The diffusion curve is based on adopters persuading non-adopters to adopt at a rate of 1% in a 
sample of 100 individuals with five initial adopters. 
 
 
In the following, I will look closer into so called relational models of the diffusion 
process. Relational models propose that direct contacts between individuals influence 
the spread of an innovation.  
 
Three relational models (Valente 1995) are discussed below, together with their 
implications for shipping. 
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1. Opinion leadership: 
• Opinion leaders are defined as those individuals in a network with whom most of 
the other individuals in the network communicate. Opinion leaders are early 
adopters of innovations. Generally, individuals in a network wait until the most 
influential members of the network adopt an innovation. After the opinion 
leaders adopt, risk and uncertainty about the innovation are considered to 
decrease and opinion followers are more likely to adopt the innovation. 
• In shipping, opinion leaders may be related to the larger and most influential 
carriers and their adoption behaviour. 
2. Group membership: 
• Individuals who are connected to one another in a group are more likely to share 
information with one another and hence reach common understanding and 
perceptions when faced with a new product. Consequently, individuals in the 
same group can be expected to have similar adoption times. This is particularly 
true for innovations that create interdependency such as new information and 
communication technologies. 
• In shipping, group membership may be related to liner conferences and shipping 
pools and the interdependence between their members. 
3. Personal network density: 
• Personal network density is the degree to which an individual's personal network 
is interconnected. A dense, or integrated, personal network is composed of 
numerous connections between the people who are communication partners. An 
individual with a dense network is not likely to receive much information from 
outside his/her own set of communication partners. Thus individuals with dense 
networks are more likely to hear of an innovation later and are thus, in average, 
later adopters of innovations. Non-dense networks are radial and indicate that an 
individual communicates with individuals who do not necessarily know or talk to 
one another and may enable an individual to hear about and thus adopt, an 
innovation early. Integrated and radial networks are illustrated in Figure 2-7. 
• In shipping, a radial network may be related to a company with  a number of 
formal and informal relations with customers, suppliers, competitors, other 
industries and institutions. 
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RadialIntegrated  
Figure 2-7 Integrated and radial networks (Valente 1995) 
An individual with an integrated network is more likely to hear of an innovation later than 
individuals with a radial network. 
 
 
Based on the above discussion of the three relational models, some implications for 
carriers may be drawn: 
 
• If a carrier has limited organisational slack (resources), the carrier should not adopt 
an innovation until the opinion leaders adopt. After the opinion leaders adopt, the 
observability of the use of the innovation increases allowing potential adopters to 
increase their knowledge before making a commitment, thus reducing the need for 
organisational slack. 
• Carriers who are connected to one another in a group should adopt an innovation at 
the same time, especially if the carriers are dependent on each other. 
• In order for a carrier to spot new products earlier than his or hers competitors, the 
carrier should strive towards a radial network by communicating with, for example, 
actors in other industries. Best practice companies (e.g. Federal Express for door-to-
door transport) may be studied in order to identify new ways of doing business. 
 
All three models emphasise the importance of individual relations as channels for 
communication on new innovations. 
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2.4 New forms of co-operation 
 
In section 2.1, I defined innovations in terms of new products, new processes and new 
forms of co-operation. In section 2.2 and 2.3 development and adoption of new products 
have been discussed. In this section, I look into new forms of co-operation. Usually, 
innovations have to be based on the development/adoption of new products and/or by 
co-operating with other companies. In section 2.1.1, I concluded that new forms of co-
operation are considered to be innovations for the companies involved. New forms of 
co-operation may also contribute to increase the total organisational slack (resources) 
for the companies, thus improving the conditions for innovation. Therefore, I feel it is 
appropriate to spend some time discussing new forms of co-operation. 
 
First, I discuss possible directions in which a company may co-operate.  
 
Then, I discuss how a co-operation may be governed by using different governance 
mechanisms. The understanding of different governance mechanisms is based upon four 
theoretical contributions complementing each other; Transaction Cost Economics 
(Williamson 1975, 1985), Agency Theory (Eisenhardt 1989), Industrial Network 
Theory (Mattson 1987, Håkansson and Johanson 1992, Håkansson and Snehota 1995) 
and Contract Theory (Klein et al. 1978, Haugland 1996). 
 
Finally, guidelines for developing and entering into a new co-operation are discussed. 
 
2.4.1 Directions of co-operation in a transport chain 
 
Haugland (1996) and Reve (1996) identify four directions in which a company may co-
operate: 
 
1. Downstream co-operation (e.g. carrier – shipper/receiver). 
2. Upstream co-operation (e.g. carrier – supplier/sender). 
3. Horizontal co-operation (e.g. carrier – carrier). 
4. Related/unrelated co-operation (e.g. carrier – carrier in other trade (related), carrier –  
insurance company (unrelated)). 
 
In a transport chain perspective, the four directions for co-operation are reduced to two 
basic forms of co-operation: horizontal co-operation and vertical co-operation. In 
addition, combinations of the two forms may occur. I define a horizontal co-operation 
as a co-operation between companies having the same task (e.g. sea transport), and a 
 45
2 Theoretical foundations – Innovation 
 
vertical co-operation as a co-operation between companies having different, but 
interdependent, tasks (e.g. sea transport and inland transport). 
 
2.4.2 Governance mechanisms discussed by Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is an evolving field of research promoted by 
Williamson (Williamson 1975, 1985). In a shipping context, a transaction may be 
defined as purchase and delivery of a transport service. In TCE, the transaction is the 
basic element of analysis, and the properties of transactions are important in explaining 
the optimal governance mechanism for a co-operation. 
 
TCE has frequently been used for analysing vertical forms of co-operation in transport 
chains. TCE may, however, also be applied to any other form of co-operation 
(Williamson 1993). 
 
In TCE, the governance mechanisms range from price to ownership. The price 
mechanism is related to transactions taking place in a market (e.g. purchase of transport 
in a spot market). The ownership mechanism is related to internal organised transactions 
(e.g. a shipper taking care of his/her own transport needs by an internal transport 
division). 
 
Generally, transaction costs are high when transactions are characterised by (Reve 
1990): 
 
• Asset specificity: investments which are specific to a particular transaction 
relationship (e.g. investments in common information technology systems, ships and 
special knowledge). 
• Uncertainty: ambiguity regarding transaction definition and performance (e.g. 
uncertainty regarding a new transport service such as processing of raw materials 
during transport). 
• Infrequency: transactions which are seldom undertaken (e.g. special type of transport 
service). 
 
When asset specificity and uncertainty are low, and transactions are relatively frequent, 
transactions will be governed by the price mechanism and take place in the market. 
When asset specificity and uncertainty are high, and transactions are not so frequent, 
transactions will be governed by the ownership mechanism and take place internally. 
 46
2 Theoretical foundations – Innovation 
 
Medium levels of asset specificity suggests bilateral relations through various types of 
co-operative agreements (e.g. strategic alliances) (Reve 1990). 
 
TCE suggests that carriers seeking strong alliances with other actors in a transport chain 
are more likely to succeed if the transactions involved are characterised by high asset 
specificity. High asset specificity may be achieved by investments in e.g. common 
information technology and special competence. 
 
2.4.3 Governance mechanisms discussed by Agency Theory 
 
Agency Theory (AT) is dealing with the co-operation between two actors. One of the 
actors (the principal) delegates tasks to another actor (the agent), who performs the 
tasks. In shipping, several interpretations of the principal/agent relationship may be 
given. In spot shipping, shippers may be regarded as principals seeking standard 
transport solutions, from a number of carriers, or agents. A big carrier, operating in 
intercontinental deep-sea trades, may be defined as the principal and the smaller short 
sea carriers (providing feeder services4) as the agents. Finally, a big short sea carrier 
may delegate transport to a smaller short sea carrier leading to a principal-agent relation 
between the two carriers.  
 
AT attempts to describe the principal/agent relationship by using the metaphor of a 
contract. The theory builds on the following assumptions (Eisenhardt 1989): 
 
• People are self-interest seeking, have bounded rationality and are risk averse. 
• Companies are faced with goal conflicts. 
• Information is a commodity which can be purchased. 
 
AT aims to determine the most efficient contract (behaviour versus outcome) a principal 
should choose to undertake with the opportunistic agent. AT has similarities with 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). Integration and ownership (TCE) roughly 
corresponds to behaviour-based contracts (AT). Price and market (TCE) roughly 
corresponds to outcome-based contracts (AT) (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
The core of AT is the trade-off between (a) the cost of measuring agent’s behaviour and 
(b) the cost of measuring outcomes and transferring risk to the agent. Generally, 
                                                 
4 Feeder services form a short sea network between ports in order for the freight (usually containers) to be 
consolidated or redistributed to or from a deep-sea service in one of these ports (hub-port). 
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outcome-based contracts are effective in curbing agent opportunism. Outcome-based 
contracts co-align the preferences of agents with those of the principal because the 
rewards for both depend on the same actions, reducing the conflicts of self-interest 
between principal and agent. Important guidelines for choosing the right type of 
contract (or governance mechanism) are (Eisenhardt 1989): 
 
• Good information systems5 lead to behaviour-based contracts. Information 
systems may be budgeting systems, reporting procedures and additional layers of 
management. In shipping, if a shipper has access to good logistics information 
systems, s/he may integrate with the carrier to some degree. 
• High outcome uncertainty leads to behaviour-based contracts. When outcome 
uncertainty is high, the costs of shifting risk to an agent are high and behaviour-
based contracts are attractive. In shipping, if outcome uncertainty is high (e.g. 
specialised transport), the shipper will want to integrate with the carrier (e.g. 
through ownership). 
• Large goal conflicts between principal and agent lead to outcome-based 
contracts. In shipping, if goal conflicts between the shipper and the carrier are 
large, the shipper will use the price (market) as a governance mechanism in order to 
increase the motivation of the carrier. 
• Long agency relationships lead to behaviour-based contracts. In a long-term 
relationship, it is likely that the principal will learn about the agent and so will be 
able to assess behaviour more readily. Behaviour-based contracts may therefore be 
increasingly preferred as a relation continues over time. In shipping, the shipper may 
choose to engage in a more close form of co-operation as time goes by and s/he 
learns about the capabilities of the carrier. 
 
Both Transaction Cost Economics and Agent Theory seem to stress the competitive and 
opportunistic aspects of relations, rather than the complementary nature of companies’ 
activities. In this way, the theories are useful in explaining the commodity segments of 
shipping characterised by a large number of carriers and fierce competition. However, 
for the more specialised industrial shipping segments, a counterbalance may be needed 
in order to explain relations between companies. In the next section, I will discuss 
Industrial Network Theory offering an alternative view on relations between companies. 
 
 
                                                 
5 In agency theory, information is regarded as a commodity: it has a cost, and it can be purchased. The 
implication is that organisations can invest in information systems in order to control agent opportunism 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
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2.4.4 Governance mechanisms discussed by Industrial Network Theory 
 
Industrial Network Theory (INT) assumes that relations between industrial actors are 
stable and characterised by openness, mutual trust and respect (Mattson 1987, 
Håkansson and Johanson 1992, Håkansson and Snehota 1995). The network model of 
innovation, discussed in section 2.2.3, is based on INT.  
 
Haugland and Reve (1994) argue that the governance mechanisms used in a specific 
situation seem to be dependent not only upon transactional properties, but also on 
relational properties. By complementing social dimensions from INT with the findings 
from Transaction Cost Economics and Agency Theory, they view the governance 
mechanisms of co-operations as combinations of price, authority (e.g. through 
ownership) and trust. Price reflects the market mechanism, while authority reflects the 
integration mechanism. Trust refers to compliance with social norms and personal 
relationships. Through an empirical survey of international distribution channels for 
Norwegian farmed salmon, they find support for the use of trust as a dominant 
governance mechanism in stable relationships or long-term contracts. 
 
Haugland and Reve (1994) argue that efficient governance cannot be achieved through 
implementation of one “right” governance mechanism, but rather through 
implementation of an optimal combination of different governance mechanisms. They 
use the concept of a vector to illustrate this point and argue that some combinations are 
common (e.g. a price-dominated vector, a trust-dominated vector and an authority-
dominated vector). 
 
From a carrier‘s point of view, INT indicates that as a relationship evolves over time, 
trust will be an increasingly important governance mechanism. 
 
2.4.5 Governance mechanisms discussed by Contract Theory 
 
Co-operation is often governed through the use of contracts. It is common to 
discriminate between explicit and implicit contracts. If information about all relevant 
factors is known and implemented in the contract, before it is signed, the contract is 
called an explicit contract. However, most contracts must address uncertainty, and do 
not address all imaginable future problems. The problems are solved as they appear and 
the contracts are termed as implicit contracts (Haugland 1996). 
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The time-horizon is another important aspect of contracts. Short-term contracts are often 
referred to as market contracts. Market contracts are used when all relevant factors are 
known (explicit contracts). The most common use of market contracts is in situations 
with purchase and sale of explicitly defined commodities and services within a limited 
time span (e.g. standard port to port transport in a spot market). The governance 
mechanism for market contracts is price. However, as the time span is widened and 
uncertainty (in future conditions) and possible post-contractual opportunistic behaviour6 
increases, price as a governance mechanism has limited efficiency (Haugland 1996). 
 
Three different forms of long-term contracts are identified and categorised according to 
their uncertainty and main governance mechanism (Haugland 1996): 
 
1. Classical long term contracts: These contracts try to specify all relevant factors 
before signing of the contract (approaches an explicit contract). The dominant 
governance mechanism is price. 
2. Internal contracts: These contracts focus the use of authority, rules and routines. 
The dominant governance mechanism is authority (e.g. integration through 
ownership). 
3. Relational contracts: These contracts focus co-operation based on trust. Relational 
contracts may be used in relations characterised by complex activities (e.g. in an 
innovation process). In such relations it will be complicated and costly to develop 
efficient price mechanisms or rules and routines for managing all possible future 
situations. The complexity will demand flexibility and continuous adaptation 
between the partners. The dominant governance mechanism is trust. 
 
Classical long-term contracts may be used in commodity shipping. Internal contracts 
may be associated with a tight co-operation (possibly through ownership) between a 
shipper and a carrier, in order to optimise a transport chain. Relational contracts may be 
used to govern a co-operation between a carrier and a yard during an innovation 
process. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Klein et al. (1978) examine the possibilities of post-contractual opportunistic behaviour. Their argument 
is that as asset specificity increases, the possible gains from opportunistic behaviour will increase, and the 
cost of contracting will generally increase more than the cost of vertical integration, leading to vertical 
integration as the co-operative form. This argument corresponds neatly with the guidelines for choosing 
co-operative forms, as given in Transaction Cost Economics. 
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2.4.6 Governance mechanisms and corresponding characteristics of 
transactions/relations 
 
With a basis in the four theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous sections, three 
different forms of co-operation are identified as market, alliance and integration. I have 
summarised the different governance mechanisms and the corresponding characteristics 
of transactions/relations for each of the three forms of co-operation in Figure 2-8. 
 
BA BA
B
A
Market Alliance Integration
Governance mechanisms:
• Trust
• Implicit contracts
Characteristics:
• Long term relations
• Complex activities
• Medium/high uncertainty
• Medium/high asset specifity
Governance mechanisms:
• Authority (e.g. ownership)
• Explicit/implicit contracts
Characteristics:
• Long term relations
• Structured activities
• High uncertainty
• High asset specifity
Governance mechanisms:
• Price
• Explicit contracts
Characteristics:
• Short term relations
• Measureable activities
• Low uncertainty
• Low asset specifity
 
Figure 2-8 Governance mechanisms and corresponding characteristics of 
transactions/relations 
Company (A) co-operates with another company (B). 
 
 
In addition to characteristics of transactions/relations, optimal governance mechanisms 
are subject to the institutional environment defining the rules of the game. Williamson 
(1993) argues that changes in property rights, contract laws, norms, customs and the 
like, may induce changes in the comparative costs of governance. In shipping, anti-trust 
legislation may ban attempts to establish carrier cartels or monopolies (through 
horizontal co-operation). 
 
I will argue that if a carrier seeks co-operation with other companies in order to increase 
organisational slack and thereby the ability to innovate, a horizontal alliance with 
another carrier could be the first step in this process. A vertical alliance may involve a 
carrier in activities where it has very little experience and should therefore not be 
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pursued before financial security and risk sharing is made possible through a horizontal 
co-operation. Full horizontal or vertical integration through ownership, may require 
extensive capital resources and increases administrative costs, although transaction costs 
and uncertainties are reduced. Falkenberg (1992) gives support for my argument that 
vertical integration may be difficult to obtain for a carrier. Falkenberg (1992) studied 
the use of governance mechanisms of strategic alliances in Norwegian shipping. Sixteen 
companies or divisions of companies participated in the study. In the study, a shipping 
liner company states that: 
 
“… the requirement of integration into areas of transportation so that you are 
able to provide a door to door service. … We have seen shipping companies 
purchasing trucking companies, and it has proven devastating. … because there 
are different conditions when it comes to operating a shipping company. I think 
that a natural way of creating door to door services would be to utilize 
organizations in the best possible way, namely to build on the knowledge that is 
within each individual company and try to find some kind of way of operating 
together – to build an alliance in that way. I think that will happen more and 
more.” 
Falkenberg (1992, p.44) 
 
In the Falkenberg (1992) study, a strategic alliance is defined as a co-operation between 
two or more companies in which each company attempts to add to its own competence 
by combining its resources with those of other companies. The most common type of 
alliances was found to be pooling agreements and these were investigated in-depth. 
Falkenberg (1992) makes use of the following definition of a pool: 
 
“Pool: A co-operation between owners who place vessels in a jointly controlled 
financial and operational unit where freight income on a time charter basis is 
divided between the partners according to a predetermined key.” 
(Falkenberg 1992, p. 42) 
 
The Falkenberg (1992) study showed that no single governance mechanism was applied 
in a co-operation, but all three (price, trust and authority) were used as circumstances 
varied. 
 
In the following, results from Falkenberg’s (1992) study of pooling arrangements are 
discussed. 
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In the study, trust is an important element in the governance of strategic alliances. One 
of the companies stated: 
 
“We've never abused their trust – and we've seen no signs that they've ever done 
anything but the reciprocal on their side” 
(Falkenberg 1992, p. 52) 
 
Price is also used as a governance mechanism in strategic alliances. The expectation of 
the partners is that the alliance will do as well or better than the market. Two of the 
companies state: 
 
“Make better return than the average market” and “produce satisfactory – which 
should be better than the average market” 
(Falkenberg 1992, p.54) 
 
The last governance mechanism is authority. This control mechanism may include 
elements such as meetings, reports and rules. Some quotes from the companies were: 
 
“We are sitting on the phone with them half the day and night, we have to supply 
them with all kinds of information” 
(Falkenberg 1992, p.54) 
 
“Control is built into the frequent regular, reporting within each section of such a 
working relation – complete openness is a key factor to have a successful 
relationship – daily exchanges as to what is happening in the market – regularly 
reporting, more formalised weekly and months summarising what is going on” 
(Falkenberg 1992, p.54) 
 
Falkenberg’s (1992) findings underline the argument of Haugland and Reve (1994) that 
efficient governance cannot be achieved through implementation of one “right” 
governance mechanism, but rather through implementation of an optimal combination. 
Falkenberg (1992) states that trust is an important control mechanism and it is used 
when the reputation of the partners is known and good. However, trust is not used 
without price. Price is used as a requirement that the alliances should be able to gain 
better prices than the market. Authority is used to a greater extent in cases where the 
reputation of the partner is not known or is poor. Authority is also used in the early 
stages of a co-operation in which the partners do not know each other. 
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2.4.7 Developing and entering into a co-operation 
 
In this section, I present some guidelines for developing and entering into a co-
operation. 
 
Haugland (1996) points to five stages in the development of a new co-operation: 
 
1. Discover complementarity: Companies realise that common goals may be reached 
by combining resources and competence. 
2. Identify activities and how to manage a co-operation: Identify activities for the 
co-operation and how to organise and manage the co-operation. 
3. Change: After some time there will usually be a need for changes in the co-
operation. This may be due to the fact that the importance of the co-operation 
becomes very critical for one of the actors and less critical for the other. 
4. Reorganise: The actors decide (separately) if it is fruitful to continue the co-
operation, and which activities should be included and how to manage these. 
5. New premises: After the reorganisation, the co-operation continues on new 
premises. 
 
Partly inspired by the five stages referred above, I present a model of the development 
of a new co-operation in Figure 2-9. 
 
In the model, a discovery of complementarity or equality in operation is assumed to 
trigger the co-operative efforts (the discovery may for instance be based on new 
customer requirements, e.g. need for just in time deliveries). After the companies have 
agreed to co-operate, they have to identify relevant activities which may constitute the 
basis of the co-operation. They also have to agree on the appropriate governance 
mechanisms (price, trust and authority) of the co-operation before entering into the co-
operation. After some time, a change in terms of power-dependency aspects will 
probably be experienced in the co-operation. This may be because one of the actors is 
more dependent upon the co-operation than the other, because of opportunistic 
behaviour by one of the actors, or because new complementarity or equality is 
discovered, leading to new business opportunities. The actors may choose to reorganise 
their co-operation according to the identified changes in the relation, or they may wish 
to end the co-operation. If they choose to reorganise, the search for complementary or 
equal activities and resources and appropriate governance mechanisms should start over 
again. 
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Discover 
complementarity or 
equality in operation
Reorganise 
co-operation
Change in the 
co-operation
Identify complementary/equal 
activities and resources. Agree 
on appropriate governance 
mechanisms
End co-operation
Enter into a new 
co-operation
Continue or 
discontinue
 
Figure 2-9 A model of the development of a co-operation 
Two actors choose to co-operate based on a discovery of complementarity or equality in operation. 
Complementary or equal activities and resources are identified and governance mechanisms are 
agreed upon before entering into a co-operation. Power-dependency aspects, opportunism and 
discovery of new complementarity or equality may change the basis for the co-operation, leading to 
a reorganisation or termination. 
 
 
A rationale for seeking a co-operation may also be explained with a basis in Power-
Dependency Theory (Emerson 1962). Emerson argues that power is a property of a 
social relation – it is not an attribute of the actor. Hence, to say that “X has power” is 
meaningless, unless one specifies “over whom”. Emerson (1962) states that the power 
of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A  (Emerson 1962, 
p.33). 
 
Emerson argues that: 
 
“The power of actor A over actor B is the amount of resistance on the part of B 
which can be potentially overcome by A” 
(Emerson 1962, p. 32) 
 
“The dependence of actor A upon actor B is (1) directly proportional to A's 
motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional to 
the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation” 
(Emerson 1962, p.33) 
 
In a commodity market with many carriers and strong competition, one may assume 
that a shipper does not have a significant dependence upon a single carrier. The shipper 
may be encouraged to exercise his/her power by playing the carriers up against each 
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other and thereby lower his/her transport costs. The power/dependency relation between 
the shipper and the carriers is unbalanced. According to Emerson (1962), a number of 
balancing operations are likely to be initiated. One of these balancing operations may be 
related to horizontal alliances, where carriers seek to reduce possible alternatives for the 
shipper to realise his/her need for transport. Another of the balancing operations may be 
related to vertical alliances, where a carrier seeks to increase the shipper's motivational 
interest in the carrier's goals. If the shipper realises that a stronger co-operation with the 
carrier may lead to a decrease in transport costs or an increase in customer satisfaction, 
a stronger co-operation may emerge, creating a more balanced power/dependency 
relation. 
 
Haugland (1996) points to four factors influencing the decision to enter into a co-
operation or not: 
 
• Strategic core: Co-operation close to the company's strategic core necessitate 
certain precautions, as there is a certain risk that an opportunistic partner will seek to 
imitate the company's core skills. 
• Relation specific investments: If one of the parts has significant higher investments 
in a co-operation than the other, and the other quits the co-operation, the part with 
the big investments may suffer a considerable economical loss. 
• Equal or complementary activities and resources: Companies need to identify 
and evaluate benefits of co-ordinating equal or complementary activities and 
resources. 
• Complexity: A complex co-operation is characterised by a high degree of required 
resources and activities not known ex-ante. 
 
In the following, a further discussion of each of the four factors is given. 
 
Strategic core 
 
Strategic core may be defined as unique and valuable assets that are necessary to attain 
a company’s strategic goals (Reve 1990). Reve (1990) argues that examples of core 
skills include specific availability of natural or technological resources, human assets, 
and know-how. However, strategic core may also be related to external relationships 
that the firm masters better than its competitors (Reve 1996). Core skills may be visible 
(e.g. physical assets), but more often they are invisible (Itami 1987) and contained in 
people's heads and organisational routines and culture (Reve 1990).  
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In a study of Norwegian shipping companies undertaken by Falkenberg (1992), 
companies defined the strategic core of their company both in terms of physical assets 
(e.g. ships), as well as in terms of human assets (e.g. management and operation of 
ships).  
 
As the strategic core is the most unique of a company, it has to be protected in order to 
prevent imitation from other companies. Co-operation close to the company's strategic 
core necessitate certain precautions, as there is a certain risk that an opportunistic 
partner will seek to imitate the company's core skills (Haugland 1996). 
 
Relation specific investments 
 
Relation specific investments are treated in section 2.4.2, referred to as asset specificity. 
Relation specific investments may not have many applications outside a co-operation: 
the investments may be related to investments in buildings, machines, human capital 
(special knowledge) and organisational routines and methods (Reve 1991). In situations 
where both parts have invested to the same extent, they will generally have the same 
interest in a continuation of a co-operation. However, all actors are not necessarily 
opportunistic, but one can not know ex-ante if any of them will act opportunistic 
(Haugland 1996). 
 
Equal or complementary activities and resources 
 
Co-ordination of equal activities and resources may contribute to benefits related to 
economies of scale, and co-ordination of complementary activities and resources may 
result in new services and/or new markets. Companies need to identify and evaluate 
benefits of co-ordinating equal or complementary activities and resources. 
 
In shipping, an example of a co-operation based on equal activities and resources is 
pooling of a certain type of vessels. Two or more carriers may market and operate their 
ships together. An example of a co-operation based on complementary activities and 
resources is co-operation between a short sea carrier and a deep sea carrier. Together, 
the two carriers may offer new transport solutions including short sea distribution and 
feedering. 
 
Complexity 
 
Complexity is related to what extent it is possible to plan in advance the execution of 
the co-operation. A high complexity may be associated with the development of 
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completely new products, requiring competence that is not presently available in the co-
operating companies. 
 
In shipping, a complex co-operation may be related to a carrier and a trucker co-
operating in order to develop a transport service involving real time tracking of cargo. A 
less complex co-operation may be related to two carriers pooling their vessels in order 
to reduce their costs. While the former co-operation is characterised by activities not 
known ex-ante, the latter is characterised by activities well known by the actors. 
 
2.5 Conclusions of chapter 2 
 
In section 2.1, it is concluded that companies requesting innovations may: 
 
• Develop, adopt and implement, 
• evolutionary and revolutionary, 
• products and co-operative forms, 
• by acknowledging and treating uncertainty with respect to changes in the business 
environment. 
 
It is concluded that in order to increase the probability of success, companies need to 
have an opinion of the future in an innovation process. However, as the future can not 
be predicted, companies are faced with a number of challenging uncertainties, as they 
plan their future service portfolio. 
 
In section 2.2, it is concluded that the innovation process is presently viewed as a 
complex and dynamic interplay between different actors in a business network. Stable 
relations between actors are viewed as a precondition for initiating and accomplishing 
an innovation process.  
 
Further: 
 
• Innovative activities require organisational slack (resources). 
• The institutional framework (authorities, institutions, education systems and 
research institutions) may trigger, or constrain an innovation process. 
• Several conditions (e.g. geographical restrictions) may trigger innovations. 
• Products should be developed based on an understanding of possible changes in the 
business environment. 
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In section 2.3, it is concluded that five aspects of a new product are important for a 
decision to adopt: 
 
1. Relative advantages (e.g. increased efficiency and flexibility). 
2. Compatibility (e.g. technological and cultural compatibility with existing systems 
and organisation). 
3. Complexity (e.g. number of interconnections in a system). 
4. Trialability (e.g. possibility of small scale tests). 
5. Observability (e.g. number of users at a given time). 
 
Further, the decision to adopt is related to a diffusion process, where a new product is 
communicated to members of a network. Three models describe how relations between 
members of a network influence the diffusion process and the decision to adopt: 
 
1. Opinion leadership: After the opinion leaders (e.g. large carriers) adopt, risk and 
uncertainty about the innovation is considered to decrease and opinion followers are 
more likely to adopt the innovation. 
2. Group membership: Companies connected to one another in a group (e.g. a shipping 
pool) can be expected to have similar adoption times. 
3. Personal network density: Companies with a radial network of relations (e.g. 
relations to companies in other industries) are more likely to hear about a new 
product earlier than companies with an integrated network of relations (i.e. few, but 
strong relations). 
 
In section 2.4, it is concluded that a company may co-operate in four directions:  
 
1. Downstream co-operation (e.g. carrier – shipper/sender). 
2. Upstream co-operation (e.g. carrier – supplier/receiver). 
3. Horizontal co-operation (e.g. carrier – carrier). 
4. Related/unrelated co-operation (e.g. carrier – carrier in other trade (related), carrier –  
insurance company (unrelated)). 
 
Further, three forms of co-operation are identified as market, alliance and integration. A 
co-operation is normally governed by using a combination of price, authority and trust. 
 
A model of the development of a new co-operation is presented, assuming that two 
actors choose to co-operate based on a discovery of complementarity or equality in 
operation. 
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Finally, four factors influencing the decision to co-operate are identified and discussed:  
 
1. Strategic core. 
2. Relation specific investments. 
3. Equal or complementary activities and resources. 
4. Complexity. 
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3 Theoretical foundations – Scenarios 
 
In this chapter I present a set of scenario-based guidelines for innovation in shipping. 
By following these guidelines, a company may: 
 
• Explore innovations 
• Evaluate innovations 
• Implement innovations 
 
First, the history of scenarios is reviewed in order to understand how scenarios have 
been used in the past and how scenarios are used today. Then, the benefits of using 
scenarios are discussed in order to show how scenarios may guide innovation. A 
company has to develop a set of scenarios prior to the application of the scenario-based 
guidelines for innovation and a representative technique for developing scenarios is 
therefore presented. Finally, the scenario-based guidelines for innovation are presented. 
 
3.1 The history of scenarios 
 
In this section, I review how scenarios have been used in the past and how scenarios are 
used today. The review is roughly divided into three periods: 
 
• 1940-1970 
• 1970-1990 
• 1990-Today 
 
which are reviewed in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.1.1 Initial use of scenarios (1940-1970) 
 
Scenarios emerged following World War II, as a method for military planning. The U.S. 
Air Force tried to imagine what its opponents might do, and prepared alternative 
counter active strategies (Schwartz 1991). 
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In the 1960s, Herman Kahn, who had been involved in the Air Force effort, refined 
scenarios and developed a business tool for prognostication. In 1967, Kahn and Wiener 
defined scenarios as: 
  
“... hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing 
attention on causal processes and decision-points” (Kahn and Wiener 1967, p.6). 
 
The scenarios considered by Kahn and Wiener were to a large extent focused on 
governmental and military issues. The scenarios were developed in order to have a 
preventive effect (e.g. avoid use of nuclear weapons) and did not aim to serve the needs 
of specific companies. 
 
In parallel with Kahn and Wiener’s scenario efforts, traditional quantitative forecasting 
techniques developed in the 1960s. Such techniques include trend analyses (for example 
time series methods, regression models and extrapolation techniques) and econometric 
models (Linneman 1983, Mandel 1993, Elias 1997). As they rely explicitly on past data, 
they may be useful in forecasting the short term, but work less well for longer range 
forecasting. Significant structural change can invalidate their projections seriously 
(Makridakis and Wheelwright 1989, Mandel 1993, Elias 1997). However, the 
techniques, worked fine in the 1960s as everything was more or less directly related to 
the gross national product (GNP), rising by about 5% a year (Godet 1987). 
 
3.1.2 The rise and fall of scenarios (1970-1990) 
 
The early 1970s, or more specifically the oil price shock in 1973, is frequently referred 
to as a turning point at which the future ceased to be predictable, due to increased 
uncertainty and more turbulence (Godet 1983, 1987, Mandel 1993, Mandel and Wilson 
1993, Schwartz 1991, Wack 1985a, Makridakis and Wheelwright 1989, Amara and 
Lipinski 1983, Fahey and Randall 1997a). Mintzberg (1994) criticises the extensive use 
of the word turbulence, meaning “violent disorder” or “commotion” according to his 
dictionary. He argues that turbulence is simply uncertainty in the marketplace, due to 
the unexpected. Further, he criticises the traditional forecasting and prediction 
techniques that emerged in the 1960s, due to their limited capability to handle the 
uncertainty. 
 
In the search for techniques being able to handle uncertainty, the theoretical and 
practical foundations for the use of scenarios in business were developed in the 1970s. 
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One of the theoretical foundations of scenarios was developed by Godet when he was in 
charge of the Department of Futures Studies with the SEMA Metra Consulting Group 
from 1974 to 1979 (Godet 1983, 1987, 1990). The scenario methodology developed by 
Godet makes extensive use of structural analysis and expert methods (Delphi and Cross-
impact matrix, refer section 3.3) in order to identify key variables concerning the future 
and to assign probabilities to these. 
 
Practical development of scenarios, to guide strategy rather than for academic uses, was 
initiated by a community of thinkers on the topic in the early 1970s. The importance of 
using scenarios to address uncertainties in strategic planning was dramatically 
underlined by the confusion which followed the oil price shock in 1973 (Mercer 1995). 
Before proceeding with the history of scenarios, I will shortly discuss the oil price 
shock, its implications for shipping and how Royal Dutch Shell did manage to prepare 
for the shock by using scenarios. 
 
Up till the early 1960s, seven large Oil Companies (Chevron, Esso, Gulf, Mobil, 
Texaco, British Petroleum and Shell), referred to as “the Seven Sisters”, controlled 
production, distribution and sales in all important oil-producing countries in the 
Western world. In 1960, thirteen oil-producing countries formed a cartel named OPEC 
(Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in order to reduce the power exerted 
by the large Oil Companies (Tenold 1995). 
 
In the early 1970s, the United States was beginning to exhaust its oil reserves, and the 
American demand for oil was steadily rising (Schwartz 1991). In the tanker market, the 
freight rates were increasing, and from May to September 1973, the rates increased 
from Worldscale7 100 to Worldscale 475. The Yom Kippur war between Egypt and 
Israel in October 1973 lead to a dramatic change in this development. After the war, the 
Arabian member countries in OPEC decided to reduce their oil-production with 25%, 
resulting in a 400% increase in the oil price and a significant reduction in the demand 
for oil transport. In the market for large tankers, the rates dropped from Worldscale 450 
in October to Worldscale 55 in November (Tenold 1995).  
 
A number of Norwegian shipowners got into trouble and went bankrupt due to the low 
freight rates. Norwegian shipowners controlled 15% of the world tanker tonnage and 
50% of the tonnage was offered in the spot market. In contrast to foreign shipowners, 
the majority of Norwegian shipowners based their new-building contracts on historical 
levels of freight rates rather than expectations of future supply and demand conditions, 
                                                 
7 Worldscale is a freight rate system used in the tanker segment of shipping. 
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resulting in a high number of contracted tanker deliveries in the following years (Tenold 
1995). 
 
Not all companies were caught by surprise when the oil price rose in 1973. In the early 
1970s, planners at Royal Dutch/Shell experimented with scenarios and were looking 
for events that could affect the price of oil, which had been more or less steady since 
World War II. Now, however, there seemed to be several significant events in the air. 
The United States was beginning to exhaust its oil reserves. Meanwhile, American 
demand for oil was steadily rising, and the OPEC was showing signs of flexing its 
political muscle. Most of these countries were Islamic, and they bitterly resented 
Western support of Israel after the 1967 six-day Arab-Israeli war. Looking at these 
factors, the planners at Royal Dutch/Shell realised that Arabs could demand much 
higher price for their oil. There was every reason they would. The only uncertainty was 
when. Based on these events, two scenarios were developed just in time to prepare 
Royal Dutch/Shell for the emerging oil crisis (Schwartz 1991). 
 
In chapter 1, the first of the necessary conditions for developing scenarios states that 
“The future is uncertain”. Scenarios may help in analysing and preparing for changes 
in the business environment. The example above clearly underlines the importance of 
having an opinion of how the future may develop when contracting new ships or 
introducing new services and innovations in a market. 
 
The use of scenarios gained rapid acceptance in the late 1970s. Empirical research 
conducted by researchers in the United States in the late 1970s show that scenario 
techniques were among the most popular strategic planning tools. A survey of Fortune 
500 firms in 1977, conducted by Diffenbach (1983) shows that scenarios were the third 
most used planning technique, following expert opinion and trend exploration. 
 
In addition, Linneman and Klein (1979) and Linneman (1983) measured a rapid 
increase in the use of scenarios between 1977 and 1981 by examining the Fortune 1000 
industrials. In 1981 50% of the respondent firms (215 firms responded) stated that they 
used multiple scenarios, compared to 22% in 1977. The non-respondent bias check 
showed that 35% of these firms (72 of 78 contacted firms responded) used scenarios in 
1981, compared to 13% in 1977. The surveys also showed that scenarios usually were 
developed without expert methods, such as the Delphi and Cross-impact analysis (refer 
section 3.3). Klein and Linneman (1981) also provided eight case studies of 
representative companies using scenarios, based on their 1977 study. These companies 
were involved in a set of rather diverse business areas such as food processing, 
chemicals, petroleum, transportation equipment and steel manufacturing. 
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From the early 1980s and up till the late 1980s, the use of scenarios was not particularly 
popular. Mercer (1995) argues that possibly as a result of sophisticated approaches (e.g. 
extensive use of structural analysis and expert methods as promoted by Godet (1983, 
1987, 1990)), scenarios earned a reputation of difficulty and cost in use. 
 
3.1.3 Rethinking the use of scenarios (1990-Today) 
 
From the late 1980s and up till now, there seems to be an increased interest in scenarios. 
Elias (1997) argues that the interest in scenario planning has increased sharply in recent 
years, based on the number of articles on this subject appearing in three major databases 
of English-language business and trade literature. This trend seems to continue into the 
late 1990s, as several comprehensive books on the topic recently have been published, 
see for example Georgantaz and Acar (1995), Van Der Heijden (1996), Fahey and 
Randall (1997a) and Ringland (1998). 
 
In Norway, Statoil’s Exploration and Development Division introduced scenario-based 
planning in the late 1980’s to develop a research and development strategy for oil and 
gas exploration and production. A review and discussion of this work is given by 
Stokke et al. (1990) and by Wilson (1997). At about the same time, a big Norwegian 
scenario project identified three possible scenarios for Norway in the year 2000. A 
presentation of the scenarios is given by Hompland (1987). 
 
More recent Norwegian contributions are given by Reve and Stokke (1996). They use a 
scenario methodology in the development of a model for strategy analysis. Finally, in 
the period 1997-1998, MARINTEK and SRI Consulting produced a report that gives a 
scenario-based analysis of innovation in the container industry (Trondsen 1998). Results 
from this project were presented on the International RINA Conference on Design and 
Operation of Containerships (Kroneberg 1999a). A copy of the RINA paper (Kroneberg 
1999a) is in Appendix A. 
 
Elias (1997) argues that although number-crunching computer power is available today 
at a lower cost than ever before, companies are moving away from quantitative tools in 
favour of more qualitative techniques, such as scenario techniques. Scenarios allow the 
inclusion of elements that are impossible to quantify, such as new regulations, value 
shifts, or radical innovation. The trend towards qualitative descriptions of the future 
may be due to the fact that they are quicker to develop and are usually perceived as 
more realistic images. 
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3.2 The benefits of scenarios 
 
In this section, the benefits of scenarios are discussed in order to show how scenarios 
may guide innovations. First, I discuss how scenarios treat uncertainty about future 
development as I have underlined the importance of addressing the future in an 
innovation process several times (refer section 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1). Thereafter, I 
discuss how scenarios may contribute in guiding the exploration, evaluation and 
implementation of innovations according to the goals put forward in section 1.2. 
 
3.2.1 Scenarios treat uncertainty regarding how the future might develop 
 
Scenarios are structurally different stories about how the future might develop. This 
implies that the first of the necessary conditions in chapter 1 (“The future is uncertain”) 
has to be met in order to develop scenarios. 
 
In developing scenarios, companies have to analyse how external forces may lead to a 
future structurally different from the situation today. An example of an (aggregated) 
external force may be globalisation. Today, companies are increasingly producing for a 
global market. Global companies require global suppliers of logistics services thus 
resulting in a number of mergers among carriers. A recent example is the merger 
between Wallenius Lines and Wilhelmsen Lines (July 1999). Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
Lines is the world’s largest vehicle and RoRo transportation and Logistics Company 
with a market share of 23%.  
 
By analysing how external forces may develop and play out, a number of plausible 
futures (scenarios) are identified. In this way, the scenarios may be used as a “map of 
the future”, enabling companies to prepare for the future and identify directions for 
innovation. The “map of the future” analogy is supported by a number of scenario 
projects undertaken by SRI Consulting8. In these projects, companies report a wide 
range of benefits including the development of consistent frameworks and language for 
discussing critical future issues throughout the business (Zaman and Wilson 1991, 
Mandel and Wilson 1993, Mandel 1993, Fergusson 1998).  
 
In order to make a good “map of the future” the scenarios should embrace the extreme 
points of plausible futures relevant for the strategic decisions, which need to be taken. 
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This understanding corresponds to the last of the three scenario requirements as 
presented in section 1.4. 
 
3.2.2 Scenarios guide exploration of innovations 
 
A number of well known scenario practitioners and authors argue that scenarios may be 
used to identify possible business opportunities and new strategy alternatives. See for 
example Fahey and Randall (1997b 1997c), Fahey (1997), Schwartz (1991), Mandel 
and Wilson (1993) and Wack (1985b). 
 
A couple of quotations from the above mentioned contributions underline the potential 
for scenarios to guide the exploration of directions for innovation: 
 
“Scenarios are thus the most powerful vehicles I know for challenging our 
“mental models” about the world, and lifting the blinders that limit our creativity 
and resourcefulness” 
(Schwartz 1991, p. xv) 
 
“The scenario process increases the range of what participants see and expands 
their mental models” 
(Van Der Heijden 1996, p. 51) 
 
“Using the newly developed scenarios the team mentally makes new combinations 
of scenario elements, leading to the invention of new and original strategy”  
(Van Der Heijden 1996, p. 125) 
 
Further, Mason (1994) relates scenario-based exploration of strategies to a learning 
process. He argues that our experience-based mental models are based on past 
knowledge and may not be carrying new, critical information, thus leading to possibly 
wrong strategic decisions. He argues further, in concert with Schwartz (1991), that a key 
success factor is how fast a company can learn, and that the ability to learn can be 
enhanced through the use of scenarios in strategic discussions. 
 
Accepting that scenarios may be used to identify possible business opportunities and 
new strategy alternatives, it follows that scenarios may guide the exploration of 
                                                                                                                                               
8 Stanford Research Institute Consulting is a subsidiary of Stanford Research Institute International. 
Stanford Research Institute International helped pioneer the use of scenarios more than 25 years ago, 
along and in parallel with Royal Dutch/Shell (Syed 1996, Fergusson 1998). 
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directions for innovation. This application of scenarios is further supported by a number 
of scenario projects undertaken by SRI Consulting. In these projects, companies report a 
wide range of benefits including benefits related to new ways of thinking about and 
planning for the future, i.e. exploratory studies (Zaman and Wilson 1991, Mandel and 
Wilson 1993, Mandel 1993, Fergusson 1998). 
 
However, some pitfalls may arise in exploratory exercises. Hamilton (1981) argues that 
a game-like atmosphere may occur. In order to avoid an atmosphere characterised by 
lack of true commitment from participants one may: 
 
• Underline that the explorative efforts will provide a basis for a further development 
and evaluation of identified directions for innovation. 
• State that the goal of the scenario process is to implement a set of new services. 
• Assure participation of decision-makers in the process (i.e. participants from the top 
management). The decision-makers will have the authority to approve further 
development, evaluation and finally implementation of innovations. 
 
Another pitfall may be related to people tending to be conservative and resistant to 
imagine dramatic shifts in the business environment. Scenarios may, however, be of 
help in forcing conservative people to think beyond a “most likely” future and expand 
their mental models of the future. 
 
Finally, a pitfall may be related to problems in concretising the implications of the 
scenarios (e.g. directions for innovation). The reason for this is that scenario techniques 
are mainly of a qualitative and intuitive nature, thus resulting in “story-based” 
scenarios. The strategic consequences of stories may sometimes be hard to concretise 
and quantify (e.g. “How many vessels, of what capacity and speed should be bought or 
chartered if this scenario should occur?”). A lack of clear understanding of strategic 
consequences derived by scenarios, is a potential obstacle for fully realising the benefits 
from using scenarios. Fagerholt and Kroneberg (2000) integrate scenario and 
optimisation techniques in order to improve the applicability of scenarios in terms of 
quantifiable consequences. A copy of this paper is given in Appendix B. 
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3.2.3 Scenarios guide evaluation of innovations 
 
In the previous section I argued that scenarios might guide the exploration of 
innovation. By using scenarios a company may identify business opportunities and with 
that directions for innovation. However, the company may be forced to choose a limited 
number of opportunities for further development and the possible directions for 
innovation therefore have to be evaluated. In this section, I show how scenarios may 
contribute in this respect. 
 
In a scenario-based evaluation of the directions for innovation, the organisational slack 
of the company must be taken into account. Although a certain innovation may meet the 
future requirements (e.g. market needs) in a superior way, limitations in organisational 
slack may prevent a further development and implementation of the innovation. In 
chapter 1, organisational slack is defined as time, financial and competency resources. 
 
A Company is faced with two possible techniques for evaluating and deciding on which 
directions for innovation to be further pursued: 
 
1. Identify robust directions for innovation. A robust direction for innovation is 
defined as a direction that will play out well in all of the scenarios (i.e. a payoff > 0 
for all scenarios). 
2. Identify optimal directions for innovation. An optimal direction for innovation is 
defined as the direction that will play out best in a given scenario (i.e. the highest 
payoff in a given scenario). 
 
A scenario/strategy payoff matrix (Leemhuis 1985) may be used to present the results of 
a scenario-based evaluation process. The results are accumulated into consistent 
quantitative or qualitative payoffs for each of the scenarios. An example of such a 
payoff matrix is given in Table 3-1. 
 
Strategy  
(Direction for innovation) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
1 100 20 20 50 
2 40 50 90 -30 
3 20 50 -50 10 
Table 3-1 A scenario/strategy payoff matrix 
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With a basis in Table 3-1, one may identify both robust and optimal directions for 
innovation: 
 
• Strategy 1 is a robust direction for innovation as the payoff never goes below zero. 
• Optimal directions for innovation are defined as the directions with the best payoff 
for a given scenario: 
• Scenario 1: Strategy 1. 
• Scenario 2: Strategy 2 and 3. 
• Scenario 3: Strategy 2. 
• Scenario 4: Strategy 1. 
 
The scenario-based evaluation process may be carried out at different levels of detail 
according to a company’s need. A comprehensive evaluation may be obtained by 
attaching different levels of weight or probability to the scenarios. 
 
However, there are some arguments in favour of not attaching different levels of 
probability to scenarios. Mandel (1993) argues that comprehensive scenarios are quite 
improbable, due to the fact that each scenario includes much information and many 
estimates about future conditions. For all these conditions to happen as described is 
unlikely. The future that actually occurs will more likely fall within the envelope of 
uncertainty indicated by a good set of scenarios. The problems with attaching 
probabilities to scenarios are also underlined by Bonnett and Olson (1994) and Schnaars 
(1987). As the purpose of scenarios is partly to enrich the understanding of future 
uncertainties in the business environment, scenarios aim more to examine the interplay 
and dynamics of forces shaping the future than to identify a most probable scenario. 
Godet (1987) points to the case of four different scenarios (S) with the following 
probabilities: S1, probability 0.40; S2 probability 0.25; S3, probability 0.15; S4 
probability 0.20. The most probable scenario (S1) is in fact the least probable outcome 
– the most probable outcome is that any one of the three other scenarios will emerge. 
 
With a basis in the discussion of problems in assigning probabilities to scenarios, it is 
generally recommended that companies pursue robust directions for innovations. 
Alternatively, a monitoring system may be established in order to track emerging 
scenario(s) and respond quickly by pursuing already identified optimal directions for 
innovation. Monitoring systems are treated in the next section. 
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The evaluation of directions for innovation should also include considerations related to 
some of the findings in chapter 2: 
 
• In section 2.1, I concluded that one could distinguish between the development and 
the adoption of new products. In this respect it may be useful to think of the total 
range of innovation processes as extending continuously from those that involve 
modest to those that involve very great uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty related to 
technical conditions and customer acceptance of new product or service). At the one 
end, the adoption of an earlier developed and tested product and at the other end the 
development of a completely new product. 
• In section 2.2, I concluded that innovation is presently viewed as a complex and 
dynamic interplay between different actors in a business network. Stable relations 
between actors are a precondition for initiating an innovation process and for 
ensuring market success. Further, I argued that the institutional framework might 
constrain certain directions for innovation. 
• In section 2.3, I concluded that five aspects of a new product are important for a 
decision to adopt (relative advantages, compatibility, complexity, trialability and 
observability). 
• In section 2.4, I concluded that four factors are influencing the decision to co-
operate (strategic core, relation specific investments, equal or complementary 
activities and resources and complexity). 
 
The above mentioned findings should be addressed and attached importance to, when 
assessed as relevant. 
 
3.2.4 Scenarios guide implementation of innovations 
 
With a basis in a scenario-based evaluation of directions for innovation (refer previous 
section), robust directions for innovation may be identified and analysed further in order 
to implement new robust transport services. 
 
Optimal directions for innovation, however, may be the right choice only if a certain 
scenario or combination of scenarios is emerging. A monitoring system may as 
mentioned contribute in tracking emerging scenario(s). 
 
Scenarios are based on assumptions regarding developments in key drivers of change 
(clusters of external forces with high impact on the decisions to be taken and with a 
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high uncertainty with respect to their outcome). The key drivers of change point to key 
indicators for monitoring. By monitoring key indicators, a company may track the 
migration of business towards a certain scenario or combination of scenarios (Zaman 
and Wilson 1991). In this way, monitoring of key indicators creates an early warning 
system and ensures that innovative efforts are consistent with the likely emerging 
scenario(s). The importance of an early warning system is underlined by Porter (1980), 
Hamilton (1981), Schwartz (1991) and Fahey and Randall (1997a). 
 
Makridakis and Wheelwright (1989) give a review of some of the different monitoring 
systems in use. They argue that the critical element in monitoring is the selection of the 
type of factor (describing the key driver of change) to be monitored. One of the 
monitoring techniques they look into is based on the concept of quality control charts. 
The principle of quality control is to discover as soon as possible, when a process or a 
product has deviated in a non-random manner from its normal value. The desired mean 
or average is plotted as a horizontal line, and above and below it two parallel lines are 
drawn. The upper line is called the upper control limit (UCL) and the lower line is 
called the lower control limit (LCL). The analyst sets the distances of these two limits 
from the mean by addressing the importance and the characteristics of the factor being 
measured. I will argue that monitoring of key indicators identified by the scenarios may 
be carried out in a similar way. The scenarios may identify branching points where one 
scenario moves towards another. If the key indicators stay within the control limits, a 
“More of the same” scenario is expected. An illustration of a monitoring chart is given 
in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Monitoring of a key indicator 
Key indicators may be monitored in order to uncover emerging scenario(s). The upper control limit 
and the lower control limit correspond to the value range for a key indicator in a specific scenario. 
If these limits are crossed another scenario, or combination of scenarios, may be emerging giving 
reasons for a shift in direction for innovation. 
 
 
In Figure 3-1, the monitoring of a quantifiable key indicator is shown. However, some 
key drivers of change may not so easily be translated into quantifiable key indicators for 
monitoring. Some key drivers of change may be related to qualitative processes, e.g. a 
political process leading to a deregulation of the liner conferences (refer Kroneberg 
1999a). It is important that different key drivers of change are monitored differently 
according to their characteristics. Typical sources for information on key indicators may 
be official statistics, journals, magazines, newspapers, conferences, fairs and a 
company’s relations to other actors in a business network. 
 
Finally, monitoring may provide signals for necessary changes in the scenarios 
themselves: 
 
• New drivers of change are discovered. 
• Some of the drivers are assigned known outcomes (e.g. an irreversible deregulation 
of the liner conferences may occur). 
 
By guiding necessary revisions of scenarios, monitoring efforts may contribute to a 
continuos strategic discussion, uncovering business opportunities as they appear. 
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3.3 Developing scenarios 
 
In this section, a representative technique for developing scenarios is presented, together 
with potential pitfalls related to the development. 
 
Today, techniques for developing scenarios are mainly of a qualitative nature (refer 
section 3.1.3) with various degrees of analytical and intuitive inputs. For an introduction 
to the broad spectrum of various scenario techniques, see for example Van Der Heijden 
(1996), Fahey and Randall (1997a) and Ringland (1998). 
 
In this section, I will present a technique for developing scenarios as applied by SRI 
Consulting. During the work on my thesis, I spent six months with SRI Consulting. 
 
I will try to elaborate and complement the presentation of the SRI Consulting technique 
by including and discussing additional contributions from the scenario field of research. 
The SRI technique is used as a basis for developing scenarios in each of the three case 
studies presented in chapter 4. 
 
3.3.1 The SRI technique for developing scenarios 
 
The SRI technique for developing scenarios includes six steps that a multidisciplinary 
team performs in a series of workshops (refer Figure 3-2). 
 
Ahead of the process, the company assures that organisational slack is present for 
developing the scenarios (corresponding to the second of the necessary conditions for 
developing scenarios as stated in chapter 1). Some companies may not have the 
necessary organisational slack required for developing a comprehensive and thoroughly 
prepared set of scenarios. It takes time and money to develop scenarios (refer case 
studies in chapter 4). In addition, a company needs competence and experience in how 
to develop a set of scenarios, otherwise it may be necessary to hire some external 
facilitators. In this context, a facilitator is defined as a person responsible for the 
practical execution of the scenario process. The facilitator will prepare workshops, 
collect, systemise and analyse critical information and assure continuity and progress in 
the process of developing and using the scenarios. 
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Strategic 
Decisions
Scenario Logic
Scenarios
External Forces Decision Implications
Key Decision 
Factors
Step 1
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Step 5 
Step 6 
 
Figure 3-2 The SRI technique for developing scenarios (Mandel and Wilson 1993) 
The development of scenarios is initiated by upcoming strategic decisions, which outcomes are 
subject to possible changes in the business environment. Key decision factors are the matters one 
needs to know more about in order to make a good decision. The outcome of the key decision 
factors is determined by how the external forces play out. The scenario logic provides a framework 
for the scenarios and then the scenarios are described in sufficient detail to be of use in analysing 
the upcoming strategic decisions. 
 
 
In the following, each of the six steps are presented and discussed. 
 
Step 1: Identify strategic decisions 
 
In this context, strategic decisions are defined as upcoming strategic decisions, the 
outcome of which is subject to possible changes in the business environment. 
 
Identifying and describing the strategic decisions the scenarios should answer both 
focus and constrains the subsequent steps in the process and make the scenarios more 
relevant for the specific company (Mandel and Wilson 1993). By identifying the 
strategic decisions, the scope of the process is narrowed. A narrow decision may be 
“What new services should we offer customer A in a five year perspective” and a broad 
decision may be “What services should we offer to our new and existing customers in a 
five year perspective”. 
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A rule of thumb is that a scenario ought to cover the full time-span relevant to the 
strategic decisions. Identifying the strategic decisions and the time horizon for the 
scenarios corresponds to the second of the sufficient conditions for developing scenarios 
as identified in chapter 1 (“Strategic decisions have to be taken, but not within a limited 
time period”). 
 
If the scenarios aim to serve as a basis for exploration, evaluation and implementation 
of innovations, the strategic decisions should be identified accordingly to this purpose. 
Relating the strategic decisions to innovation corresponds to the first of the sufficient 
conditions for developing scenarios as identified in chapter 1 (“Forced innovation is 
wanted”). 
 
Step 2: Identify key decision factors 
 
Key decision factors are defined as the matters that decision-makers want more 
information about, in order to make a good strategic decision (as identified in step 1) 
(Mandel and Wilson 1993, Mandel 1993). 
 
The key decision factors are identified at a rather aggregated level and will serve as a 
starting point for identifying external forces in the next step. One way of identifying the 
key decision factors may be to ask each team member to name five major matters s/he 
would like to know more about before making the decision. 
 
Step 3: Identify external forces 
 
External forces are defined as forces that influence the outcome of the key decision 
factors, as identified in the previous step. It is often helpful to structure the 
identification of external forces around micro forces and macro forces (Wilson 1997). 
Micro forces may be analysed according to Porter’s (1980) five competitive forces 
(competitors, suppliers, customers, substitutes and potential entrants). Macro forces may 
be analysed by using the SEPT scheme – in which external forces are organised in terms 
of Social, Economic, Political and Technological forces (Mandel 1993). 
 
Step 4: Establish scenario logic 
 
The scenario logic is defined as the organising principle of the key drivers of change 
(i.e. in what way will the key drivers of change develop and change the business 
environment). 
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In developing scenarios, companies have to analyse how key drivers of change may lead 
to a future structurally different from the situation today. An example of a key driver of 
change may as already mentioned be globalisation. Today, companies are increasingly 
producing for a global market. Global companies require global suppliers of logistics 
services thus resulting in a number of mergers among carriers. 
 
Analysing the external forces in terms of their relative uncertainty and impact on the 
key decision factors will contribute in identifying the key drivers of change. The results 
from such an analysis can be displayed on an impact/uncertainty matrix, as illustrated in 
Figure 3-3. 
 
Degree of uncertainty  
Low Medium High 
  
High 
 
   
 
Level of impact 
 
Medium 
 
   
  
Low 
 
   
Figure 3-3 Impact/uncertainty matrix 
 
 
The impact/uncertainty matrix highlights some important insights (Zaman and Wilson 
1991): 
 
• The sources of difference between the scenarios (i.e. the key drivers of change) – lie 
in the forces grouped in (or near) the high impact/high uncertainty cell of the matrix. 
• The high impact/low uncertainty cell contains important entries: relatively 
predictable forces that may affect the business, regardless of the scenario. 
• As for other entries on this matrix, low impact/low uncertainty forces can, by and 
large, be set aside. However, planners should monitor events of low impact/high 
uncertainty to check whether the assessment of high uncertainty might have 
influenced the planners’ judgement about the impact. 
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A potential pitfall in the development of scenarios is related to difficulties in limiting 
the number of key drivers of change to be considered. Structuring scenarios around 
combinations of all high impact/high uncertainty forces may often create an 
unmanageable number of alternative futures. For n key drivers of change with two 
levels of occurrence (e.g. high/low, significant/insignificant), 2n scenarios have to be 
generated in order to capture all combinations. 
 
In order to reduce the number of key drivers of change to be used, the scenario team 
may choose to cluster the high impact/uncertainty forces. In order to cluster the forces, 
two different techniques may be used: 
 
• Cross-impact analysis: According to most accounts, cross-impact analysis was first 
used in developing scenarios at Kaiser Aluminum in 1966. The basic philosophy of 
the cross-impact analysis is that no development occurs in isolation. Rather, it is 
rendered more or less likely by the occurrence of some other events or forces. A 
cross-impact analysis attempts to capture these “cross-impacts” effects from 
judgmental estimates of experts. The experts provide some estimate of how likely it 
is that some development will occur given the occurrence of some other 
development (Schnaars 1987). By identifying cross-impacts, forces may be 
clustered into a limited number of key drivers of change. The use of cross-impact 
analyses in the development of scenarios is described by for instance Godet (1983, 
1987, 1990) and Millett (1997). 
• Influence diagrams: Influence diagrams describe developments and dependencies 
of different forces. An influence diagram attempts to uncover cause/effect relations 
between the forces. In this way, forces with high dependency are identified and may 
be clustered into a limited number of key drivers of change. 
 
By clustering the forces, a limited number of independent key drivers of change are 
established. Each key driver is now assigned extreme, but plausible, levels of 
occurrence. Then, by combining the different levels of occurrence, possible skeletal 
scenarios are identified. Using the arguments underlying the logic of each scenario, the 
scenario team makes simple statements about basic conditions in external forces and 
key decision factors. These statements partly flesh out the scenarios and help the team 
to judge their value, and possibly redefine the scenario logic (Mandel 1993). Finally, a 
set of scenarios is selected based on which scenarios are logical, plausible and most 
useful in supporting the strategic decisions (Refer arguments in section 1.4 and 3.2.1 
regarding a need for scenarios embracing the extreme points of plausible futures 
relevant for the strategic decisions). 
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Regarding the number of scenarios, different recommendations are given. Three 
scenarios may direct focus to a “most likely middle case” only and two scenarios may 
result in one “good” and one “bad” (Schnaars 1987). Four scenarios seem to avoid such 
pitfalls (Schwartz 1991). Duncan and Wack (1994) and Mercer (1995) recommend two 
scenarios, Quinn and Mason (1994) recommend four to five scenarios, while a literature 
survey conducted by Schnaars (1987) shows that most scenario techniques include two 
to four scenarios. 
 
In chapter 1, I stated that the minimum number of scenarios to be developed is two and 
the maximum number is five. There is no need to develop just one scenario, as this 
would imply that the future is certain. The minimum number of scenarios to be 
developed is therefore two. There seems to be a tendency towards developing two to 
five scenarios, and I will argue that a maximum number of scenarios should be set to 
five. In addition, learning and problem-solving experiments show that the amount of 
information that can be held in the short-time memory appears to be seven, plus or 
minus two (Miller 1956). 
 
Step 5: Describe scenarios 
 
In this step, the scenarios are described in sufficient detail to be of help in analysing the 
scope of strategic decisions as identified in step 1. The scenarios may be described by: 
 
• A story line incorporating developments and interactions in important external 
forces and key decision factors. It is important that the story lines are characterised 
by causal relations and internal consistency with respect to the underlying logic 
(refer step 4), 
• A table showing how the key parameters vary across the scenarios, 
• Specific events, and 
• A creative name or heading9. 
 
                                                 
9 While writing the scenarios, it is important to develop titles that capture the attention of decision-
makers. Titles such as “Best case”/“Worst case”, “High growth”/“Low growth” tell little about the true 
character of the business environment and virtually nothing about its dynamics. Royal Dutch/Shell has 
used titles such as “Sustainable World” and “Global Mercantilism”. The terms may mean little without 
the story line, but once explained and elaborated, they tend to stick in the mind and convey a complex 
structure of forces, issues and business implications (Wilson 1992). 
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Regardless of how the scenarios are eventually presented, they should always include 
clear statements of the underlying logic (refer step 4) and key assumptions (Mandel and 
Wilson 1993, Mandel 1993). 
 
Step 6: Analyse decision implications 
 
In the final step, the scenario team analyses and interprets the scenarios to identify their 
implications for the strategic decisions (Mandel and Wilson 1993). 
 
In the next section I will present a set of guidelines for how scenarios may be used in 
exploring, evaluating and implementing innovations. 
 
3.4 Scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
In this section, the scenario-based guidelines for innovation are presented. By following 
these guidelines, a company may explore, evaluate and implement innovations. The 
application of the guidelines is subject to the fulfilment of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, as identified in chapter 1. 
 
The scenario-based guidelines are presented in Figure 3-4. The guidelines are not 
described in detail at a prescriptive level. The reason for this is that the individual 
companies should be able to tailor the guidelines according to their needs. 
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1. Develop 
scenarios
Key indicators for 
monitoring
2. Explore new 
services
3. Evaluate new 
services
5. Implement 
optimal services
4. Implement 
robust services
 
Figure 3-4 Scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
The scenario-based guidelines for innovation consist of five major steps. Not all of the 
steps need to be carried out each time the process is run (e.g. the evaluation of new 
services may come out negative, resulting in no further implementation efforts). The 
process is also iterative (e.g. monitoring of key indicators may provide signals for 
necessary changes in the scenarios and evaluation of new services may trigger 
additional ideas for new services). 
 
In the following, the content of each step is described. 
 
Step 1: Develop scenarios 
 
In the first step, a set of scenarios is developed aiming to guide the exploration, 
evaluation and implementation of innovations. 
 
The scenarios may be developed according to the technique described in section 3.3. 
 
With a basis in the scenarios, key indicators for monitoring are identified (refer section 
3.2.4). By monitoring key indicators, a company may track the migration of business 
towards a certain scenario or combination of scenarios. In this way, the monitoring may 
support the implementation of optimal services (step 5) and provide signals for 
necessary changes in the scenarios themselves (indicated by dotted line in Figure 3-4). 
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Step 2: Explore new services 
 
Refer section 3.2.2 for applicability of scenarios to guide explorative studies. 
 
In the second step, the scenarios are used to explore future needs for services and 
identify directions for innovation. The exploration may be carried out by the team who 
developed the scenarios, or by teams consisting of both original and new participants. In 
this way, the basis for creative ideas and suggestions may be extended. The explorative 
discussions may be carried out in a set of workshops.  
 
A member of the team who developed the scenarios should conduct the workshops in 
order to give a proper presentation of the scenarios and their logic. The scenarios should 
be presented in an easy understandable way, e.g. by highlighting the major scenario 
differences and assumptions. 
 
After a presentation of the scenarios, the exploration teams should imagine themselves 
living in the scenarios and ask questions such as (Van Der Heijden 1996, Fahey and 
Randall 1997c): 
 
• What would we want to do if this was how the real world would be developing, what 
would seem good business opportunities? 
• Which new services or innovations does each scenario suggest? 
• How are these services different from each other? 
• How different are these services to those currently being considered? 
 
For each scenario a set of directions for innovation with a basis in future needs for 
services is established. During the exploration phase, creative methods (e.g. 
brainstorming) may be used. In addition, a set of provoking questions or statements for 
each scenario may be used to trigger creativity. 
 
Potential new services and directions for innovation may be displayed in a 
scenario/service matrix as shown in Table 3-2. This matrix will be subject to an 
evaluation in the next step. 
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Scenario 1 
Direction for 
innovation 
Scenario 2 
Direction for 
innovation 
Scenario 3 
Direction for 
innovation 
Scenario 4 
Direction for 
innovation 
Service 1.1 Service 2.1 Service 3.1 Service 4.1 
Service 1.2 Service 2.2 Service 3.2 Service 4.2 
Service 1.3  Service 3.3 Service 4.3 
Service 1.4  Service 3.4 Service 4.4 
  Service 3.5  
Table 3-2 Scenario/service matrix 
For each scenario, a direction for innovation is identified and further specified by indicating need 
for relevant/corresponding new services. 
 
 
Step 3: Evaluate new services 
 
Refer section 3.2.3 for applicability of scenarios in evaluating directions for innovation 
and need for new services. 
 
In the third step, the scenarios are used to evaluate the new services and potential 
directions for innovation as identified in the previous step. The evaluation teams should 
include both members from the team who developed the scenarios (step 1) and members 
from the teams who explored the scenarios (step 2). 
 
First, the new services are evaluated according to what they require of the organisational 
slack (resources) of the company. If a service has to be rejected, it should be archived 
together with documentation stating why it was rejected and how the organisational 
slack has to increase in order for the service to become viable. 
 
Secondly, new services that may be provided within the organisational slack are 
evaluated with a basis in the scenarios in order to identify: 
 
1. Robust services/directions for innovation (i.e. services with a payoff > 0 for all 
scenarios). 
2. Optimal services/directions for innovation (i.e. service(s) with the highest payoff in 
a given scenario). 
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Step 4: Implement robust services 
 
Refer section 3.2.4 for applicability of scenarios in implementing innovations. 
 
In the fourth step, the company needs to develop and analyse the robust services further 
in order to implement and introduce them to the market. 
 
Step 5: Implement optimal services 
 
Refer section 3.2.4 for applicability of scenarios in implementing innovations. 
 
In the fifth step, optimal services are implemented provided that a monitoring of key 
indicators gives reasons to believe that (parts of) the related scenario will be 
materialised. 
 
3.5 Conclusions of chapter 3 
 
With a basis in section 3.1, it is concluded that scenarios have evolved from being used 
as military tools, to develop government policies, and finally to support business 
strategies. Today, there is a trend towards qualitative descriptions of the future (i.e. 
scenarios), possibly as a result of the fact that qualitative descriptions of the future are 
quicker to develop and are usually perceived as more realistic images of the future. 
 
With a basis in section 3.2, it is concluded that scenarios treat uncertainty regarding 
how the future might develop by analysing how key drivers of change may lead to a 
future structurally different from the situation today.  
 
Scenarios may contribute in exploring directions for innovation by expanding our 
experience-based mental models. Further, scenarios may contribute in evaluating 
identified directions for innovation by testing them against a range of plausible futures 
(referred to as a “map of the future”). Finally, scenarios point to key indicators to be 
monitored. By monitoring these indicators, a company may track the migration of 
business towards a specific scenario or combination of scenarios. In this way, the 
scenarios may guide the implementation of innovations. 
 
With a basis in section 3.3, it is concluded that a set of scenarios needs to be developed 
prior to the exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations. A broad 
spectrum of techniques for developing scenarios exists and a representative technique 
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for developing scenarios as applied by Stanford Research Institute Consulting (SRI 
Consulting) is presented. 
 
With a basis in section 3.4, it is concluded that the application of the guidelines is 
subject to the satisfaction of necessary and sufficient conditions, as identified in chapter 
1. The guidelines are not described in detail at a prescriptive level. The reason for this is 
that the individual companies should be able to tailor the guidelines according to their 
needs.  
 
The scenario-based guidelines for innovation indicate five major steps as illustrated in 
Figure 3-4. 
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4 Practical implications 
 
Chapter 4 reports from how the guidelines developed in chapter 3 have been applied in 
three different companies: 
 
• MARINTEK. 
• Statoil Driftstjenester. 
• Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines. 
 
The methodology used and underlying the empirical work is described and discussed in 
section 4.1. The three cases are treated in section 4.2 – 4.4.  In section 4.4, I discuss 
general and case-specific problems related to implementation of innovations. 
 
For each case, the scenario process is described according to the following structure: 
 
1. Introduction: 
• Company profile. 
• Conditions leading to interest in scenarios. 
• Goals of scenario process and time horizon for scenarios. 
• Time for accomplishing the scenario process. 
• Organisational slack available for the scenario process. 
• Scenario team. 
2. Development of scenarios (step 1 in the scenario-based guidelines for innovation, 
refer Figure 3-4): 
• The practical execution and results of each step are described. 
3. Exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations (step 2-5 in the scenario-
based guidelines for innovation, refer Figure 3-4): 
• The practical execution and results of each step are described. 
4. Evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation: 
• Advantages and disadvantages based on feedback during the execution of the 
process and interviews with participants shortly after the termination of the 
process. 
 
In the description of the three cases, the practical execution of each step is emphasised. 
The actual results of the process, in terms of new services and strategies, are described 
to the extent possible within the companies’ approval. The actual results are to some 
degree constrained by commercial confidentiality. 
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For each case, theoretical foundations as outlined in chapter 2 and 3 contributed to the 
end result. However, I have not made explicit references to relevant parts of chapter 2. 
 
4.1 Methodology for empirical studies 
 
Each of the three case descriptions given in section 4.2 – 4.4 has been read, commented 
upon and approved by a leading company representative in order to assure correctness 
of the findings reported in the thesis. The leading company representatives were: 
 
• MARINTEK: Geir Langli, Research Manager, Maintenance Technology 
• Statoil Driftstjenester: Arne Solheim, Manager, Business Development 
• Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines: Reidar Nilsen, Manager, Research and Development 
 
Observations of the three cases may be structured in the following way: 
 
1. Development of scenarios 
2. Use of scenarios to guide innovations 
3. Evaluation of scenario based guidelines for innovation 
 
In the following, the methodology used for each of the empirical parts is described. 
 
1 Development of scenarios 
 
In developing the scenarios the SRI technique, as described in section 3.3.1, has been 
applied. In the MARINTEK and Statoil Driftstjenester cases, the SRI technique was 
applied in a strictly prescriptive manner by a core team carrying out all steps. In the 
Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines case, some of the steps related to identification of key 
decision factors and external forces had been performed in previous in-depth studies. 
Further, the work of the core team were complemented by regional workshops 
addressing specific regional challenges and more generally – the core team findings.  
 
For each of the three companies the development of scenarios is described with a basis 
in minutes of meeting (read and commented upon by all team members) and final 
company approved reports/presentations. In addition, a leading company representative 
has approved the findings reported in the thesis. By this, the development of scenarios 
has been described in a proper manner as far as the scenario teams are concerned. 
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2 Use of scenarios to guide innovations 
 
For using the scenarios to guide exploration, evaluation and implementation of 
innovations, the scenario-based guidelines for innovation (refer section 3.4) were 
applied in all cases. 
 
As for the development of scenarios, the use of scenarios to guide innovations is 
described with a basis in minutes of meeting (read and commented upon by all team 
members) and final company approved reports/presentations. In addition, a leading 
company representative has approved the findings reported in the thesis. By this, the use 
of scenarios has been described in a proper manner as far as the scenario team is 
concerned. 
 
3 Evaluation of scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
This is an important part of my work as the evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines 
for innovation is the basis of the recommendations with respect to the applicability of 
the guidelines. 
 
For each case, the evaluation has been structured in the following way: 
 
1. Evaluation of the guidelines (refer Figure 3-4). 
2. Evaluation of the practical execution of the process. 
3. Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied. 
4. Necessary adjustments of guidelines. 
 
The evaluation is based on feedback received from participants during the execution of 
the process. In each workshop, I made notes with respect to comments related to the 
four points mentioned above. Most of the workshops were concluded by discussions 
around the table with emphasis on participants’ impressions of the day ranging from 
scenario specific details to more general observations addressing for instance the 
practical execution of the process. 
 
In the MARINTEK and Statoil Driftstjenester cases, each of the participants were 
interviewed shortly after the termination of the process. In the MARINTEK case 
personal interviews were carried out while the Statoil Driftstjenester interviews were 
carried out by written correspondence. For the two cases I used an interview guide 
directing attention towards the four points mentioned above. In addition, the interviews 
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were specifically tailored with respect to the company in question. One of the questions 
relating to satisfaction of scenario process goals in the Statoil Driftstjenester case was: 
 
“Have you increased your understanding of the external forces shaping the future 
business environment?” 
 
For this question, answers could be given according to a scale ranging from “To a large 
degree” to “No change at all”. In addition, the participants could comment upon each 
question beyond merely setting an X for the perceived score. 
 
For the Wallenius Wilhelmsen case, the evaluation is based on notes taken during the 
execution of the process and discussions at the end of the workshops. 
 
It is my experience that evaluations based on formal interview procedures are difficult 
to account for due to subjective elements. Different people may attach different scores 
to conditions that they actually have the same perception of. In addition, the number of 
participants in the MARINTEK and Statoil Driftstjenester cases was limited thus 
preventing reliable statistics. I experienced that comments received during the 
workshops and from “round the table discussions” summing up the workshops were 
more to the point and more extensive than comments received through the interviews. 
The interviews tended to be short and to some degree disconnected from the actual 
process as they were held after the termination of the process. 
 
4.2 MARINTEK 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by MARINTEK is described. 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
Company profile: 
 
MARINTEK is a research company within the SINTEF Group. MARINTEK delivers 
marine technology research and development (R&D) services within shipping, 
shipbuilding and offshore. 234 employees contributed to a 210 million NOK turnover in 
1998. MARINTEK is based in Trondheim, Norway. 
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Conditions leading to interest in scenarios: 
 
MARINTEK’s interest in scenarios was largely triggered by two conditions.  
 
In the period 1997-1998, MARINTEK and SRI Consulting produced a report that gives 
a scenario-based analysis of innovation in the container industry (Trondsen 1998). 
Results from this project were presented on the international RINA conference on 
Design and Operation of Containerships (Kroneberg 1999a). A copy of the RINA paper 
(Kroneberg 1999a) is, as already mentioned, given in Appendix A. 
 
Another line may be drawn back to an earlier MARINTEK project concerning 
international business opportunities for Norwegian suppliers of technology for floating 
production of oil. The project was finished in November 1997. A number of interesting 
results emerged from the project, but the project participants were not sure how to 
follow up on the results. 
 
With a basis in these two conditions, one of the MARINTEK managers suggested a 
scenario process. The scenario process could contribute to a continuance of the floating 
production project. In addition; the scenario process would allow MARINTEK to test 
out the scenario methodology on an internal case before offering scenario services to 
industry. 
 
Goals of scenario process and time horizon for scenarios:
 
The time horizon for the scenarios was set to ten years, and the goals were: 
 
1. Identify and evaluate MARINTEK’s future marine technology research and 
development services within offshore, in a ten-year perspective. 
 
2. Learn about forces and mechanisms influencing the development of the offshore 
sector and the need for new research and development services. 
 
Time for accomplishing the scenario process: 
 
The scenario process was performed in three months: 01.09.98 – 01.12.98. In this 
period, three workshops were held (09.09.98, 01.10.98 and 10.11.98). 
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Organisational slack available for the scenario process: 
 
The available financial and time resources for the project were limited. Two facilitators 
spent about 250 hours in preparing the workshops and collecting and analysing relevant 
information. A facilitator is defined as a person responsible for the practical execution 
of the scenario process. The facilitator will prepare workshops, collect/systemise and 
analyse critical information and assure continuity and progress in the process. Direct 
costs (travel expenses, books, lunches) added up to a total of 8.000 NOK. It was 
difficult to identify relevant persons with sufficient time to participate in all of the 
workshops. Four persons did however participate in all of them. 
 
Scenario team: 
 
Facilitators: 
André Kroneberg, Research Fellow, Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Torbjørn Landmark, Research Engineer, Logistics, MARINTEK 
 
Participants: 
Peter C. Sandvik, Senior Research Engineer, Offshore Structures, MARINTEK 
Harald Ellingsen, Senior Research Engineer, Ship Performance, MARINTEK 
Geir Langli, Research Manager, Maintenance Technology, MARINTEK 
Trond Andersen, Research Engineer, Maintenance Technology, MARINTEK 
 
In addition to the participants listed, three other MARINTEK managers attended one or 
more of the workshops. 
 
4.2.2 Development of scenarios (step 1) 
 
In order to develop the scenarios, the scenario team applied the 6-step SRI technique as 
described in section 3.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
 
Step 1: Identify strategic decisions: 
 
This step was undertaken in the first of the workshops held 09.09.98. In a brainstorming 
session all participants gave their views on the subject. Through an open discussion all 
participants agreed to a short one-line decision focus, capturing the goals of the process: 
 
“Offshore services provided by MARINTEK in a ten-year perspective” 
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Step 2: Identify key decision factors: 
 
The first attempt to identify the key decision factors was carried out at the first 
workshop (09.09.98). An additional refinement of the factors was undertaken in the 
second workshop (01.10.98). During the workshops, the facilitators wrote down 
suggestions from a brainstorming session on post-it notes and displayed them at a 
blackboard visible to all participants. Analysing and discussing all identified factors 
resulted in four clusters of key decision factors: 
 
1. Energy development (Developments in oil price and alternative energy sources). 
2. Political conditions (Public R&D spending, environmental and safety politics, role 
of European Union). 
3. Market actors (Competitors, potential alliance partners). 
4. Technology leaps (Radical innovations in offshore technology). 
 
These key factors were all believed to heavily influence the strategic decision focus 
agreed upon in step 1. 
 
Step 3: Identify external forces: 
 
External forces were identified at the first workshop. By asking the question: “What 
external forces may influence the key factors?” and by using a framework based on 
Porter’s (1980) five competitive forces and the SEPT scheme – in which external forces 
are organised in terms of Social, Economic, Political and Technological forces, 53 
external forces were identified. The facilitators wrote down suggestions from a 
brainstorming session on post-it notes and displayed them at a blackboard visible to all 
participants. The layout of the blackboard and a few examples of the external forces are 
given in the figure below. 
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MARIN (competitor): 
Offers ocean laboratory services and is 
very good at marketing 
Fjords (substitutes for ocean laboratories): 
Fjords are “free” and may lead to a 
reduction in entry barriers for laboratory 
services 
Marginal field technology (technological): 
New advances in this area may secure 
prolonged offshore activity on the 
Norwegian Continental shelf 
OPEC (political): 
Controls 40% of the global oil 
supply and with that the oil price 
Macro forces 
(by SEPT scheme) 
Micro forces 
(by Porter’s five competitive forces) 
Figure 4-1 Blackboard set up for the identification of external forces 
External forces were identified in a brainstorming session where the facilitators wrote down ideas 
on post-it notes and displayed them on a blackboard visible to all participants. In the figure, four 
examples of external forces are shown. 
 
 
Step 4: Establish scenario logic: 
 
The scenario logic was established in the second workshop (01.10.98). Ahead of the 
workshop, the facilitators wrote down all external forces on post-it notes. Each post-it 
note corresponded to one external force. All post-it notes were placed in an 
impact/uncertainty matrix (refer Figure 4-2). 
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Degree of uncertainty  
Low Medium High 
  
High 
 
 • Oil price, OPEC, Asia financial 
crisis 
• Public R&D policy 
• Deepwater technology 
 
Level of impact 
 
 
Medium 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Low 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Example of external forces displayed on an impact/uncertainty matrix 
External forces (on post-it notes) were displayed on a blackboard visible to all participants. The key 
forces confronting the strategic decision focus, and the sources of difference among the scenarios, 
lie in the forces grouped in (or near) the high impact/high uncertainty area. In the figure, a few 
examples of key forces are shown. 
 
 
An example of a force with high impact on the decision focus and key factors was the 
oil price. In addition, the oil price is very uncertain and is influenced by a number of 
other forces (e.g. actions taken by OPEC regarding reductions in oil production and 
financial crisis in industrialised regions of the world, such as Asia). Forces believed to 
have high uncertainty and high impact on the decision focus were clustered into four 
groups by analysing how the forces influenced each other. 
 
With a basis in the four clusters, two key drivers of change were identified, aiming to 
stretch the room of uncertainty to its plausible limits: 
 
1. The oil price: A major driver with high impact on the extent and type of services 
requested from MARINTEK in the future. 
2. Government intervention: A driver with high impact on R&D activities in the 
industry and in the Research institutions. 
 
In the selection of the two key drivers of change, one tried to identify drivers with a 
high level of independence, in order to achieve structurally different scenarios. Each of 
the drivers was assigned two extreme, but plausible, levels of occurrence. In this way, 
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the extreme points of plausible futures were embraced. Based on the two key drivers of 
change a scenario logic was established as shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
Oil Price
G
ov
er
nm
en
t
in
te
rv
en
tio
n
Scenario 3:
“Industry Growth”
Scenario 4:
“Sunset”
Scenario 1:
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Figure 4-3 Scenario logic – MARINTEK 
The first scenario is characterised by a high oil price and active Government intervention. The 
second scenario is characterised by a low oil price, but active Government intervention. The third 
scenario includes a high oil price, but passive Government intervention. The fourth and last 
scenario includes both a low oil price and passive Government intervention. 
 
 
Step 5: Describe scenarios: 
 
The facilitators undertook this step between the second (01.10.98) and the third 
(10.11.98) of the workshops. Each of the scenarios was fleshed out by: 
 
• A story line incorporating developments and interactions in important external 
forces. A lot of effort was put into developing causal relations and internal 
consistency. 
• Specific events (e.g. election day in 2001 leading to a conservative Government). 
• A creative name or heading. 
• A table showing how the key parameters varied across the scenarios. 
• Fictive front pages of Dagens Næringsliv (the major industrial paper in Norway). 
 
During the process of describing the final scenarios, the participants frequently assessed 
drafts of the scenarios. In Figure 4-4, a short summary of the scenarios is given. 
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Scenario 1 “Black Gold” 
(High Oil price, Active Government intervention) 
 
Reductions in the OPEC exports result in an oil 
price of 25 $/barrel. The Norwegian Government 
launches an active offshore policy and allows 
exploration and development in new areas of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. Major advances in 
deepwater technology occur and the demand for 
verification services is increasing. Marin, a major 
competitor, expand their services by building 
laboratory facilities both in Norway (Stavanger) 
and the USA (Houston). In the USA, major 
research projects regarding renewable energies 
are intensified. New environmental taxes are 
constantly introduced and cleaning technology 
becomes one of the top priorities in the 
Norwegian Research Council. The public R&D 
spending in the offshore sector increases, and 
support is also given to promote an offshore 
cluster in Stavanger, including a strengthening of 
the offshore education in that region.  
Scenario 2 “Blue Monday” 
(Low Oil price, Active Government intervention) 
 
A lack of powerful, governing incentives leads to a 
significant “illegal” export of OPEC oil. In 
addition, Iran and Iraq are allowed to export more 
oil, as they gradually become more Western 
oriented. The oil price resides in a low level around 
8-12 $/barrel. The Norwegian Research Council is 
strengthened and focus is on increasing the 
efficiency of offshore activities (including 
automation of some processes) and on improving 
the utilisation of existing fields. Some of the less 
profitable production vessels and drilling rigs are 
laid up. The development of smaller fields stops 
due to lack of profitability. Norwegian yards are 
faced with nearly no new building activity. Some of 
the yards try to enter new markets by offering 
services related to operation and maintenance of 
installations in existing fields. Environmental issues 
are on the agenda, and CO2 quotas are traded 
between nations. 
Scenario 3 “Industry Growth” 
(High Oil price, Passive Government intervention) 
 
A boost in the Asian economy leads to increased 
consumption of oil, and the oil price reaches a 
level of 20 $/barrel. The election day in 2001 
leads to a conservative Government. Subsidies for 
Norwegian yards are reduced. The demand for 
supply ships is decreasing and Fosen Mekaniske 
Verksted, Umoe Haugesund and Ulstein Verft 
(Norwegian yards) are all shut down. Norwegian 
yards experience a 70% reduction in number of 
employees. Shipping companies, on the other 
hand, are experiencing good times as the refund 
system is strengthened and the taxes are lowered. 
Environmental technology is on the agenda of the 
Research Council of Norway. Statoil is privatised 
and undergoes an extensive internationalisation 
process, in order to survive as most of the 
Norwegian oil production ends around 2010. 
SHELL buys a major share in Statoil. DNV starts 
to offer laboratory tests as part of their service. 
Scenario 4 “Sunset” 
(Low Oil price, Passive Government intervention) 
 
Internal disagreements in OPEC and a prolonged 
Asian crisis contribute to a low oil price in the area 
of 10-13 $/barell. The gas price follows the oil 
price, and there is no interest in a further 
development of gas fields. The demand for supply 
ships is decreasing and some of the Norwegian 
yards take over the operation and maintenance of 
some of the existing fields and become third party 
providers. The operators who are experimenting 
with outsourcing a number of earlier in-house 
functions support this development. New 
international regulations concerning the 
environment are introduced. Statoil undertakes a 
centralisation of its activities to Stavanger 
(including their Trondheim based R&D division). 
The Government is not interested in maintaining a 
regional policy, and parts of a highly competent 
work force in Trondheim choose to move to Oslo. 
Figure 4-4 Summary of scenarios – MARINTEK 
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Key indicators for monitoring were not formally identified in this process. However, 
some of the participants stated that they were paying greater attention to the news, with 
respect to forces and mechanisms influencing the offshore services provided by 
MARINTEK, than prior to the scenario process. 
 
4.2.3 Exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations (step 2-5) 
 
In this section, the practical execution and results of step 2-5 in the scenario-based 
guidelines for innovation are described. 
 
Step 2: Explore new services: 
 
This step was undertaken in the third and final workshop (10.11.98). 
 
For each scenario, main directions/needs for innovation were identified. Then, a 
brainstorming session was held. Approximately 8-10 ideas for new services were 
identified for each scenario. Below, a few examples are given: 
 
• Offer deepwater verification services related to emerging deepwater concepts (e.g. 
ROV10-support) by investing in a new deepwater laboratory (scenario 1 – high oil 
price and increased focus on deepwater technology). 
• Offer traditional offshore services to the shore-based oil industry in the Middle East 
(scenario 2 – low oil price, reduced activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
increased activity in the Middle East due to low production costs). 
• Establish MARINTEK as an R&D co-ordinator for oil companies’ R&D 
investments (scenario 3 – passive Government intervention). 
• Offer consultancy services instead of R&D services (scenario 4 – passive 
Government intervention). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 ROV: Remote Operated Vehicle. 
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Step 3: Evaluate new services: 
 
After the identification of directions for innovation and need for new services, each 
service was evaluated in the following order: 
 
1. How well does the service meet the external requirements (e.g. a low oil price, 
no public R&D funding) of the scenario it was triggered from? All services 
triggered from a given scenario would probably meet the requirements fairly well. 
However, in order to differentiate the services, they were assigned either a + or a ++ 
in an evaluation scheme. 
2. How well does the service meet the internal requirements as given by 
MARINTEK? Internal requirements were identified as: 
• Organisational slack: Will the development of the new service require capital 
investments beyond available financial resources? How much time and what 
kind of competency are required in order to develop the new service, and are 
time and competency available? 
• Strategic core: Will the new service imply a movement away from the strategic 
core (e.g. offering R&D activities to land-based industry may be a movement 
away from the core which is related to R&D activities in the maritime sector)? 
Each service was assigned a + or a – indicating respectively a good or bad service 
according to the internal requirements of MARINTEK. 
3. How well does the service meet the external requirements of the other 
scenarios? This step was undertaken in order to identify possible robust services 
able to meet, for example, both a high and low oil price. 
 
After the third workshop some of the participants contributed in a further evaluation of 
the services. In the middle of this process, the scenarios were presented for the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. This presentation ought to have been 
undertaken before new services were identified, as the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy had some comments regarding the structure and content of the 
scenarios. However, the presentation was useful and contributed in a further evaluation 
of the identified services. 
 
As a result of the evaluation process, two new services were further developed and 
detailed for possible implementation. 
 
The first service was named “The 6 dollar concept”. This service would be able to face 
a continued low oil price (scenario 2 and 4). The service may also be relevant for higher 
oil prices and it was therefore robust with respect to the oil price. 
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The second service was named “Green package”. Environmental considerations are 
important for all scenarios (a predetermined force with high impact, but low 
uncertainty), and the service is thus robust. 
 
Both services were developed by describing: 
 
• Their technical/professional content. 
• Their business profile (the balance between research and consultancy work). 
• Their internal requirements (organisational slack and closeness to strategic core). 
• Their potentials for further development and extension (e.g. possible synergies with 
other, related services). 
 
Step 4/5: Implement robust/optimal services: 
 
Two new services were developed and described in detail, but no major effort has been 
put into the implementation of these. 
 
A discussion of challenges related to implementation of new services is given in section 
4.5. 
 
4.2.4 Evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by MARINTEK is evaluated with a basis in 
feedback received during the execution of the process and interviews with participants 
shortly after the termination of the process. 
 
The evaluation has been structured in the following way: 
 
1. Evaluation of the guidelines (refer Figure 3-4). 
2. Evaluation of the practical execution of the steps. 
3. Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied. 
4. Necessary adjustments of guidelines 
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Evaluation of the guidelines: 
 
• Put a larger emphasis on the implementation of new services (step 4 and 5). During 
the whole process one should keep in mind that this is not a game, but actually an 
effort in developing a set of new services which should possibly be implemented. 
• Some of the participants missed an initial step aiming to develop a common 
platform and understanding of the company and its current strategies and goals. 
Such a step would contribute in bringing all participants to the same level before the 
process started. 
• All participants would consider making use of scenarios in later strategic 
discussions. It was underlined that this method, compared to other strategy methods, 
forced the participants to look beyond their traditional perception of the business 
environment. 
• The participants felt that, especially in an early phase, scenarios were of help in 
evaluating new services. 
• Regarding the final scenarios, participants were satisfied with the way the scenarios 
were presented. One of the participants underlined the fictive newspaper headlines 
as very successful. Another of the participants argued that the table showing how the 
key parameters varied across the scenarios should possibly be excluded in favour of 
a scenario comparison based on the extreme differences between the scenarios. This 
could trigger more creative discussions. 
 
Evaluation of the practical execution of the process: 
 
• More time resources should have been reserved for step 4 and 5 (refer the above 
evaluation of guidelines). 
• Three of the participants felt that the time between the workshops should be reduced 
to two weeks. One of the participants suggested that workshops should be 
undertaken once a week. Shorter time between the workshops would keep the 
process fresh and less effort would be needed in preparing for the workshop. One of 
the participants argued that time between workshops could increase for workshops 
held later in the process. 
• Each workshop should last for at least half a day. Two of the participants suggested 
one day. 
• All participants felt that a scenario process should include at least three to four 
workshops. 
• The importance of continuity was underlined. The same persons should participate 
in all workshops. 
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• Refreshments should be served during each workshop in order to revitalise 
discussions. 
 
Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied: 
 
• Three of the participants felt that they had increased their knowledge and 
understanding of forces and mechanisms influencing the development of the 
offshore sector and the need for research and development services provided by 
MARINTEK. The last participant said that he could have increased his 
understanding if more effort had been put into systemising key factors and external 
forces identified in the first and second workshop. 
• Two of the participants felt that the scenarios stimulated creativity in the exploration 
of new services. Two of the participants stated that many of the identified services 
were rather obvious beforehand, but that the scenarios contributed to a better 
documentation and reasoning for why to implement them. 
• The identified services were not developed further for implementation, possibly as a 
result of lack of ownership (refer necessary adjustments of guidelines below). 
 
Necessary adjustments of guidelines: 
 
• A clarification of the ownership of the process should be undertaken early in the 
process. One (or more) of the participants should be assigned the responsibility of 
developing the identified services further and eventually implement the services in 
the company. The clarification of ownership should be undertaken ahead of step 1. 
• An initial step aiming to develop a common platform and understanding of the 
company and its current strategies and goals should be added. Such a step would 
contribute in bringing all participants to the same level before the actual scenario 
process starts. 
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4.3 Statoil Driftstjenester 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by Statoil Driftstjenester is described. 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
Company profile: 
 
Statoil Driftstjenester is a support unit for Statoil (a major Norwegian Oil Company). 
Statoil Driftstjenester is responsible for: 
 
• Operation of terminals ashore (terminal services, material administration, customs 
clearance and administration of spare part stock). 
• Personnel transport by helicopter. 
• Sea transportation (standby vessels, anchor handling vessels, vessels for ROV-
support and supply vessels). 
• Purchasing (acquisitions for operating platforms). 
• Emergency preparedness and traffic supervision. 
• Catering service for most of Statoil’s offshore installations. 
 
Statoil Driftstjenester employs about 650 persons (including 450 persons for the 
catering service) and is responsible for a budget of approximately 3 billion NOK 
(1997). Statoil Driftstjenester is based in Bergen, Norway. 
 
Conditions leading to interest in scenarios: 
 
Statoil Driftstjenester’s interest in scenarios emerged from a large R&D project with 
participants from MARINTEK, Statoil Driftstjenester and Statoil F&U (Research & 
Development unit). The project was aiming at analysing problems and challenges in 
order to identify potentials for improvements. 
 
Statoil Driftstjenester was facing an increasingly turbulent environment with 
uncertainties, for instance, related to corporate strategies for outsourcing non-core 
activities and the development of the oil price and potential new competitors. In order to 
survive and prosper in the future, Statoil Driftstjenester wanted to become “The best of 
the best” in delivering services for offshore installations. 
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During one of the project meetings, I gave a presentation of the scenario methodology 
and its advantages to a couple of managers from Statoil Driftstjenester. They found the 
presentation interesting, and a couple of months later, a scenario project for Statoil 
Driftstjenester was initiated as part of the larger R&D project. By using scenarios, a 
structured analysis of uncertainties could be undertaken, together with an exploration of 
the need for future services. 
 
Goals of scenario process and time horizon for scenarios: 
 
The major goal for the project was to develop scenarios that could: 
 
• Enhance the regular strategy process run by Statoil Driftstjenester. 
• Contribute to adjust the R&D project run by Statoil Driftstjenester, Statoil F&U and 
MARINTEK. 
 
In addition, the project stated some process goals: 
 
• Develop a common mental framework for strategic discussions related to the future. 
• Contribute to an overall understanding of the interaction between the external forces 
that shape the future business environment. 
• Challenge “established truths” and question developments easily taken for granted. 
 
The time horizon for the scenarios was set to five years. 
 
Time for accomplishing the scenario process: 
 
The scenario process was performed in a time of approximately four months. In this 
period, one kick-off meeting and four workshops were held (26.01.99, 22.02.99, 
10.03.99, 19.03.99 and 29.04.99). 
 
Organisational slack available for the scenario process: 
 
The available financial and time resources for the project were considerably better than 
for the MARINTEK project. Two facilitators spent about 450 hours in preparing the 
workshops and collecting and analysing relevant information. Direct costs (travel 
expenses, books, conference fees and expenses related to guest speakers) added up to a 
total of approximately 70.000 NOK. Five persons participated in all of the workshops. 
In addition, three guest speakers participated in some of the workshops. The guest 
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speakers’ role was to contribute with a fresh perspective and bring new thoughts and 
ideas into the discussions. 
 
Scenario team: 
 
Facilitators: 
André Kroneberg, Research Fellow, Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Torbjørn Landmark, Research Engineer, Logistics, MARINTEK 
 
Participants: 
Arne Solheim, Manager, Business Development, Statoil Driftstjenester 
Svein Sævild, Manager, Sea Transportation, Statoil Driftstjenester 
Audun Gunnarsen, Manager, Terminals, Statoil Driftstjenester 
Bjørn Tyssøy, Business Development, Statoil Driftstjenester 
Johnny Litzheim, Project Manager, Statoil Forskning og Utvikling 
 
Guest speakers: 
Bjørn E. Asbjørnslett, Research Fellow, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology (workshop 1) 
Jan Tore Pedersen, Independent Consultant (workshop 2) 
Per Anton Kleppa, Manager, North Sea Container Line (workshop 2) 
 
4.3.2 Development of scenarios (step 1) 
 
In order to develop the scenarios, the scenario team applied the 6-step SRI technique as 
described in section 3.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
 
Ahead of each workshop, the facilitators scanned and reviewed a set of relevant journals 
and papers in order to provide the participants with some stimulating articles to be read 
prior to the workshop. In addition, the facilitators conducted conversations with internal 
customers in Statoil, external suppliers and competitors and the Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy. All these actors had different views on how the industry would 
develop over the next five years, and their inputs were used as a basis for discussions in 
the workshops. A major oil and gas conference was also attended in order to increase 
the understanding of the offshore industry. 
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Initial Step: Develop common platform: 
 
In the MARINTEK case, some of the participants missed an initial step aiming at 
developing a common platform and understanding of the company and its current 
strategies and goals. In this case, such a step was undertaken in order to bring all 
participants to the same level before the actual scenario process started. The facilitators 
collected information about present internal and external challenges, goals and 
strategies ahead of the first workshop. This information provided the basis for initial 
discussions in the first workshop. 
 
Step 1: Identify strategic decisions: 
 
This step was undertaken in the first workshop held 22.02.99. Each participant was 
given five minutes to write down a couple of suggestions for relevant strategic 
decisions. Subsequently, each participant presented his suggestions in plenary. In this 
way, the contribution of all participants was assured.  
 
After a discussion, the decision focus was agreed: 
 
“The role of Statoil Driftstjenester in integrated supply chains: Robust strategies with a 
focus on control of the chains” 
 
Step 2: Identify key decision factors: 
 
This step was undertaken in the first workshop held 22.02.99. After agreeing on the 
strategic decision focus, the participants identified a set of key factors. As for the 
previous step, each participant was given five minutes to write down a couple of 
suggestions for key factors. Subsequently, each participant presented his suggestions in 
plenary and post-it stickers were attached to a blackboard visible to all participants. By 
clustering key factors with high dependencies, five clusters were obtained: 
 
• Political actions (e.g. changes in regulations for licenses, taxes and ownership). 
• Market development (e.g. cost/service requirements and competitors). 
• Corporate actions (e.g. degree of internationalisation and outsourcing). 
• Technology development (e.g. floating production and sub-sea processing). 
• Energy development (e.g. oil price and alternative energy sources). 
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Ahead of the second workshop, the facilitators analysed the key decision factors and 
developed an influence diagram showing the dependencies between the key decision 
factors. This diagram was used in order to understand how the key decision factors may 
interact and as a map for the following steps. 
 
Step 3: Identify external forces: 
 
The second workshop was entirely devoted to an identification of external forces 
influencing the level of occurrence of the key factors. Approximately 100 external 
forces were identified by using a framework based on Porter’s (1980) five competitive 
forces and the SEPT scheme – in which external forces are organised in terms of Social, 
Economic, Political and Technological forces. All forces were written on post-it stickers 
and displayed at a blackboard (refer Figure 4-5 for examples of external forces). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information Technology (IT) firms 
(potential entrants): 
IT firms are experts on logistics/information 
systems – new integrators of supply chains? 
Customer requirements (customers): 
Increased differentiation is expected 
 
OPEC (political): 
Actions taken by OPEC influences the oil 
price 
 
Public opinion (social): 
Increased environmental awareness in 
the society 
 
Macro forces 
(by SEPT scheme) 
Micro forces 
(by Porter’s five competitive forces) 
Figure 4-5 Identification of external forces 
 
Step 4 establish scenario logic: 
 
The scenario logic was established in the third workshop (19.03.99). Ahead of the 
workshop, the facilitators wrote down all external forces on post-it stickers. Each post-it 
sticker corresponded to one external force. All post-it notes were placed in an 
impact/uncertainty matrix (refer Figure 4-6). 
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Degree of uncertainty  
Low Medium High 
  
High 
 
 • IT/logistics providers 
• Global mergers 
• Norwegian oil reserves 
 
Level of impact 
 
 
Medium 
 
  
 
 
  
Low 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Example of external forces displayed on an impact/uncertainty matrix 
External forces (on post-it notes) were displayed on a blackboard visible to all participants. The key 
forces confronting the strategic decision focus, and the sources of difference among the scenarios, 
lie in the forces grouped in (or near) the high impact/high uncertainty area. In the figure, a few 
examples of key forces are shown. 
 
 
Forces believed to have high uncertainty and high impact on the decision focus were 
clustered into six groups by analysing how the forces influenced each other. 
 
With a basis in the six clusters, two key drivers of change were identified, aiming to 
stretch the room of uncertainty to its plausible limits: 
 
1. Intensity in exploration and development in the North Sea: At what level will 
exploration activities take place? What kind of developments will take place (e.g. 
sub-sea, floating production, deep water and close to/far from existing 
infrastructure)? 
2. Globalisation of offshore logistics: Will global supply chain integrators enter the 
offshore industry? Who are the competitors of tomorrow? What kind of role will 
Information Technology play? 
 
Each of the drivers was assigned two extreme, but plausible, levels of occurrence. In 
this way, the extreme points of plausible futures were embraced. Based on the two key 
drivers a scenario logic was established as shown in Figure 4-7. 
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Figure 4-7 Scenario logic – Statoil Driftstjenester 
 
 
Step 5: Describe scenarios: 
 
The facilitators undertook this step between the third (19.03.99) and the fourth 
(29.04.99) of the workshops. 
 
The scenarios were given names based on a “soft drink” theme. Coca-Cola is a global 
brand (significant globalisation) and has high sales (high intensity). Schweppes is also a 
global brand (significant globalisation), but has lower sales (low intensity). Solo is a 
Norwegian brand only (limited globalisation), but has high national sales (high 
intensity). Grans Rødbrus is a Norwegian brand only (limited globalisation) and has 
very limited sales (low intensity). The scenario names were easy to remember and at the 
same time they captured the essence of each scenario. 
 
Each scenario was fleshed out by a story line incorporating specific events, 
developments and interactions in important external forces. In Figure 4-8, a short 
summary of the scenarios is given. 
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Scenario 1 “The Coca-Cola race” 
(High Intensity, Significant Globalisation”) 
 
• Oil price of 20 $/barrel 
• Scattered and dynamic activity on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf 
• Floating production in focus 
• Standardised IT systems 
• Global logistics suppliers offer total solutions 
for the offshore industry 
• Deregulation of the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf 
• Privatisation of Statoil 
 
Scenario 2 “Schweppes around the world” 
(Low Intensity, Significant Globalisation”) 
 
• The oil price fluctuates around 6-7 $/barrel 
• Focus on sub-sea developments connected to 
existing infrastructure 
• Global suppliers of logistics services enter 
the North Sea market 
• Statoil undergoes an internationalisation 
process in order to survive 
• Deregulation of the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf 
• Privatisation of Statoil 
Scenario 3 “Solo” 
(High Intensity, Limited Globalisation”) 
 
• The oil price reaches 18-19 $/barrel 
• Deep water technology in focus 
• Traditional suppliers of offshore logistics 
• The North Sea is perceived as one market 
(including both the Norwegian and British 
areas) 
• Statoil operates regionally 
• Privatisation of Statoil 
 
Scenario 4 “Grans Rødbrus” 
(Low Intensity, Limited Globalisation”) 
 
• Oil price down to 6 $/barrel 
• Stagnation of exploration and development 
activities in the North Sea 
• Operation on existing installations 
• Increased exploitation and sub-sea solutions 
• Traditional suppliers of offshore logistics 
• Non-standardised IT systems 
• Privatisation of Statoil 
 
 
Figure 4-8 Summary of scenarios - Statoil Driftstjenester 
 
 
In addition to the story lines, the scenarios were also visualised by block diagrams 
showing the construction of the scenarios (refer Figure 4-9). 
 
In the block diagrams, a deregulation of the Norwegian Continental shelf and a 
privatisation of Statoil are expected in all scenarios. Further, the development in each of 
the key drivers of change is described in a “cause – effect” way, following the arrow. 
The resulting effects for “The Coca-Cola Race” scenario (refer Figure 4-9) are the 
emergence of a new type of competitors with high skills in IT and logistics and clients 
with increasingly differentiated logistics needs. 
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One block diagram was developed for each of the scenarios and they were of particular 
help in discussing new services (step 7). 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Block diagram for "The Coca-Cola Race" scenario 
 
 
Guidelines for monitoring of key indicators were given. In addition, the interface 
between monitoring system, scenarios and the regular strategy process as run by Statoil 
Driftstjenester was defined. 
 
4.3.3 Exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations (step 2-5) 
 
In this section, the practical execution and results of step 2-5 in the scenario-based 
guidelines for innovation are described. 
 
Step 2: Explore new services: 
 
The exploration of new services took place in the fourth and final workshop. 
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For each scenario, main directions/needs for innovation were discussed. In a 
brainstorming session, approximately 2-4 new services or strategies were identified for 
each scenario. Below, a few examples are given: 
 
• Develop a niche strategy, focusing on value added services to be offered in 
restricted geographic areas (scenario 1 – global logistics providers enter the arena). 
• Be a cost-effective supplier with a flexible organisation structure adaptable to 
reduced activity on the Norwegian Shelf (scenario 4 – low intensity in exploration 
and development in the North Sea and a low oil price). 
 
Step 3: Evaluate new services: 
 
After the identification of directions for innovation and new services, the services were 
evaluated in the same way as for the MARINTEK case. A robust strategy including a 
set of new services was established. A keyword for the strategy was Supply Chain 
Management. In establishing the strategy, the following conditions were considered: 
 
• How to obtain a balanced service portfolio? 
• Where are the markets for the services? 
• What kind of IT systems are needed? 
• Is there a need for developing strategic alliances in order to be able to offer the 
services? 
• Is there a need for changes in organisation structure and type? 
 
Step 4/5 Implement new services: 
 
The robust strategy identified in step 3 has later been developed in more detail with 
inputs from the regular strategy process, and has gradually been implemented. The 
strategy involves a significant departure from present practice for Statoil Driftstjenester. 
The strategy outlines a number of new services to be offered in a supply chain 
management perspective, need for internal change, degree of asset investments and need 
for alliances (refer section 2.4 for different forms of co-operation and their different 
governance mechanisms). 
 
A discussion of challenges related to implementation of new services is given in section 
4.5. 
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4.3.4 Evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by Statoil Driftstjenester is evaluated with a 
basis in feedback received during the execution of the process and interviews with 
participants shortly after the termination of the process. 
 
Feedback from participants in the MARINTEK case contributed in improving the 
scenario process run by Statoil Driftstjenester (e.g. an initial step was undertaken 
aiming at developing a common platform and understanding of the company and its 
current strategies and goals). Generally, fewer comments were received in the Statoil 
Driftstjenester case than in the MARINTEK case. 
 
The evaluation has been structured in the following way: 
 
1. Evaluation of the guidelines (refer Figure 3-4). 
2. Evaluation of the practical execution of the process. 
3. Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied. 
4. Necessary adjustments of guildelines. 
 
Evaluation of the guidelines: 
 
• All participants would consider making use of scenarios in later strategic 
discussions. 
• It was underlined that the scenarios contributed in stimulating creativity and 
exploring new ideas. The systemised construction of the scenarios forced the 
participants to look beyond their traditional perception of the business environment. 
• One of the participants argued that it is a challenge to integrate the scenarios with 
the regular strategy process. Although some time was spent in defining the interface 
between the monitoring system, scenarios and the regular strategy process, more 
emphasis should have been put upon defining new roles and responsibilities. All 
participants felt that it was of great importance to make the scenarios a part of the 
on-going strategic discussions. 
• The participants felt that scenarios could contribute in an evaluation of new services. 
• Generally, the participants were very pleased with the way the scenarios were 
presented. 
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Evaluation of the practical execution of the process: 
 
• More time resources should have been reserved for integrating the scenarios with 
the regular strategy process (refer the above evaluation of the guidelines). 
• All participants were pleased with the way the process was facilitated. 
• Some of the participants emphasised the advantages of having guest speakers with 
provoking and stimulating perspectives in some of the workshops. 
 
Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied: 
 
• The process contributed in adjusting the R&D project run by Statoil Driftstjenester, 
Statoil Forskning og Utvikling and MARINTEK. 
• Together with the regular strategy process run by Statoil Driftstjenester the scenario 
process contributed in establishing a robust strategy including new service elements. 
However, more resources should have been put into integrating the scenarios with 
the regular strategy process. 
• The scenarios contributed in a better documentation and reasoning for why to 
implement new strategies and services. 
• All participants felt that they had increased their knowledge and understanding of 
the interaction between external forces shaping the future business environment. 
• A common mental framework for strategic discussions related to the future was 
established. 
• Established truths were challenged. 
 
Necessary adjustments of guidelines: 
 
• Introduce an additional step, following step 1, aiming to define the interface 
between the monitoring system, scenarios and the regular strategy process. In 
addition new roles and responsibilities (related to monitoring efforts and an 
integration of scenarios in the regular strategy process) should be defined. In this 
way, the scenario process will not die, but be part of the on-going strategic 
discussions in the company. 
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4.4 Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines (WWL) is 
described. 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
Company profile: 
 
WWL is the world’s largest vehicle and ro/ro transportation and logistics company with 
an annual turnover reaching 1.5 billion USD. WWL has a global market share of 23% 
for ocean going vehicle and ro/ro transportation services and transports around 1.5 
million car units and 300.000 ro/ro units annually. The WWL fleet consists of almost 70 
vessels. WWL’s headquarters are in Oslo, Norway and Stockholm, Sweden. 
 
Conditions leading to interest in scenarios: 
 
WWL’s interest in scenarios emerged from a large R&D project with participants from 
MARINTEK and WWL. The project is aiming at developing new global logistics 
services to be offered by WWL. Failure to offer global logistics services could limit 
WWL’s role to become a sub-contractor for major third party providers of logistics (e.g. 
UPS and FedEx). 
 
MARINTEK suggested that WWL should run a scenario process in order to undertake a 
structured analysis of how key drivers of change could lead to a future structurally 
different from the situation today and how the clients’ needs with respect to logistics 
could change. 
 
Goals of scenario process and time horizon for scenarios: 
 
The time horizon for the scenarios was set to five years and the major goals of the 
scenario process were to develop a set of scenarios in order to: 
 
• Explore the need for future logistics management services. 
• Contribute in the (2001) strategy formulation process and in establishing divisional 
and regional measures and targets with respect to new logistics management 
services. 
 114
4 Practical implications 
 
• Develop a common mental map of the future with respect to new logistics 
management services. 
• Evaluate whether scenarios should be used regularly in the WWL strategy planning 
process. 
 
Time for accomplishing the scenario process: 
 
The scenario process was performed in approximately five months (15.12.99-15.05.00). 
In this period, one kick-off meeting, three core team workshops and four regional 
workshops were held. 
 
Organisational slack available for the scenario process: 
 
Two facilitators spent about 500 hours in preparing the workshops and collecting and 
analysing relevant information. Direct costs added up to a total of approximately 
150.000 NOK. Ten WWL managers participated in some or all of the workshops 
undertaken by the core team. In addition, a number of people participated in the four 
regional workshops held in Europe, America (two workshops including participants 
from Far East) and Oceania. 
 
Scenario team: 
 
Facilitators: 
André Kroneberg, Research Fellow, Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Torbjørn Landmark, Research Engineer, Logistics, MARINTEK 
Eivind Dale, Research manager, MARINTEK 
 
Participants: 
Bengt Eurén, Senior Vice President, Operation, WWL 
Steve Cadden, Senior Vice President, Global Logistics, WWL 
Jan Walle, Senior Vice President, Business Services and Finance, WWL 
Reidar Hauge, Senior Vice President, Information Systems, WWL 
Anders Boman, Senior Vice President, Commercial, WWL 
Reidar Nilsen, Vice President, Research and Development, WWL 
Bengt Ramberg, Vice President, Global Logistics, WWL 
Fridtjof Næss, Vice President, Business Performance & Pricing, WWL 
Jesper Olsson, Research and Development, WWL 
Gudbrand Fløtaker, Information Systems, WWL 
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4.4.2 Development of scenarios (step1) 
 
The scenarios were developed with a basis in the 6-step SRI technique as described in 
section 3.3.1 and illustrated in Figure 3-2. However, the technique was not applied in a 
strictly prescriptive manner as in the two previous cases (MARINTEK and Statoil 
Driftstjenester). Step 2 and 3 of the SRI technique had already been undertaken as part 
of the large R&D project. In the first core team workshop, step 1 and 4 were on the 
agenda. In the second core team workshop, further discussions related to step 4 took 
place. In the last core team workshop, a set of scenarios were used to explore new 
strategies and services with respect to logistics management. Several follow-up 
meetings were held after the third core team workshop in order to integrate the scenario 
findings with the regular strategy process. In the following, a structured discussion of 
the scenario development is given according to the SRI technique. 
 
Initial Step (1): Clarify ownership of process and responsibility for integrating 
scenarios in the regular strategy process: 
 
In the Statoil Driftstjenester case, one of the participants argued that it could be a 
challenge to integrate the scenarios with the regular strategy process. More emphasis 
should have been put upon defining roles and responsibilities with respect to the 
scenario process. All participants felt that it was of great importance to make the 
scenarios a part of the on-going strategic discussions. 
 
In the WWL scenario process, an initial step was undertaken in order to define roles and 
responsibilities with respect to integrating the scenario process as a part of the on-going 
strategic discussions. The WWL R&D department was given the responsibility to 
ensure that the scenario process was anchored in the top management team and taken 
seriously as a strategic tool for discussions related to future WWL logistics services. 
The scenario findings together with regular R&D activities such as macro economic 
analysis and trade forecasts would constitute a basis for the regular strategy formulation 
process starting in May (refer Figure 4-10). 
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Figure 4-10 The inclusion of scenarios in the regular WWL strategy process 
The traditional WWL forecasting efforts will be supplemented by scenario processes in order to 
enhance the regular strategy process which is based on the use of Balanced Scorecard. 
 
 
Initial Step (2): Develop common platform: 
 
In line with the Statoil Driftstjenester scenario project, an initial step was undertaken in 
order to bring all participants to the same level with respect to understanding of the 
logistics concept. These discussions took place at the first workshop held 21.02.00. The 
following questions were raised as part of a group work: 
 
• Define the concept of logistics with respect to activities and processes. 
• Discuss the present WWL logistics services with a basis in your marketing ads. Do 
the marketing ads really reflect your logistics services? 
 
Generally, all participants had similar understandings of the logistics concept. The 
participants agreed that logistics consists of management of information and physical 
flow of cargo. With respect to logistics services offered by WWL, the participants stated 
that WWL offers customised logistics solutions to key clients. An understanding of the 
client’s needs (e.g. with respect to lead times and information needs) was therefore of 
vital importance. The participants also agreed that WWL did not want to become a sub-
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supplier, but rather to maintain direct contact with clients in order to understand their 
needs and be able to differentiate their services from what was offered by other players.  
 
Step 1: Identify strategic decisions: 
 
Ahead of the first workshop, the facilitators in co-operation with a few key participants 
had formulated a proposal for the strategic decision focus: 
 
“Logistics management services required by new and existing customers in the next five 
years” 
 
This formulation was based on the WWL vision: 
 
“Help our customers succeed through innovative transportation and logistics solutions” 
 
The strategic decision focus was discussed and accepted by all participants. 
 
Step 2: Identify key decision factors: 
 
Key decision factors were identified with a basis in several studies undertaken in the 
MARINTEK/WWL R&D project. These studies were specifically discussing: 
 
• Global market trends. 
• Global logistics and information technology trends. 
• WWL partners’/competitors’ engagement in logistics management. 
 
With a basis in the studies, four clusters of key decision factors were established: 
 
• Customers (Who is the future customer of WWL and what services are required? 
Continuance of mega-mergers in the auto industry?, Increased regional production 
of cars?). 
• Competitors (Emergence of new competitors including non-asset owners?). 
• Regulatory regime (Deregulation of liner conferences?). 
• E-business (New ways of doing business?). 
 
In the first regional workshop, held in Brunswick, Georgia, three of the key decision 
factors were discussed more in detail. In this workshop, representatives from all WWL 
regions (Europe, Asia, Oceania and Americas) were present. A total of 18 participants 
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were organised into two groups. One of the groups discussed competitor’s actions and 
how they could use e-business as part of their strategies in the future. The other group 
discussed how customers’ requirements could change as a result of mergers/acquisitions 
in the auto industry, reduction of lead times and emerging e-business solutions applied 
by large auto companies. 
 
Step 3: Identify external forces: 
 
External forces were identified with a basis in the above mentioned studies undertaken 
in the MARINTEK/WWL R&D project. Examples of external forces are: 
 
• Mergers/acquisitions in the auto industry: 
• Nissan/Renault, Ford/Volvo/Jaguar/Mazda, Mercedes/Chrysler, GM/Saab, 
Toyota/Daihatsu. 
• Common platforms (frameworks for cars): 
• The new auto companies use common platforms for different brands (e.g. 
Nissan/Renault – common Micra/Clio platform). 
• Fewer platforms: 
• Auto companies use fewer platforms in order to realise economies of scale (e.g. 
Volkswagen base their brands on four platforms only). 
• E-commerce: 
• Ford and GM move all their purchasing operations on to the Internet11. 
November 2, 1999, Ford and Oracle formed a joint venture, to establish 
AutoXchange. AutoXchange will be the preferred vehicle for all of Ford’s $80 
billion annual purchases of components and materials. Further, the supply chain 
back-end will integrate with Ford’s consumer facing web sites. These efforts 
will transform Ford’s supply chain from one based on forecasts and building for 
inventory, to a real time build to order model. 
• The emergence of large, global supply chain integrators (e.g. Caliber, Ryder and 
Exel, in co-operation with IT providers such as i2 and IBM). 
 
Step 4: Establish scenario logic: 
 
As opposed to the MARINTEK and Statoil Driftstjenester scenario projects, one tried to 
carry through a more thorough assessment of potential key drivers of change. Several 
                                                 
11 After the workshop, GM, Ford and Daimler/Chrysler have announced that they are planning to combine 
their efforts to form a business-to-business integrated supplier exchange through a single global portal. 
This venture will create the world’s largest virtual marketplace. 
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key drivers of change were discussed in the first and the second workshop, the goal 
being to identify the truly critical key drivers with a high impact on the logistics 
services to be offered by WWL in the future. 
 
In the first workshop, three key drivers of change were discussed: 
 
1. “Erosion of conferences” 
• Conferences are critical to the ocean car transport industry profitability today. 
• Increased focus on cost and service level could induce auto makers to exert 
pressure to eliminate conferences. 
• Politically, the regulatory justification for conferences is on a shaky ground 
today. 
2. “Containerised sea transport of cars” 
• If a cost-effective solution for carrying finished vehicles by containers appears, 
the supply of deep sea auto transportation would increase dramatically and 
WWL profitability could be significantly reduced. 
• A projection of significant excess slot capacity in the container industry in the 
foreseeable future may contribute to develop technology for transport of cars in 
containers. 
• The new boss of Neptun Orient Lines (NOL) (NOL recently acquired American 
President Lines) thinks container auto shipments is quite viable. 
3. “Emergence of global lead logistics providers (LLPs)” 
• Emergence of integrated logistics companies (e.g. UPS and Ryder) may pose a 
threat to WWL and their need for direct contact with their clients. WWL could 
become a sub-supplier to an integrator. 
• A reform in U.S. maritime law now permits shippers and carriers to enter into 
multi-faceted contracts. This will probably induce LLPs to become much more 
involved in the maritime supply chain. 
• In order to effectively manage global supply chains, auto makers require state of 
the art logistics capabilities. GM and Ford are presently pursuing globalisation 
and will reach out to logistics providers who have the required competencies. 
This has also to do with information systems technology which through the 
Internet is at the stage where integration of global logistics can occur. 
• Integrators, such as UPS and Ryder, have finally accumulated enough 
experience in domestic markets to have credibility for expanding into global and 
thereby ocean services. 
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The participants were organised into three groups, and each group was assigned one key 
driver of change for discussion, with respect to: 
 
• What strategies/logistics services should WWL pursue in order to maintain/increase 
profits? 
• What strategies/logistics services are other players (e.g. customers and competitors) 
likely to pursue? 
• Requirements related to change in WWL strategic core? 
• Time horizon/viability of key driver? 
 
Presentations of the group work were given in plenary followed by a discussion. 
 
In the second workshop, the goal was to explore key drivers of change with respect to 
structure of inland distribution in the future. The goal was to throw light on which role 
WWL should play in inland activities in the transport chain.  
 
Three key drivers of change were chosen as a basis for discussions: 
 
1. Customer’s requirements. 
• What expectations/needs do customers have for inland activities/distribution in 
the future? 
2. Existing/emerging inland logistics actors. 
• What strategies do existing/emerging inland actors have for inland activities? 
Traditional asset based operators versus third party logistics providers? What 
about mergers/acquisitions/partnering? Will some of the actors come between 
WWL and its customers? 
3. E-commerce. 
• How may e-commerce change the rules of the game? 
 
Once again, the participants were organised into three groups. Instead of assigning one 
driver to each group, all drivers were to be treated by each group this time. WWL is a 
global company with global business and representation organised in four regions: 
Europe, America, Asia and Oceania. In order to trigger discussions with respect to 
WWL inland engagements in each of the regions, three key trades were chosen: 
 
1. Asia-Europe. 
2. Europe-North America/North America-Europe. 
3. Europe/North America-Oceania. 
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The three key trades represent a significant share of total WWL revenue. All three 
groups discussed the Europe region (the region best known to the participants), and at 
the same time the other three regions were touched upon. Representatives from the four 
regions were allowed to give their views with respect to WWL inland activities in the 
regional workshops. 
 
Each group was asked to imagine themselves being the key trade team responsible for 
the trade in question. Each group was asked to: 
 
1. Develop a set of scenarios for the guidance of WWL’s inland engagements in the 
future. 
• Give a short description of how each of the three key drivers may develop. 
• Combine the descriptions into scenarios. 
• Assess the viability of the scenarios and what forces/events could change the 
scenario assumptions and content radically? 
2. Develop a strategy for WWL inland engagements in the regions relevant for the key 
trade in question. 
• Goals: Why should (not) WWL be involved in inland activities in the regions? 
• Secure/strengthen trade, key customer’s requirements, market shares and 
revenue in inland activities? 
• Are there any specific synergies between the deep sea trade and inland 
services to be offered by WWL? 
• Strategy: 
• What kind of inland activities/services in what regions? 
• What kind of co-operations (e.g. Joint Venture or full ownership) may be 
formed for what activities? 
• What would be a rational degree of investment in assets? 
 
In the regional workshops, the same approach was taken in discussing WWL’s future 
engagement with respect to inland logistics. However, the regional participants were 
also asked to describe the situation today with respect to organisation/structure of 
logistics in the region. The description should include discussions related to 
organisation of trucking, rail, PDI (Pre Delivery Inspection) and terminal operations, 
seeking answers to: 
 
• Who are the actors and how do they co-operate? 
• In what way is the customer involved (what activities/services are insourced/ 
outsourced)? 
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• How is e-commerce applied? 
 
The description of the situation today, provided the core team with a frame of reference. 
 
On this basis, scenarios should be developed addressing the same elements as 
mentioned above. The participants were also asked to identify what could radically 
change their scenario assumptions. With a basis in their scenarios, the groups were 
asked to develop a WWL strategy for inland engagements in the regions. 
 
With a basis in the findings from the core team and regional workshops, the following 
key drivers of change were identified: 
 
1. Deep sea supply + customer relations: The supply of deep sea tonnage and the type 
of customer relations are believed to have a high degree of dependence. If a cost-
effective solution for transporting cars in containers emerge, the potential tonnage 
supply will increase sharply due to excess slot capacity in the container trades today. 
If the tonnage supply increases, one is likely to see a commodity market and more 
short-term and dynamic customer relations. Short term customer relations could also 
be a result of the global web portals being pursued by the large auto companies 
today. 
2. Degree of regionalisation: How will mass customisation, postponement of 
production and shorter delivery times influence the production of cars? Will we see 
an increase in regional production and transplants (Transplants are common 
production facilities resulting from the mergers/acquisitions and development of 
common platforms in the auto industry. E.g. Renault produces Nissan cars in Europe 
and vice versa). 
 
Each of the drivers was assigned two extreme, but plausible, levels of occurrence. In 
this way, the extreme points of plausible futures were embraced. Based on the two key 
drivers a scenario logic was established as shown in Figure 4-11. 
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Figure 4-11 Scenario logic - Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines 
 
 
Step 5: Describe scenarios: 
 
This step was undertaken by the facilitators between the second and the third of the 
workshops. 
 
A short story line was developed for each of the scenarios. In addition, block diagrams 
were used to highlight the main contents of and the main differences between the 
scenarios (refer Figure 4-12). 
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Figure 4-12 Block diagram for "It's a jungle out there" scenario 
The block diagram aims to capture and highlight the main assumptions and content of the scenario. 
The broad arrow tries to illustrate the cause-effect relations (e.g. customers co-operate with IT 
providers and establish global web portals thus leading to more dynamic and short term relations). 
 
 
In a series of follow-up meetings, the scenario findings were integrated with the regular 
WWL strategic planning process and procedures for monitoring of scenario key 
indicators were established. 
 
4.4.3 Exploration, evaluation and implementation of innovations (step 2-5) 
 
In this section, the practical execution and results of step 2-5 in the scenario-based 
guidelines for innovation are described. 
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Step 2: Explore new services: 
 
In the third workshop, needs and directions for innovation were identified for each of 
the scenarios. Two groups discussed the scenarios and came up with a suggestion for 
new WWL logistics services to be offered. For each scenario, the following questions 
were raised: 
 
1. Scope: What logistics services to what customers, regions and trades? 
2. Which are competitive advantages/uniqueness? 
3. How to develop and offer new services using internal/external resources? 
 
Below, an example is given: 
 
• Increase High & Heavy (project cargo such as rail wagons, escalators and 
agricultural machines) cargo volumes by using ro/ro vessels for High & Heavy 
cargo exclusively, while the PCCs (Pure Car Carrier) and PCTCs (Pure Car Truck 
Carrier) would take care of the decreasing car cargo volumes (scenario 4 – increased 
tonnage supply and reduced deep sea car transport demand). 
 
A further development of the service descriptions took place in a number of follow-up 
meetings. After an aggregation and clustering of services, 3-5 services were identified 
for each scenario. 
 
Step 3: Evaluate new services: 
 
After the identification of directions for innovation and potential new services, the 
services were evaluated in the same way as for the MARINTEK and Statoil 
Driftstjenester cases. 
 
Step 4/5: Implement new services: 
 
A possible implementation of new services will be decided in the regular strategy 
process starting in June, 2000. Important elements to be considered are related to degree 
of outsourcing of non-core activities (refer section 2.4 for discussions on strategic core), 
investments in IT systems capabilities and extended scope of services for selected key 
customers (e.g. degree of logistics services to be provided in different parts of the 
chain). 
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A discussion of challenges related to implementation of new services is given in section 
4.5. 
 
4.4.4 Evaluation of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
In this section, the scenario process run by WWL is evaluated with a basis in feedback 
received during the execution of the process. 
 
Feedback from participants in the MARINTEK and Statoil Driftstjenester cases 
contributed in improving the scenario process run by WWL. Initial steps were 
undertaken aiming to: 
 
• Clarify the ownership of the scenario process and the responsibility for integrating 
scenarios in the regular strategy process. 
• Develop a common platform and understanding of the logistics concept and the 
company’s logistics services today. 
 
Generally, fewer comments were received in the WWL case than in the MARINTEK 
and Statoil Driftstjenester cases. 
 
The evaluation has been structured in the following way: 
 
1. Evaluation of the guidelines (refer Figure 3-4). 
2. Evaluation of the practical execution of the process. 
3. Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied. 
4. Necessary adjustments of guidelines. 
 
Evaluation of the guidelines: 
 
• The WWL managers felt that by using scenarios they would be better prepared for 
serious changes in the business environment. One of the managers stated that WWL 
had never before, in a structured way, addressed such “what if” scenarios. The 
typical was to discuss new strategies/services after a significant change in the 
business environment had taken place. The scenario discussions were said to 
represent a structured and pro-active way of moving the business in the right 
direction. 
• A cross-functional team was perceived as useful in developing and discussing the 
scenarios. Managers from all WWL divisions were participating in the workshops. 
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• The regional anchoring was emphasised as important by the core team. If no 
workshops had been held in the regions, regional representatives should have joined 
the core team. The regional inputs were useful in evaluating the findings in the core 
team workshops. 
• The managers felt that scenarios should be used on a regular basis also for 
longer/shorter time horizons than five years. 
• Some of the managers felt that the scenario discussions contributed to identify early 
warning signs. 
• One of the managers suggested that short-term follow-ups could be initiated based 
on the scenario discussions (i.e. pursue critical initatives right away instead of 
waiting till the scenario process is finalised). 
 
Evaluation of the practical execution of the process: 
 
• No significant comments were received. 
 
Evaluation of how the goals of the scenario process were satisfied: 
 
• An exploration of the need for future logistics management services was 
accomplished. 
• The scenario findings served as input in the (2001) strategy formulation process and 
in establishing divisional and regional measures and targets with respect to new 
logistics management services. 
• A common mental map of the future with respect to new logistics management 
services was established. 
• An evaluation of whether scenarios should be used regularly in the WWL strategy 
planning process was undertaken and WWL decided to use scenario learning on a 
regular basis. 
 
Necessary adjustments of guidelines: 
 
• Based on the feedback, there is no indication that adjustments of the guidelines 
should be made. 
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4.5 Challenges related to implementation of innovations 
 
In this section I will briefly discuss some general problems and challenges related to 
implementation of innovations triggered by  scenarios. The discussion will be illustrated 
by drawing upon experience gained from the three case studies. 
 
Based on my experience from working with scenarios, there are basically three main 
problems related to a successful implementation of innovations triggered from 
scenarios: 
 
1. A game-like atmosphere may occur, thus hindering true implementation efforts. 
2. Difficult to decide the right time for making a radical change in service portfolio due 
to radical need for internal change. 
3. Difficult to concretise the service if quantifiable consequences are needed. 
 
In the following, each of the three points mentioned above are further discussed. 
 
Game-like atmosphere 
 
Initiatives aiming at avoiding an atmosphere characterised by lack of true commitment 
from participants in a scenario-based innovation process are outlined in section 3.2.2. 
The initiatives may be summarised as: 
 
• Emphasise that the scenario process is part of a larger strategic process aiming at 
exploring and implementing innovations. 
• Assure (continuos) participation of the decision makers in the process. 
 
In the MARINTEK case, the participants commented that a larger emphasis should have 
been put on the implementation efforts. Recommendations were to put more time 
resources into preparing implementation efforts, possibly through an implementation 
plan. In addition, it was agreed that one (or more) of the participants should be assigned 
the responsibility of implementation management. 
 
In the Statoil Driftstjenester case, the participants pointed to the challenge of integrating 
scenarios into the regular strategy process. By defining roles and responsibilities in this 
respect, the importance of the process  would be further underlined. 
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In the Wallenius Wilhelmsen case, the ownership of the scenario process together with 
responsibilities for integrating the scenarios in the regular strategy process were 
clarified early in the process. The problem of a game-like atmosphere with no true 
commitment form participants was not present in this case study and no critical 
comments regarding implementation efforts were received. 
 
The right time for implementation 
 
Although robust innovations may be implemented right away, such innovations may 
imply radical changes in internal organisation (e.g. dismissal of employees and 
outsourcing of activities). Some managers are resistant to such changes and are not 
willing to give a go on such initiatives unless absolute necessity can be demonstrated. A 
natural implication following this observation is that the scenarios need to be well 
documented and argued for. The managers need to believe in the scenarios and their 
underlying logic. Again continuos participation of the decision makers is called for. In 
order to improve the continuity, one of the participants in the Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
case suggested that the participants could be given the responsibility for performing 
small tasks between the workshops (e.g. analyse and document strategic initiatives in 
the container industry with respect to transport of cars in containers). 
 
In addition to robust services, the scenarios may also reveal optimal services suited for 
one particular scenario, or a certain combination of scenario elements. The right time 
for implementation of such services may be hard to decide. A monitoring system may 
contribute in this respect. In addition, one needs to consider the time needed for 
implementation in relation to possible early warning signs given by the monitoring of 
key indicators. How long is it appropriate to wait in order to be sure that a certain 
scenario is unfolding? In appendix B, these questions are dealt with in a case study 
aiming to develop an optimal transport system for a set of offshore installations today 
and in the future. 
 
In the Statoil Driftstjenester and Wallenius Wilhelmsen cases, guidelines and 
responsibilities for monitoring of key indicators were established. However, the effects 
of monitoring have not been documented well enough for any of the cases as these 
effects only will be measurable over a longer term. 
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Identification of quantifiable consequences 
 
Some services need to be optimised through quantification in order to be implemented. 
Consider the task to design an optimal transport system for serving offshore 
installations today and in the future (refer Appendix B). The transport system could be 
defined by the number and type of vessel (e.g. small/large, slow/fast). Several forces 
may affect the design of such a system. However, a set of scenarios consisting of stories 
and mainly qualitative elements may not give clear indications on number and type of 
vessels in an optimal fleet. In Appendix B, a methodology integrating scenario and 
optimisation techniques are presented in order to solve problems related to 
quantification of scenario consequences. 
 
However, not all services need to be quantified in a manner as outlined above in order 
to be implemented. For the Wallenius Wilhelmsen Lines case, some services were 
related to strategic questions such as: 
 
• Should we offer pre-delivery inspection (PDI) of cargo, 
• for which customers, 
• and should we invest in PDI facilities or just co-ordinate such services? 
 
Generally, it is my impression that scenarios help in taking major strategic decisions 
related to the introduction of new services and that other techniques may be used in 
order to concretise scenario implications when found necessary. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 5 wraps up the thesis by assessing how the goals of the thesis are met and by 
concluding the applicability of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation. 
 
5.1 Recapturing the goal of the thesis 
 
In chapter 1, my main goal is stated as: 
 
Show how innovation in shipping may be guided by using scenarios. 
 
In order to reach this goal I have developed and tested a set of guidelines for using 
scenarios to undertake innovation.  
 
The scenario-based guidelines were developed with a basis in a relatively broad 
understanding of innovation. In addition, the literature surveyed has been illustrated 
with a number of examples from the shipping industry in order to make the theory more 
comprehensible. 
 
The guidelines consist of five major steps (refer Figure 5-1). For a further description of 
each step, please refer to section 3.4. 
1. Develop 
scenarios
Key indicators for 
monitoring
2. Explore new 
services
3. Evaluate new 
services
5. Implement 
optimal services
4. Implement 
robust services
 
Figure 5-1 Scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The guidelines were tested and evaluated by three companies with different 
engagements in shipping. The three case studies uncovered a need for a few revisions of 
the guidelines, the following should be added: 
 
1. Clarification of the ownership of the process. One (or more) of the participants 
should be assigned the responsibility for developing the identified services further 
and eventually implement the services in the company. This task has to be 
undertaken ahead of the development of scenarios. 
2. Development of a common platform and understanding of the company and its 
current strategies and goals among the participants. This activity should contribute 
to bring all participants to the same level before the actual scenario process starts, 
and needs to be part of an initial step, ahead of step 1. 
3. Development of plans for how to integrate development and use of scenarios in the 
regular strategy process and how to monitor key indicators. Define roles and 
responsibilities for these tasks. This task may be undertaken ahead of the 
development of the scenarios, but may also be subject to the outcome of the scenario 
process. 
 
With a basis in these findings, revised guidelines are given in Figure 5-2. 
1. Develop 
scenarios
Key indicators for 
monitoring
2. Explore new 
services
3. Evaluate new 
services
5. Implement 
optimal services
4. Implement 
robust services
Develop common 
platform
Clarify ownership 
of process
Develop plans for 
integration of 
scenarios in regular 
strategy process
 
Figure 5-2 Revised scenario-based guidelines for innovation                        
Revisions are indicated by dotted boxes and lines. Integration of scenarios in the regular strategy 
process may take place ahead, during or after the scenario process. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
With a basis in the above discussion, I will argue that the goal of the thesis is met. 
 
5.2 The applicability of the scenario-based guidelines for innovation 
 
Generally, all companies confirmed the applicability of the guidelines. 
 
In chapter 1, I presented a set of conditions and requirements which have to be met in 
order to develop and use scenarios for innovation in shipping. In the following, the three 
cases are discussed according to how they meet these conditions and requirements. 
 
The first of the necessary conditions states that the future has to be uncertain in order to 
develop scenarios. This condition was met in all cases, as demonstrated in chapter 4. 
 
The second of the necessary conditions states that organisational slack is needed in 
order to develop scenarios. This condition was met in all cases, but to a different level. 
MARINTEK had rather limited financial and personnel resources for the scenario 
process. The resources were substantially better in the Statoil Driftstjenester and 
Wallenius Wilhelmsen cases. MARINTEK was mainly interested in gaining experience 
from running scenario processes, while the two other companies had a higher 
motivation and need for innovation. The results were that MARINTEK did not follow 
up the results from the scenario process, while the two other companies managed to 
identify and follow up need for innovation and new services. The findings indicate that 
sufficient organisational slack is needed in order to develop and use scenarios for 
innovation. 
 
If sufficient conditions are present, the applicability of scenarios is secured, provided 
that the necessary conditions are met. 
 
In chapter 1, the first of the sufficient conditions states that the company has to request 
forced innovation in order to develop scenarios. This condition was met in all cases. All 
companies were somehow forced to innovate in order to adapt to changing conditions in 
the business environment (e.g. WWL did not want to become a sub supplier, but rather 
to maintain direct contact towards clients). 
 
The second of the sufficient conditions states that strategic decisions have to be taken, 
but not within a limited time period. This condition was met in all cases as the 
companies were planning new services for a 5-10 year horizon. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
If both necessary and sufficient conditions are present, scenarios are to be developed. In 
order to be of use, however, scenarios should satisfy a set of requirements. The 
requirements are related to the number of scenarios and the time horizon and also that 
the scenarios should embrace the extreme points of plausible futures. The three 
requirements were met in all cases, as demonstrated in chapter 4. 
 
Both the theoretical and practical results of this thesis confirm that scenarios may be 
used to guide innovation in shipping. More specifically, the three cases confirm that 
scenarios may be used to guide exploration, evaluation and implementation of 
innovations in shipping given that necessary and sufficient conditions and requirements 
are present. 
 
However, more time is needed in order to asses how monitoring of key indicators may 
guide the implementation of innovations. The effects of monitoring have not been 
documented well enough for any of the cases as these effects only will be measurable 
over a longer term. 
 
Scenarios provide guidance for innovations in shipping involving major strategic 
decisions. Other techniques (e.g. optimisation techniques) may be used in order to 
concretise scenario implications when found necessary. Further work is needed in order 
to identify ways of combining scenario techniques with quantitative techniques in order 
to reveal quantifiable consequences of scenarios when needed. 
 
5.3 Closure 
 
Results from the thesis have been communicated to the industry through the three case 
studies and through a number of articles on the subject (Kroneberg 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 
Østvik et al. 1998, Fagerholt and Kroneberg 2000). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, my experience from working in shipping over the last 
five years indicates that shipping companies are mainly concerned with day to day 
operations and that little effort is put into pursuing innovation in a systematic manner. It 
is my conviction that long range planning will strengthen the competitive force in 
shipping and therefore, my hope is that results from this thesis may inspire and 
strengthen the use of scenarios for innovation in shipping. 
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SUMMARY 
 
The paper is based upon the results from a research project, initiated by the Norwegian 
Marine Technology Research Institute (MARINTEK), which primary aim was to give 
an analysis of possible future innovations in container shipping [1]. Rather than 
forecasting specific innovations in a highly uncertain environment - with a very small 
chance of correctly forecasting such innovations - the project team realised that richer 
and more useful results would be obtained by the use of a scenario methodology. 
 
Scenarios are alternative stories about how the future might develop. Scenarios are not 
predictions, but rather descriptions of plausible futures. In this project, scenarios were 
used as explorative tools for thinking about the future in new ways. 
 
Four structurally different scenarios are established based on two identified key drivers 
of innovation: Conference Erosion (elimination of the conference system - public 
policies that grant antitrust immunity to carriers on issues of price and service offerings) 
and Seamless Systems Integration (full scale adoption and implementation of open 
architecture information and telecommunications systems). Should these factors, or 
some combination of these factors occur, carriers would need to develop innovative 
services and capabilities to remain competitive against their main rivals and other forms 
for competition. 
 
Taking a supply chain perspective, the paper identifies and discuss the rationale for 
possible innovations within each of the four scenarios, and specifically address the 
interface and relations between deepsea and shortsea container shipping. 
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Intelligence Center (SRI Consulting), Menlo Park, California, and studies scenario 
techniques. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, the container shipping industry is characterised by eroding profitability, a 
fragmented industry structure with a large number of participants of varying size, and 
competition that is largely based on cost and operational efficiency and/or regulated 
pricing structures [1, 2]. 
 
Change in the container shipping industry takes place slowly, at least in taking actions 
that can shift the basis of competition (through radical or breakthrough innovations). 
The container shipping industry has introduced some changes in ship design and size in 
order to realise economies of scale. Other changes may be related to implementation of 
tracking software, hub and spoke systems and double stack trains [1]. 
 
In general, one could say container carriers today are striving to reduce costs wherever 
they can. This behaviour is reinforced by the liner conference structure, which sets 
service and rates at a level to satisfy the least competitive members. In allowing liner 
conferences, the regulatory regime discourages innovative carrier behaviour by 
protecting carriers from the risks of competing in open markets [1]. 
 
Key structural components of the container shipping industry are, however, undergoing 
varying degrees of change. The degree of change in these structural components and 
their impact on future innovations in the container shipping industry can not be known 
for sure. Scenarios acknowledge this uncertainty by making it possible to take into 
account structural changes causing the future to deviate radically from observable 
trends.  
 
First, the paper gives a definition and explanation of scenarios, followed by a 
presentation of possible benefits which may be gained by the use of scenarios. 
Thereafter, it outlines a formalised methodology for conducting a scenario analysis. The 
paper proceeds with presenting results from a scenario based analysis of innovation in 
the container shipping industry. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
2 THE NATURE OF SCENARIOS 
 
This chapter will start by explaining the concept of scenarios. Thereafter, possible 
benefits stemming from the use of scenarios will be described. Finally, a formalised 
methodology for developing scenarios will be presented, together with some key 
problems in scenario generation. 
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2.1 DEFINITION 
 
Scenarios are alternative stories about how the future might develop. Scenarios are not 
predictions, but rather descriptions of plausible futures. Scenarios reject traditional 
single point forecasting techniques based on historical data, by making it possible to 
take into account structural changes causing the future to deviate radically from 
observable trends. The scenario approach to addressing uncertainty is illustrated in Fig 
1. The scenarios are developed in a logical and structural manner as described in chapter 
2.3. 
 
Envelope of uncertainty
Scenario A
Scenario B
Scenario C Scenario D
Single point forecast
 
 
Fig 1 Scenarios bound the envelope of uncertainty [3] 
 
 
2.2 BENEFITS 
 
Companies report a wide range of benefits stemming from scenario planning [3, 4, 5]: 
 
• A broader framework for strategic planning (helps to avoid blindspots that result 
from considering isolated trends, solely quantifiable information and purely 
economic data) - more complete understanding of the dynamics of change, present 
and future 
• Consistent frameworks and language for discussing critical future issues throughout 
the business 
• Encouraging new ways of thinking about and planning for the future (exploratory 
studies) - an expanded range of strategy options 
• More robust and flexible strategies, through the use of scenarios as a testbed for 
evaluation of strategies 
• Identification of major uncertainties so that companies can develop and direct 
appropriate business-environment scanning and monitoring efforts 
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The paper is based upon the results from a research project aiming to give an analysis of 
possible future innovations in the container shipping industry. In this project, scenarios 
were used as tools for thinking about the future in new ways (exploratory studies). 
 
 
2.3  A SCENARIO METHODOLOGY 
 
In the following, a methodology for developing scenarios will be presented. This 
methodology is developed by SRI Consulting. SRI Consulting has used scenario based 
techniques in a wide range of studies of the future since the mid 1960s. SRI Consulting 
also played a major role in the research project described in this paper (chapter 3). 
 
The methodology, as illustrated in Fig 2, is based on a six step process that a 
multidisciplinary team performs in a series of workshops. The six steps will be further 
commented and exemplified in chapter 3. 
 
Strategic 
Decisions
Scenario Logics
Scenarios
Environmental 
Forces
Decision 
Implications
Key Decision 
Factors
Step 1
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Step 5 
Step 6 
 
Fig 2 A scenario methodology [5] 
 
The process is decision-focused in that its starting points give a clarification of the 
strategic decisions the scenarios aim to address and of the key decision factors. 
Describing the strategic decisions will focus and constrain the subsequent steps in the 
process. Key decision factors are the matters that the decision makers want more 
information about, because if this information was available it would enable them to 
make better decisions.  
 
Step 3 seeks to identify environmental forces that influence the value of the key 
decision factors. It may be helpful to structure the thinking around micro-environmental 
forces and macro-environmental forces. Micro-environmental forces may be analysed 
according to Porter’s five competitive forces (competitors, suppliers, buyers, potential 
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entrants, and substitutes) [6]. The macro-environmental forces may be analysed by the 
help of the SEPT scheme - in which environmental forces are organised in terms of 
Social, Economic, Political and Technological factors [4]. Following the identification 
of the environmental forces, the forces have to be analysed in terms of their relative 
uncertainty and importance for and impact on the key decision factors. The key 
uncertainties confronting the business - and the sources of difference among the 
scenarios - lie in the forces grouped in the “high impact/high uncertainty area” [3]. 
 
Step 4 may be referred to as “the heart of the scenario process”. The scenario team 
seeks to identify different scenario logics - organising principles or themes - that will 
reasonably encompass the “high impact/high uncertainty area” [4]. Structuring scenarios 
around various combinations of all high impact uncertainties would create an 
unmanageable number of alternative futures. The team needs to group, or cluster the 
forces identified in step 3 logically around a limited number of key “axes of 
uncertainty” that provide a structure for the scenarios and stretch the envelope of 
uncertainty to its plausible limits [3]. 
 
In step 5, the participants describe the scenarios in sufficient detail to identify and 
explore decision implications. Normally these scenario descriptions will include an 
extended story line of two to three pages, a tabular description of scenario differences, 
and selective quantification of key factors. Regardless of how the scenarios eventually 
are presented, they should always include clear statements of the underlying logics and 
key assumptions [4, 5]. 
 
In the last step, participants analyse and interpret the scenarios to identify their 
implications for the prospective decision [5]. 
 
Even when following a formalised methodology for developing scenarios, there are 
several factors in scenario generation that tend to make things complicated. These 
factors must be dealt with in workshops undertaken by the project participants [7]: 
 
• Difficult to limit the number of uncertain factors to be considered (an evaluation of 
importance of the different factors, and cross-impact methods for developing clusters 
of factors may reduce this difficulty) 
• People tend to be conservative, cannot imagine dramatic shifts (scenarios may, 
however, be a helpful tool for conservative people as they are forced to think beyond 
a "most likely" future) 
• Difficult to assign probabilities to final scenarios chosen (However, there are dangers 
associated with attaching probabilities to scenarios. Comprehensive scenarios are 
quite improbable, due to the fact that each scenario includes much information and 
many estimates about future condition. For all these conditions to happen as 
described is quite unlikely. The future that actually occurs will more likely fall 
within the envelope indicated by a good set of scenarios. As the purpose of scenarios 
is partly to enrich the understanding of future uncertainties in the business 
environment, scenarios aim more to examine the interplay and dynamics of forces 
shaping the future than to identify a most probable scenario) 
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3 EXPLORING FUTURE INNOVATIONS IN CONTAINER SHIPPING 
 
This chapter presents results from a scenario based analysis of innovation in the 
container shipping industry. The analysis was undertaken by the Norwegian Marine 
Technology Research Institute (MARINTEK) in co-operation with SRI Consulting. 
 
The main goal and decision focus for the project was to describe the extent and type of 
innovations that may emerge in the container shipping industry. However, as this is a 
first attempt to use scenarios in a shipping context (according to the project team’s 
knowledge), the process and its results should be regarded as a ”demonstrator”. Given 
the nature and objectives of the SRI-MARINTEK project, a simplified version of SRI’s 
full-blown scenario methodology, as described in chapter 2.3, was chosen. The 
simplified approach involved the following steps: 
 
• Examining alternative key driving forces that could play a key role in determining 
the future business environment in container shipping (step 3 in chapter 2.3) 
• Selecting the two most important driving forces of the scenarios (step 4 in chapter 
2.3) 
• Deriving four alternative scenarios based on the two driving forces (step 4 and 5 in 
chapter 2.3) 
• Exploring implications for innovations within each scenario (step 6 in chapter 2.3) 
 
In the following, these steps will be discussed – leading up to a presentation of each of 
the four scenarios with implications for both deepsea and shortsea container shipping. 
 
 
3.1 SELECTING KEY DRIVING FORCES AND SCENARIO LOGIC 
 
After a thorough analysis of external forces shaping the future business environment in 
container shipping, the project team concluded that some of the key structural 
components of the container shipping industry are undergoing varying degrees of 
change. The change trigger of greatest importance is the need to satisfy customers that 
are demanding ever-higher levels of service, in terms of fast and reliable deliveries. The 
emerging information technologies contribute to a strengthened focus on customer 
service in terms of real time information and order status. Another structural component 
of great importance is the regulatory regime which question the carrier conference 
system due to competitive constraints. The broader issue of national protection of 
carriers is on the agenda of the next World Trade Organisation discussions. In addition, 
shippers are also organising to fight the conference system.  
 
With a basis in the analysis of external forces and emerging trends, the two driving 
forces that the project team believe were most important in determining future 
innovations in the container shipping industry were identified as: 
 
• Elimination of the conference system (generally, public policies that grant antitrust 
immunity to carriers on issues of price and service offerings) 
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• Full-scale adoption and implementation of open architecture information and 
telecommunications systems 
 
Should these factors, or some combination of these factors occur, carriers will need to 
develop innovative services and capabilities to remain competitive against their main 
rivals and other forms of competition. The nature of these innovations will be 
exploitative rather than explorative. Brand new concepts of container shipping – such as 
disposable containers or ships that travel on land – are not expected, but rather in the 
creative implementation and extension of existing ideas, technology and practices. The 
full flowering of these ideas – in the form of creative and radical approaches to 
customer relations, competitor alliances, and new service offerings – will not take place 
until the conference system erodes or changes significantly from its current state and 
until full-scale adoption of integrated global information systems becomes a reality. 
 
The ocean conference system, although beginning to permit more market-oriented 
member actions, on the whole still inhibits efficiency and innovation in the container 
industry. For carriers inside conferences, rules govern prices and services offered to 
shippers, which to some degree inhibit close carrier-shipper partnerships. In addition, 
”creative” pricing to accommodate the individual needs of important shippers is 
generally not available to carriers. Carriers outside the conference trades enjoy their 
own form of protection from carriers that compete principally within the conference 
system. These nonconference carriers are insulated from direct competition with many 
of the larger, better-equipped and financed global carriers, which are content to operate 
within conferences to obtain their protective advantages. 
 
Supply chain integration is dependent upon integration of information systems and 
databases across multiple value chains. In this way, seamless information exchange will 
become a key enabler that links supply-chain members and drives innovation. However, 
some barriers to this development remain such as the lack of universal data and 
communication standards and formats. 
 
A scenario logic based on the two driving forces was established as shown in Fig 3. 
 
  Conference Erosion (CE) 
  Significant Insignificant 
 
 
 
Systems 
 
Significant 
 
Scenario 1: 
“Interactive Partnerships” 
 
 
Scenario 2: 
“Turbulent Times” 
Integration 
(SI) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Scenario 3: 
“Tailored Partnerships” 
 
 
Scenario 4: 
“More of the Same” 
 
Fig 3 Scenario Logic 
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3.2  FOUR SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS ON FUTURE  
INNOVATIONS IN THE CONTAINER SHIPPING INDUSTRY 
 
Taking a supply chain perspective, each scenario and its implications for future 
innovations in the container shipping industry will be discussed. The interface and 
relations between deepsea and shortsea container shipping will be given special 
attention. 
 
The identified innovations reflect the project teams accumulated experience of the 
supply chain arena. Additional in-depth analysis would be necessary to confirm, reject, 
or modify the conclusions. The resulting scenarios and implications for innovations are 
very much a function of the selection of the key driving forces. If the two key drivers 
change significantly, the conclusions could also change significantly. 
 
 
3.2(a) Scenario 1: ”Interactive Partnerships” (CE: Significant, SI: Significant)
 
In this scenario, conferences experience significant erosion, removing major 
competitive constraints from carriers. Significant systems integration takes place, 
enabling closer links among carriers, suppliers, shippers and receivers and allowing 
better and more real-time communications and data flow. 
 
Likely supply chain innovations in this scenario are: 
 
• Shippers and carriers join forces in strategic and tactical transport and network 
planning activities. With a basis in integrated co-operative systems, shippers and 
carriers will integrate their planning, execution, and analysis systems to maximise 
profits for each partner 
• The number of brokers (or middlemen) is reduced. This trend is already observable 
in the container shipping industry today. In Europe, Nedlloyd has introduced a “one 
stop shopping” concept under the tradename of “Nedlloyd Flowmasters” [2] 
• Critical interface linkages improve. Integrated information systems among partners 
will facilitate efficient, highly productive cargo transfers at critical interfaces in the 
supply chain, such as terminals and intermodal facilities 
• Integrated value chains. Each participant is able to understand clearly and 
immediately the financial, operational, and strategic implications of actions it and 
other channel members take in the course of doing business 
 
Implications for shortsea carriers in this scenario: 
 
Global ocean carriers, information systems companies such as Microsoft and IBM, and 
logistic management companies will drive innovations. These big companies will seek 
other alliance partners who are excellent in their fields, including shortsea carriers. 
Shortsea carriers will be vital links in the success of moving and storing cargo and 
information to the final destination, and as feeder vessels working on behalf of the 
larger channel captain. A considerable customer intimacy is necessary to prosper in this 
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scenario. Big investments in management and information systems will have to be made 
in order to avoid acquisitions or mergers either by other SSS operators or by the larger 
channel captain itself. 
 
 
3.2(b) Scenario 2: ”Turbulent Times” (CE: Insignificant, SI: Significant)
 
In this scenario, significant systems integration takes place enabling more efficient 
communication and information flows. No significant conference erosion takes place 
and the carriers lack the freedom for competitive actions that emerge in scenario 1. 
 
Likely supply chain innovations in this scenario are: 
 
• Financially able conference carriers create interactive planning and tactical systems 
with shippers. Conflicts will erupt with other conference carriers that rely on 
traditional methods of setting price and service levels 
• Some nonconference carriers will also invest in high-level interactive systems. 
Some conference carriers will want to create supply-chain alliances with 
nonconference carriers that share their goals. The desire to reach across conference 
barriers may result in disharmony among conference members 
• Because of the inability to create completely seamless supply chains (due to 
conference barriers), players will focus on improving internal and external data 
communications and capabilities 
• Certain carriers will use information systems to become specialists in selected 
operational areas and will sell these services to others, including competitors, in and 
outside the container shipping industry. 
 
Implications for shortsea carriers in this scenario: 
 
Regional operators would have to invest in high-level systems capabilities. In addition, 
a great uncertainty will exist due to the fact that shortsea operators will be dragged into 
experiments of large conference members to reach out to non-conference members to 
form relationships with carriers best in their fields. 
 
 
3.2(c) Scenario 3: ”Tailored Partnerships” (CE: Significant, SI: Insignificant)
 
In this scenario, significant conference erosion takes place, creating a more open 
competitive environment. But the information technology infrastructure that enables 
closer linkage between companies is now absent, due to insignificant systems 
integration. 
 
Likely supply chain innovations in this scenario are: 
 
• Large carriers create close-knit partnerships with selected shippers representing high 
profit margins. Elimination of conferences will permit this kind of relationships 
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• Smaller carriers form alliances with large global network providers. More of the 
small carriers will survive this scenario than in scenarios 1 and 2 because major 
systems investment will be less 
• Many carriers will develop value-added service offerings that are not based on 
information systems. Without the integrated systems capabilities of scenarios 1 and 
2, service differentiation based upon precise transit times, sailing frequencies, and 
guarantees of service reliability will not be possible. Instead carriers will move into 
other forms of more basic value added services in such areas as warehousing and 
distribution 
 
Implications for shortsea carriers in this scenario: 
 
With lower systems investment, shortsea operators could fare well under this scenario. 
The larger carriers would no longer be insulated from non-conference competition and 
would want to form alliances with smaller, but highly efficient partners. They would 
want to form industry-focused supply chains with support from smaller carriers. 
 
 
3.2(d) Scenario 4: ”More of the Same” (CE: Insignificant, SI: Insignificant)
 
In this scenario, neither of driving factors – conference erosion or systems integration – 
changes significantly. Thus, little structural change and little radical innovation can 
occur. 
 
Likely supply chain innovations in this scenario are: 
 
• Carriers will focus on process improvement initiatives. Most non-ocean industry 
firms have accepted the value of “process reengineering” to reduce cost and improve 
efficiencies. In general ocean carriers have been behind other sectors in adopting 
these tools. With few innovations likely, process reengineering will be the focus of 
ocean carriers 
• More cost driven alliances will occur. Gradually, these alliances will try to include 
customer service issues as time goes by, but this step will be difficult because of 
conference rules and non-integrated systems 
 
Implications for shortsea carriers in this scenario: 
 
If shippers could not obtain satisfactory levels of service and product offerings from the 
container industry, they would obtain it from alternative forms of transport, such as 
truck, rail and air. Some short sea carriers would survive as niche players by 
implementing process reengineering programs and investing in quality market 
segmentation programs. Internal process improvements would be in focus. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
 
By using a scenario methodology, container carriers may prepare for an uncertain 
tomorrow. Scenarios capture the envelope of uncertainty and provide carriers with 
benefits related to more complete understanding of the dynamics of change, common 
mental frameworks for discussing future issues, creative ideas and robust strategies. 
 
Results stemming from a scenario based analysis of future supply chain innovations in 
the container shipping industry are presented. Based on the two key drivers – 
conference erosion and systems integration – four scenarios are developed based on 
significant and insignificant levels of the key drivers. Broadly, major changes in these 
two external factors could lead to significant carrier innovation, including integrated 
strategic planning, mergers and alliances, integrated value chains, new ways to manage 
information assets and improved customer service. 
 
The resulting scenarios and implications for innovations are very much a function of the 
selection of the key driving forces. If the two key drivers change significantly, the 
conclusions could also change significantly. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, scenario and optimisation techniques are combined in order to design 
optimal transport systems for an uncertain future. Scenarios establish a set of future 
transport requirements, which serve as input to an optimisation algorithm. For each 
scenario, an optimal transport system is suggested. By analysing these results, one may 
seek a robust solution meeting requirements of all scenarios. By monitoring certain key 
drivers of change one may also be able to respond quickly to emerging scenario(s). A 
simplified case study illustrates the use of the methodology. The case is related to the 
development of a transport system aiming to maintain the supply to a set of offshore 
installations today and in the future. The transport system is defined as a fleet of supply 
vessels, which is characterised by the number and type of each vessel.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Designing future transport systems is a challenging task due to ever changing conditions 
in the business environment. This paper presents a methodology for this purpose that 
combines and integrates scenario and optimisation techniques. The methodology 
identifies and analyses key drivers of change in the business environment with a high 
impact on the transport systems in order to suggest optimal transport policies. To the 
authors’ knowledge, integrating scenario and optimisation techniques is new to the 
literature. 
 
First, a set of scenarios is developed for the problem considered. Scenarios are defined 
as images of possible futures, each with a plausible story that accounts for how the 
scenario develops logically (in a cause/effect way) from the present. The scenarios will 
establish a set of transport requirements that may vary from one scenario to another. 
The requirements serve as input to an optimisation algorithm, in which the actual 
transport problem is modelled and then analysed by a computer. For each scenario, an 
optimal transport system is suggested. By evaluating these results, one may seek a 
robust solution meeting requirements of all scenarios. By monitoring key drivers of 
change one may also be able to respond quickly to emerging scenario(s). Finally, the 
suggested transport systems may serve as input to a further specification and design of 
vessels. 
 
 159
Appendix B 
 
A case study from the offshore oil industry will illustrate the use of the methodology. 
The case is related to the design of a transport system aiming to maintain the supply to a 
set of offshore installations today and in the future. The transport system is defined as a 
fleet of supply vessels, which is characterised by the number and type of each vessel. 
By analysing how changes in the business environment may affect the number of 
installations to be served, their location and transport demand, a set of scenarios is 
established. The scenarios then serve as input to the optimisation algorithm and an 
optimal transport system for each scenario is obtained. The solutions may be a decision 
support for designing a future transport system. 
 
In chapter 2, a brief overview of both scenario and optimisation techniques is given, and 
the advantages of integrating these techniques are discussed. Chapter 3 presents the use 
of the methodology on the case study, while conclusions are given in chapter 4. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter provides a short introduction to scenario and optimisation techniques and 
potential benefits from integrating these techniques. 
 
2.1 Scenario Techniques 
 
Scenarios are structurally different stories about how the future might develop. 
Scenarios are not predictions, but rather descriptions of plausible futures. Scenarios 
reject traditional single point forecasting techniques based on historical data, by making 
it possible to take into account structural changes in the business environment causing 
the future to deviate radically from observable trends.  
 
Scenarios emerged following World War II, as a method for military planning. The U.S. 
Air Force tried to imagine what its opponents might do, and prepared alternative 
counter active strategies [1]. The theoretical and practical foundations for the use of 
scenarios in business were developed in the 1970s. The importance of using scenarios to 
address uncertainties in strategic planning was dramatically underlined by the 
widespread confusion, which followed the oil price shock in 1973 [2]. 
 
Companies report a wide range of benefits from scenario planning ([3], [4] and [5]): 
 
• A broader framework for strategic planning. Scenarios help to avoid blind-spots that 
result from considering isolated trends, solely quantifiable information and purely 
economic data. 
• Consistent frameworks and language for discussing critical future issues throughout 
the business. 
• New ways of thinking about and planning for the future (exploratory studies). 
• More robust and flexible strategies through the use of scenarios as a test-bed for 
evaluation of strategies. 
• Identification of major uncertainties so that companies can develop and direct 
appropriate business-environment scanning and monitoring efforts. 
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For an introduction to the broad spectrum of various scenario techniques, see for 
example [6], [7] and [8]. The techniques are mainly of a qualitative and intuitive nature, 
thus resulting in “story-based” scenarios. The strategic consequences of stories may 
sometimes be hard to concretise and quantify (e.g. “How many vessels, of what capacity 
and speed should be bought or chartered if this scenario should occur?”). A lack of clear 
understanding of strategic consequences derived by scenarios is a potential obstacle for 
fully realising the benefits from using scenario techniques. 
 
2.2 Optimisation Techniques 
 
A general formulation of a mathematical optimisation problem can be stated as: 
 
f(x)min , (1)
Subject to  . Xx∈ (2)
 
Here, f is an objective function to be minimised, while x is a vector of variables or 
decisions. X is the solution space for the vector x, defined by the problem constraints. 
Various techniques exist to solve optimisation problems defined as in (1) – (2). 
Examples of such techniques are linear/integer programming, dynamic programming 
and specialised network algorithms, see for instance [9]. Combinations of these 
techniques may also be applied to solve optimisation problems. Rule-based search 
techniques may also be a good approach, especially for combinatorial problems where it 
is hard to find the supreme optimum, see for instance [10]. 
 
It is hard to discuss the applicability of optimisation techniques on a general basis, due 
to the variety of these techniques. However, there are (at least) two common 
characteristics for these techniques.  
 
First, one has to make a model of the real problem considered. The optimal solution of a 
model is however not an optimal solution of a problem unless the model is a perfect 
representation of the problem, which it never is [11]. When it comes to modelling the 
real problem, there is often a trade-off between detail level of the model and the ability 
to solve it. One often has to make simplifications to be able to construct models that can 
be solved. 
 
Second, most optimisation techniques do not handle uncertainty and stochastic elements 
in an explicit way. However, in the last decade or so there has been some research effort 
in developing optimisation techniques for stochastic problems, see for instance [12]. 
Still, most practical stochastic problems are really hard to solve by optimisation 
techniques and one may also often question how well the stochastic models succeed in 
reflecting the uncertainty of the real problem. 
 
Despite this, there are numerous examples of successful applications of optimisation 
techniques. In problems where the solution space is large, it may often be a good help to 
let an optimisation routine implemented on a computer search through the solution 
space. The solutions from an optimisation algorithm may also be a valuable support in 
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understanding strategic consequences of various decisions. In a study of determining 
optimal routing policies for supply vessels in the oil industry by Fagerholt and Lindstad 
[13], an optimisation method was applied to evaluate the effect of various decisions. 
Based on this, the Oil Company changed their fleet of supply vessels, and experienced 
annual savings of several million dollars.  
 
2.3 Integrating Scenario and Optimisation Techniques 
 
Realising that scenario and optimisation techniques may complement each other, a 
number of desired benefits might be realised by combining the two. 
 
Optimisation techniques do not handle uncertainty in a satisfactorily way, but “story-
based” scenario techniques describe possible structural changes that may cause the 
future to deviate radically from observable trends. These scenario techniques do not 
give a complete understanding of strategic consequences, but optimisation techniques 
will reveal quantifiable consequences of scenario assumptions. 
 
To the authors’ knowledge, integrating scenario and optimisation techniques is new to 
the literature. However, simulation techniques have successfully been applied in 
scenario planning in order to calculate variables such as revenue, cost, profit and market 
share over a number of business cycles. Computer simulations also allow for 
exploration of how key drivers of change interact over time and their resulting strategic 
implications. For practical suggestions on how to integrate simulation with scenario 
planning see [14]. 
 
3. CASE STUDY 
 
In this chapter, a case study demonstrates how scenario and optimisation techniques 
may be integrated. 
 
3.1 Problem Description 
 
Today, oil companies are operating a number of various offshore installations around 
the world. Crucial for an efficient operation is that regular supplies of various 
commodities (e.g. food, mud, brine, diesel and water) are maintained. Offshore 
installations are normally served from onshore depots by supply vessels. 
 
In this simplified case, we imagine three offshore installations presently being served 
from one onshore depot, as illustrated in Figure 1. The task is to design an optimal 
transport system for serving offshore installations today and in the future. The transport 
system is defined as a set of supply vessels, which is characterised by the number and 
type of vessels. In the future, the structure of installations (number, location and 
demand) depends upon changes in the business environment, which again may 
influence the need for transport demand. We assume for simplicity that there are only 
two vessel sizes and two vessel speeds that can be selected. This gives a total of four 
 162
Appendix B 
 
vessel types: Small/slow, small/fast, large/slow and large/fast. Each vessel type has a 
given time charter cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Onshore depot  
 
 
Figure 1: Onshore depot and offshore installations, today 
Offshore depot, size indicates supply demand  
 
3.2 Development of Scenarios 
 
In order to develop the scenarios, a scenario technique developed by SRI Consulting is 
applied (refer Figure 2). SRI Consulting has used scenario based techniques in a wide 
range of studies of the future since the mid 1960s. 
 
Strategic 
Decisions
Scenario Logics
Scenarios
External Forces
Decision 
Implications
Key Decision 
Factors
Step 1
Step 2 
Step 3 
Step 4 
Step 5 
Step 6 
 
Figure 2: Scenario Technique developed by SRI Consulting [4] 
 
The methodology includes six steps that a multidisciplinary team should perform in a 
series of workshops. In this case study, however, the purpose is merely to demonstrate 
benefits from integrating scenario and optimisation techniques. A full-blown scenario 
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process has therefore not been undertaken. A simplified approach was chosen. The 
authors worked out a set of scenarios in a one-day workshop based on their experience 
from earlier projects in offshore logistics. 
 
In the following, the results from the one-day workshop are presented by following the 
six steps in the scenario technique as presented in Figure 2. 
 
The process starts out by identifying the strategic decisions the scenarios should answer. 
The strategic decision will focus and constrain the subsequent steps in the process. In 
this case, the strategic decisions were stated as: 
 
Design an optimal transport system for serving a set of offshore installations today and 
in the future. The transport system is defined as a set of supply vessels, characterised by 
the number and type of each vessel. 
 
In the second step, a set of key decision factors is identified. Key decision factors are 
the matters that the decision-makers want more information about, because if this 
information were available it would enable them to make better decisions. In order to 
choose an optimal transport system for serving future offshore installations, the authors 
would like to know more about: 
 
• Client structure – number, location and demand of existing and future installations 
 
The third step seeks to identify external forces that influence the value of the key 
decision factors. It may be helpful to structure the thinking around micro forces and 
macro forces. Micro forces may be analysed according to Porter’s five competitive 
forces (competitors, suppliers, buyers, potential entrants, and substitutes) [15]. The 
macro forces may be analysed by the help of the SEPT scheme - in which external 
forces are organised in terms of Social, Economic, Political and Technological factors 
[5].  Normally, 80-100 external forces are identified. 
 
In the fourth step, the forces are analysed in terms of their relative uncertainty and 
impact on the key decision factors. The key uncertainties confronting the strategic 
decision - and the sources of difference among the scenarios - lie in the forces grouped 
in the “high impact/high uncertainty area” [3]. By analysing and clustering “high 
impact/high uncertainty” forces, key drivers of change are identified and a structure for 
the scenarios is developed. For the case study, two key drivers of change were 
established: 
 
1. The Oil Price. A key driver with a high impact on the level of exploration activities.  
2. Technology Development. A key driver influencing the type of new installations to 
be developed (e.g. sub-sea and floating production). 
 
In selecting the key drivers, we were trying to identify drivers with a high level of 
independence, in order to achieve structurally different scenarios. Each key driver was 
assigned two extreme, but plausible, levels of occurrence. In this way, the extreme 
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points of plausible futures could be embraced. Based on the two key drivers a scenario 
logic was established as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The scenario logic 
 
In Table 1, a short summary (step 5) of the scenarios is given together with their 
strategic implications (step 6) for the key decision factors (step 2) and the strategic 
decisions (step 1). 
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Table 1: Four scenarios 
 
Scenario 1 “Deep Water Day” 
(High Oil Price, Revolutionary Technology) 
 
The scenario is characterised by:  
• A stable high oil price 
• Strengthened exploration activities 
• Breakthroughs in deep water technology 
enabling exploitation of deep water oil fields 
 
 
Likely strategic implications are: 
• Development of two major deep water fields 
with high supply demands, located farther 
away from shore than existing fields 
• Continuation of production in existing fields 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 2 “Bottom Line” 
(Low Oil Price, Revolutionary Technology) 
 
The scenario is characterised by:  
• The oil price resides in a low level  
• Reduced exploration activities 
• The low oil price triggers a breakthrough in 
technologies for separation of oil, allowing for 
sub-sea production and processing with direct 
transfer of oil to shore by pipelines 
 
Likely strategic implications are: 
• Close-down of existing fields, due to low oil 
price 
• Only minor needs for supply services in order 
to develop sub-sea installations and 
infrastructure 
 
Scenario 3 “Floating Clients” 
(High Oil Price, Evolutionary Technology) 
 
The scenario is characterised by:  
• A high oil price ensured by strong self 
discipline among OPEC members 
• Strengthened exploration activities 
• Floating production technology improves as 
experience from operation is gained 
 
Likely strategic implications are: 
• Continuation of production in existing fields  
• Oil production in a number of smaller new 
fields by floating production vessels results 
in increased supply demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 4 “Sub-sea King” 
(Low Oil Price, Evolutionary Technology) 
 
The scenario is characterised by:  
• A steady reduction in the oil price 
• Reduced exploration activities 
• Further development of today’s sub-sea 
technology for improving the utilisation of 
existing fields 
 
Likely strategic implications are: 
• No new installations 
• Continuation of production in existing fields 
• Sub-sea production connected to the existing 
infrastructure results in slightly increased 
demand for supply services 
 
Sub-sea 
infrastructure 
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3.3 Designing optimal solutions 
 
An optimisation algorithm is developed to determine the optimal fleet of supply vessels 
for each scenario. However, to determine an optimal fleet, one must also consider the 
coherent routing policy for the fleet, since the routing influences the optimality of the 
fleet and vice versa. The algorithm used to determine the optimal fleet therefore also 
simultaneously calculates the coherent routes for each vessel selected to be in the fleet 
(although the determination of the routes is not an essential task in this matter). The 
routes to be performed by the vessels are repetitive with given time intervals. For 
instance, one may determine routes that are to be repeated with a cycle of one week.  
 
Since a vessel may perform several routes during the cyclic time interval, the underlying 
routing problem can be considered to be a multi-trip Vehicle Routing Problem (VRP). 
The classical single-trip VRP is a hard and well-known combinatorial optimisation 
problem which calls for the determination of the optimal routes for a fleet of vehicles 
with given capacities, based at a depot, serving a set of customers with given demands. 
For details on the VRP, see for instance the survey of Toth and Vigo [16]. For the 
single-trip VRP, it is assumed that each vehicle performs only one trip during the 
planning period, while this is relaxed in the multi-trip VRP. The multi-trip VRP is 
studied in [17] and [18]. 
 
Determining an optimal fleet together with the coherent routes in a multi-trip VRP has 
received little attention. A problem having some similarities to the case studied here is 
given in [19]. However, the solution algorithm developed there requires all vessels to 
have the same service speed. Fagerholt and Lindstad consider a problem similar to the 
one presented here, and their solution algorithm allows the vessels to have various 
speeds [13]. A simplified version of their solution algorithm is used to determine the 
optimal fleet for each scenario and is described in the following. For details of the 
solution algorithm, see [13]. 
 
The proposed optimisation algorithm works in two phases and combines the use of 
dynamic and integer programming. By going through the two-phase algorithm for each 
of the four scenarios, an optimal fleet is suggested for each scenario. Variations of this 
solution approach have frequently been applied in determining optimal routes for a 
given fleet, see for instance [20] and [21].  
 
In phase 1, all feasible routes for each of the four vessel types are generated. This is 
done by systematically working through all possible subsets of offshore installations. 
For each subset, we check if the selected vessel type has enough capacity compared 
with the given demand at the installations in the subset. If so, the optimal roundtrip is 
determined by solving a Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), which may for instance 
be done by dynamic programming. 
 
In the second phase, the vessel types to be used and their coherent routes are determined 
by solving an integer programming model, in which the columns represent the vessel 
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routes generated in phase 1. The integer programming model will be described as 
follows: 
 
Sets 
K  Vessels in the pool, indexed by k. 
N  Offshore installations, indexed by i.  
Rk  Schedules for ship k (generated in phase 1), indexed by r. 
 
 
Parameters 
Tr
k  The duration in hours of schedule r for ship k (calculated in phase 1). 
Air
k  Constant that is equal to 1 if vessel k services installation i on schedule r 
and 0 otherwise (derived in phase 1). 
MAXT  Length of cycle period. 
Si  Minimum number of services for installation i during the period . MAXT
Ck  Cost of using supply vessel k. 
M Large number. 
 
Variables 
δ k  Binary variable that is equal to 1 if vessel k is used in the optimal 
solution and 0 otherwise. 
xr
k  Integer variable indicating the number of times per week ship k sails its 
schedule r. 
 
The integer programming model of phase 2 in the solution algorithm can now be 
formulated: 
 
∑
∈Kk
kkC δmin ,  (3)
A x Sir
k
r
k
r R
i
k K k∈∈
∑∑ ≥ , ∀ ∈i N , (4)
MAX
Rr
k
r
k
r TxT
k
≤∑
∈
, ∀ ∈k K , (5)
x Mr
k
r R
k
k∈
∑ − ≤δ 0 , ∀ ∈k K , (6)
xr
k  integer, ∀ ∈ ∈k K r Rk, , (7)
δ k ∈{ , }0 1 , ∀ ∈k K . (8)
(3) is the objective function and ensures the minimisation of the total cost of using the 
vessels. The main cost component is the TC-cost, which also reflects the capital costs if 
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the vessels are owned. Constraints (4) ensure that each offshore installation is served at 
least the minimum number of times during the cyclic period, which can for instance be 
one week. This requirement may vary between the four scenarios. Constraints (5) ensure 
that the sum of the total time of the schedules for a given vessel does not exceed the 
length of the cyclic period. Then, we determine routes that are repeated every period. 
Coupling constraints (6) ensure that if at least one route is selected, then the 
corresponding binary variable for that vessel must be equal to one. (7) and (8) impose 
integer and binary restrictions on the variables, respectively. 
  
To ensure that several vessels of each type can be selected, one may duplicate the 
columns for each vessel type before solving the integer programming model given by 
(3) - (8). The model can now be solved by commercial integer programming software.  
 
By going through the generation of routes (phase 1) and the solution of the integer 
programming model (phase 2), we can determine an optimal fleet and the vessel routes 
for each of the four scenarios. Since there are significant variations in the demand and 
the locations of the oil and gas installations between the scenarios, the solutions will 
also differ. Table 2 shows what the optimal fleet for the four scenarios can be for the 
simplified case study. 
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Table 2: Model solutions 
Scenario Name Optimal solution 
   
1 Deep Water Day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 large/fast and 1 small/slow vessels 
Scenario 1 involves two new major deep water 
installations. Since sailing times compared to 
service times are higher for the deep water 
installations than for existing installations, it is 
optimal to introduce two high speed vessels 
serving the deep water installations. The small 
slow speed vessel and some surplus capacity 
of the two high speed vessels serve the 
existing installations. 
 
2 Bottom Line 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 small/slow vessel 
Scenario 2 involves a drastic reduction in the 
demand of supply services and the optimal 
solution involves only one small slow speed 
vessel. 
3 Floating Clients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 small/slow and 1 large/slow vessels 
Scenario 3 involves increased demand for 
supply services due to oil production in some 
new smaller fields. The optimal solution 
involves two small slow speed vessels and one 
large slow speed vessel, which together serve 
all fields. 
4 Sub-sea King 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 large/slow and 1 small/slow vessels 
Scenario 4 gives a slight increase in transport 
demand due to increased production in 
existing fields. The optimal solution involves 
one large slow speed vessel and one small 
slow speed vessel, which together serve the 
fields. 
Sub-sea 
infrastructure
 
 
3.4 Discussion of Solutions 
 
Before deciding on an optimal transport system for the future, one should address the 
time horizon of the scenarios and the time required for implementing the optimal 
transport solution.  
 
Generally, scenarios are developed for time horizons ranging from five to twenty years, 
with an emphasis on five to ten years. However, whether a certain change in the 
business environment occurs in three, five or seven years is difficult to say and of less 
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importance. What is important is to understand how the key drivers of change may 
shape the future, what implications may be expected and in what time. In this way a 
common mental framework for the future might be developed. By “rehearsing the 
future”, a company may be able to react to changes faster than its competitors. In the 
case study, a high oil price and major technological breakthroughs in deep-water 
technology may trigger a decision to develop two major deep-water fields. The time 
from the decision to develop the installations until the installations are in operation may 
take several years. However, if developments in offshore technology are of a more 
evolutionary kind, and the oil price rises, increased interest in floating production may 
be expected. Depending on the market for floating production vessels, oil production in 
a number of smaller fields may start in a relatively short time period. 
 
The time required for implementing the optimal transport system may vary from a 
couple of weeks to several years. If the charter market has surplus capacity, a new 
supply vessel may be chartered and made ready for operation in a couple of weeks. 
However, if there are no suitable vessels available, a new vessel may have to be built. A 
new-building process may take up to several years depending on the degree of 
innovation in the design. Scenario and optimisation techniques may also reveal a future 
need for vessels not available in the market today, for example supply vessels with a 
speed exceeding 25 knots. If this is the case, one may prepare for such requirements by 
developing relations to innovative yards and designers. 
 
Based on the discussion above, it is obvious that a monitoring system should be 
established in order to track the migration towards emerging scenario(s). Key drivers of 
change that have been identified in the scenario process point to key indicators for 
monitoring. By monitoring these indicators, one may initiate necessary actions at an 
early stage in order to establish a new optimal transport system meeting new needs. 
 
It is also possible to identify a robust strategy for the transport system. A robust strategy 
may be to own a small slow speed vessel, and charter additional vessels on short-term 
contracts. The reason for owning a small slow speed vessel is that all scenarios require 
such a vessel. By chartering additional vessels on short-term contracts, flexibility for 
adapting to emerging scenarios is gained. 
 
A robust strategy combined with a monitoring system may be the best solution for this 
case study.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper describes the design of future transport systems by combining and 
integrating scenario and optimisation techniques. These two techniques complement 
each other. Optimisation techniques do not handle uncertainty in a satisfactorily way, 
but scenario techniques do. Scenario techniques do not give a sufficient basis for 
strategic decisions, (i.e. quantifiable) but optimisation may contribute in this respect. 
 
The methodology has been illustrated on a simplified case from the oil industry, related 
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to the development of a transport system aiming to maintain the supply services to a set 
of offshore installations today and in the future. By analysing key drivers of change 
(e.g. the oil price and development in offshore technology), four scenarios are 
established, each describing a plausible future. By using optimisation techniques, an 
optimal fleet of supply vessels for each scenario is suggested. The scenario specific 
solutions are discussed according to robust elements and how monitoring of key drivers 
of change may assist in choosing the best solution. 
 
It would be appropriate to perform sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the 
robustness of the optimal solutions. This can be done by running several optimisations 
for each scenario. For each run, we could for instance adjust the demand levels at the oil 
fields. Another way to evaluate the robustness of an optimal solution is to model the 
problem by a simulation tool and run simulations. 
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